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The purpose of this study is to explore the effect of electoral politics on 
macroeconomic and distributive policy in East Asian “developmental states” using 
empirical evidence from South Korea. Based on existing theories of political budget 
cycles (PBCs) and distributive politics, this study examines how democratization affects 
the pattern and degree of political budget cycles and targeted spending. Contrary to the 
bureaucracy dominance thesis in developmental state theory, I argue that authoritarian 
leaders in Korea had incentives to manipulate macroeconomic conditions before elections 
to increase the ruling party’s urban representation. The incentives for PBCs and targeted 
spending under authoritarian rule were, of course, smaller than that under democracy, but 
the constraints on PBCs and targeted spending were also smaller under authoritarian rule.  
I find that PBCs occurred in Korea before and after democratization and that 
democratization did not affect the degree of PBCs in statistical terms. Based on these 
 vi 
findings, I conclude that the increased constraints (checks and balances) offset the 
increased incentives (electoral competition) after democratization. This study also pays 
attention to the institutional variables that shape incumbent’s preference regarding 
tactical allocation: the N=2 Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) system under 
authoritarian rule adopted to increase ruling party’s urban representation; the five-year 
single term presidency under democracy that led the president’s goal to focus on 
preempting early lame-duck status and obtaining a graceful retirement. Based on the 
analysis of the institutional effect on identifying target group, I demonstrate that the main 
target for the incumbents during the authoritarian period was swing voters in urban areas, 
while the main targets for the incumbents during the democratic period were both the 
incumbent’s core support group and opposition backers.  
 
 
 vii 
 
Table of Contents 
 
List of Tables ......................................................................................................... ix 
List of Figures ..........................................................................................................x 
Chapter 1: Apolitical Developmental States?: Theoretical Discussion on Election-
Oriented Economic Policy ..............................................................................1 
I. Introduction ............................................................................................1 
II. Theoretical Discussion ...........................................................................5 
III. Testable Hypotheses ............................................................................45 
IV. Expected Theoretical Contribution ......................................................52 
V. Research Design...................................................................................53 
VI. Organization of Dissertation ................................................................56 
Chapter 2. Contextual Approach to Political Budget Cycles and Target Spending in 
Korea: Incentive and Constraint Structures .................................................58 
I. Electoral Politics: Pre-democratization Period (1972-1987) ...............59 
II. Electoral Politics: Post Democratization Period (1987-PRESENT) ....73 
III. Checks and Balances: Legislative-Executive Relations ......................88 
IV. Concluding remarks: Combining the incentive and the constraint structure
............................................................................................................114 
Chapter 3: The Effect of Democratization on Political Budget Cycles ...............116 
I. Review of Empirical Studies on PBCs in Korea ...............................116 
II. Preliminary Analysis ..........................................................................120 
III. Testable Hypotheses ..........................................................................129 
IV. Statistical Analysis .............................................................................131 
V. Discussion and Conclusion ................................................................151 
 viii 
Chapter 4. The Effect of Democratization on Distributive Politics: Dynamics of 
Targeted Spending ......................................................................................153 
I. Review of Distributive Politics and THE Democratization Effect ....154 
II. Korean Context and Testable Hypotheses .........................................158 
III. Preliminary Evidence of Target Spending .........................................170 
IV. Statistical Analysis .............................................................................174 
V. Discussion and Conclusion ................................................................186 
Chapter 5. Conclusion ..........................................................................................191 
I. Summary of Main Findings ...............................................................192 
II. Implications........................................................................................195 
Appendix ..............................................................................................................202 
I. Appendix to Chapter 2 .......................................................................202 
II. Appendix to Chapter 3 .......................................................................209 
REFERENCE .......................................................................................................216 
 ix 
List of Tables 
Table 1-1. The Ruling DRP’s Perspective regarding the Change of Electoral 
System ....................................................................................................... 48 
Table 1-2. Hypotheses and Theoretical Expectation ........................................ 51 
Table 2-1. SMD’ Effect of Conversion Ratio ................................................... 64 
Table 2-2. National Assembly Seat Ratio (Urban vs Rural area) ..................... 66 
Table 2-3. Numbers of Election Rankings in the Urban and Rural Area during 
Pre-Democratization Period ...................................................................... 68 
Table 2-4. Presidential Candidates’ Vote Shares during the Post-
Democratization Period (%) ..................................................................... 76 
Table 2-5. Seat Shares (%) of Parties in the National Assembly by Region .... 77 
Table 2-6. Number of Ruling Party’s Seats in the National Assembly Elections
................................................................................................................... 78 
Table 2-7. President’s withdrawal from ruling party and Non-Party Governance 
(1987-2008)............................................................................................... 85 
Table 2-8. Executive-Legislative Relations in Law Making ............................ 95 
Table 2-9. Budget Amendment by the National Assembly and Contribution of 
the NABO ............................................................................................... 103 
Table 2-10. International Comparison of Legislative Influence ..................... 108 
Table 3-1. Existing Empirical Studies on PBCs in Korea .............................. 117 
Table 3-2. Revenue and Expenditure around the 9th National Assembly 
Election ................................................................................................... 125 
Table 3-3. Budget Cycles around the 15th National Assembly Election ....... 127 
Table 3-4. Hypothesis and Theoretical Expectation ....................................... 131 
Table 3-5. Election Date in South Korea ........................................................ 133 
Table 3-6. Timing of Election ......................................................................... 143 
Table 3-8. Differences between the Pre- and Post-Election Effect ................ 150 
Table 4-1. Comparative rank order for authoritarian political effectiveness: 
Choice of institutional means.................................................................. 159 
Table 4-2. Theoretical Expectations ............................................................... 170 
Table 4-3. Expenditure per capita in Local Government ................................ 171 
Table 4-4. Summary of Variables during Pre-Democratization Period .......... 179 
Table 4-5. Summary of Variables during Post-Democratization Period ........ 179 
Table 4-6. Political Allocation during Pre-Democratization Period ............... 189 
Table 4-7. Political Allocation during Post-Democratization Period ............. 190 
Table 5-1. Summary of the Key Findings ....................................................... 195 
 x 
List of Figures 
 
Figure 1-1. Development of Political Business Cycle Theory ........................... 8 
Figure 1-2. Regular Business Cycle and Stabilized Business Cycle ................ 13 
Figure 2-1. Presidential Approval Rates in Korea ............................................ 82 
Figure 2-2. Number of Cases of Professional Support from NABO .............. 102 
Figure 2-3. Gross Public Debt in OECD Countries ........................................ 104 
Figure 2-4. Amendment of Budget by the National Assembly ...................... 107 
Figure 2-5. Government Spending and the Level of Income in 2011 ............ 110 
Figure 2-6. Various Elements of Indices for Legislative Budget Institutions 111 
Figure 2-7. Political Budget Cycles and Check and Balance ......................... 113 
Figure 3-1. Business Cycles in Korea ............................................................. 122 
Figure 3-2. Budget Cycles around the 9th National Assembly Election ......... 126 
Figure 3-3. Trend of Revenue and Expenditure in the National Assembly 
Election in 2000 ...................................................................................... 128 
Figure 3-4. Fiscal Impulse and Election Timing ............................................ 138 
Figure 3-5. Rolling Estimation Result ............................................................ 148 
Figure 4-1. Expenditure per capita in Local Governments ............................. 173 
Figure.4-2. Political Support and Electoral Margin ........................................ 177 
Figure 4-3. Intuitive Explanation about the Quadratic Relationship .............. 182 
 1 
Chapter  1: Apolitical Developmental States?: Theoretical Discussion on 
Election-Oriented Economic Policy  
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
 
The purpose of this study is to explore the effect of electoral politics on 
macroeconomic and distributive policy in East Asian “developmental states” using 
empirical evidence from South Korea. Based on existing theories of political budget 
cycles (PBC) and distributive politics, this study examines how democratization affects 
the pattern and degree of political budget cycles and targeted spending.  
Contrary to the bureaucracy dominance thesis in developmental state theory, I 
argue that authoritarian leaders in Korea had incentives to manipulate macro-economic 
conditions before elections to increase the ruling party’s urban representation. The 
incentives for PBCs and targeted spending under authoritarian rule were of course 
smaller than that under democracy, but the constraints on PBCs and targeted spending 
were also smaller under authoritarian rule.  I find that PBCs and targeted spending 
occurred in Korea before and after democratization and that democratization did not 
affect the degree of PBCs in statistical terms. Based on these findings, I conclude that the 
increased constraints (checks and balances) offset the increased incentives (electoral 
competition) after democratization. Furthermore, I demonstrate that the main target for 
the incumbents during the authoritarian period was urban areas, while the main targets for 
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the incumbents during the democratic period were both the incumbent’s core support 
group and opposition backers.  
A common conception is that elections affect the pattern of governments’ 
management of macroeconomic and distributive policy and vice versa. Developmental 
states in East Asia, however, have been regarded as “hard cases” for detecting electoral 
effects on macroeconomic and distributive policy (Kwon 2005), because the role of 
economic bureaucrats has been exclusively highlighted in developmental state theory 
(Johnson 1982; Kim 1987; Chu 1989, Haggard 1990). In other words, it is assumed that 
the bureaucrats in these countries have decided major policies based on the long-term 
development objectives without taking into account short-term political considerations. 
Because developmental states in East Asia have faced terrific challenges regarding 
economic management since the late 1980s, however, some scholars have cast doubt on 
the possibility of a “politicized” developmental state in East Asia (Pempel 1987, Kang 
2002, Kwon 2005).  
Based on existing studies that challenge the apolitical nature of developmental 
states in East Asia, I draw two sets of research questions. First I ask questions regarding 
the political budget cycle:  
1) Can PBC occur without electoral competition, or with a low level of electoral 
competition?  
2) Were the bureaucrats in pre-democratic developmental states autonomous and 
apolitical as the bureaucracy dominance thesis argues?  
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3) Are PBCs in these countries a new phenomenon that came into being only after 
democratization?  
 
The above questions present a theoretical challenge to the conventional wisdom 
that PBCs require electoral competition. If empirical analyses show that electoral 
incentives for an incumbent to manipulate the macro-economy existed during pre-
democratization period in developmental states, this would suggest greater politicization 
in these countries than the bureaucracy dominance thesis holds. If the degree of PBCs 
between pre and post-democratization period has not changed, it suggests that the 
increased constraints (checks and balances) offset the increased incentives (electoral 
competition) for political manipulation of the macro-economy after democratization. 
The second group of research questions I will address here deal with distributive 
politics:  
1) What are the main political goals and strategies of the incumbent in each 
period?  
2) To achieve these goals, which group was the more effective target for 
transferring economic resources?  
3) Do opposition backers, a group that has rarely been examined in studies of 
distributive politics, play any role in regards to targeted spending?  
There has been little effort to investigate how distributive politics may be 
conditional upon different institutional arrangements, the political goals and strategies of 
the incumbent as well as specific country contexts. If we begin to figure in these factors, 
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numerous questions arise to help resolve the deadlock between the “core voter” and 
“swing voter” arguments. When comparing the distributive patterns of the pre-
democratization period with those of the post-democratization period, these country-
specific questions become more important because “political bias in allocating public 
resources is hardly separated from each country’s institutional and cultural backgrounds” 
(Horiuchi and Lee 2008). Without such investigations, it is almost impossible to identify 
the particular political challenges that confront incumbents or presidents. 
This chapter presents the theoretical framework and testable hypotheses regarding 
the electorally motivated economic policy.  First, it outlines some of the main 
propositions of the electoral cycles of a macro-economy, often referred to as political 
business cycles, and election-oriented distributive politics, referred to as targeted 
spending. The second section examines why these general theories regarding electoral 
politics and economic policy have not been applied to East Asian developmental states, 
focusing on the bureaucracy dominance thesis. The third section proposes an alternative 
theoretical framework based on a critical assessment of the above discussion in the 
Korean political context. The testable hypotheses for this dissertation are summarized in 
the fourth section, and the expected theoretical contribution of this study is presented in 
the last section. 
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II. THEORETICAL DISCUSSION  
1. General Theor ies on Election-Oriented Economic Policy 
 
As Tufte (1978) points out, “the single most important fact about politicians is 
that they are elected. The second is that they usually seek reelection.” It is beyond dispute 
that reelection is the most critical concern of incumbents and thus, they try to use 
available resources to enhance their prospects for reelection. Economic policies—both 
fiscal and monetary—are their main tool for achieving this goal. Given that voters’ 
economic welfare is one of the most influential criteria for reelection, as the economic 
voting theory argues (Lewis-Beck and Paldam 2000, Powell and Whitten 1993), 
incumbents seeking reelection have strong incentives to improve their constituents’ 
economic fortunes. Scholars have explored election-oriented economic policy from the 
incumbents’ perspective in terms of their effective resource utilization and raised the 
following questions: 1) when do the incumbents use their resources and 2) who are their 
targets. The political business cycle theory is an attempt to answer the first question, and 
the distributive politics theory responds to the second question.  
 
(1) Electoral Economic Cycles: Political Business (Budget) Cycles  
 
When incumbent politicians face the potential risk of losing power before 
elections, they are tempted to manipulate current macroeconomic conditions as a way to 
signal their competence to otherwise uninformed voters. Building on such premise, a 
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significant amount of research on the Political Business Cycle (henceforth PBC) has been 
conducted since the publication of Nordhaus’s (1975) seminal work on the political 
determinants of macroeconomic policy.  
The main logic of pure PBC theory is simple. According to Nordhaus (1975) and 
Tufte (1978), voters are assumed to have short memories and lack foresight. They weigh 
the recent past more heavily than the distant past when evaluating incumbents on the 
basis of macroeconomic performance. Their preferences are for both low unemployment 
and low inflation, a condition which, according to the Philips curve, is incompatible since 
there is a trade-off between the two. Unemployment and inflation are not end-goals or 
preference, per se, for opportunistic incumbents whose only preference is reelection. 
Therefore, if they can stimulate the macro-economy before elections to signal or feign 
their competence, they are eager to do so. In other words, incumbents have strong 
incentives to manipulate economic condition to improve the likelihood of their re-
election as elections approach. As a result of the incumbents’ electioneering, we can 
observe election-motivated cycles of economic expansion and contraction.  
 
PBC Categor ization: Politician’s Objectives vs. Voting Behaviors 
PBC theory has two branches, one pertaining to politicians’ objective functions 
and the other to the nature of voting behavior as shown in Figure 1-1. Traditional PBC 
theory characterizes politicians as identical and opportunistic, and voters as myopic and 
naïve (Nordhaus 1975; Tufte 1978). The traditional model (the Opportunistic-Myopic 
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model) has been criticized for both characterizations. Hibbs (1977) first attacked the 
notion that politicians are purely opportunistic, arguing that partisan governments reflect 
policy preferences of their supporters and select policies in their favor. According to him, 
right-wing parties assign more value to low inflation at the expense of lower 
unemployment, while left-wing parties assign greater value to low unemployment to the 
detriment of higher inflation. Tufte (1978) also discussed the persistently divergent views 
of the U.S. Democrat and Republican platforms, which reflected their supporters’ 
socioeconomic differences. However, the early Partisan model (Hibbs 1997, Tufte 1978) 
assumed the myopic voting behavior of the Traditional PBC model. 
Other studies have criticized the traditional PBC approach that assumes voters are 
myopic. Within the framework of opportunistic politicians, Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and 
Rogoff (1990) revised the Nordhaus model to incorporate voters’ rational expectations. 
This new model relies on asymmetric information between voters and politicians with 
regard to the competence of the latter. In other words, the model proposes that voters’ 
expectations are conditional on the information made available to them at any given time. 
Alesina (1987) also introduced rational voting to the partisan PBC model.  
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Figure 1-1. Development of Political Business Cycle Theory 
 
Politicians 
Opportunistic Partisan 
Voters 
Myopic 
(Irrational) 
Opportunistic-Myopic 
Model  
- Nordhaus (1975) 
Partisan-Myopic 
Model  
- Hibbs (1977) 
Rational 
Opportunistic-Rational 
Model  
- Rogoff & Sibert 
(1988) 
Partisan-Rational 
Model  
- Alesina (1997) 
 
This dissertation applies the Opportunistic-Rational model developed by Rogoff 
and Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (1990) for two reasons.  First, Partisan models (Hibbs 
1977; Alesina 1987) are not appropriate to explain developmental states in East Asia, 
especially Korea, because the well-defined left-right ideological divide apparent in most 
industrial democracies is not as clear in these countries (Block 2002, Schuknecht 1996). 
As a result, East Asian countries have ideologically-skewed party systems. For example, 
Korea’s progressive Democratic Labor Party, which would be categorized as a left party 
from the perspective of most industrial democracies, emerged in 2002 as the third largest 
party with its first representation in the National Assembly. However, the Democratic 
Labor Party has not had much political influence as its seat share indicates – it only won 
3.3 percent of the seats in the National Assembly in 2002-2006, and 1.7 percent in 2006-
2010. There are relatively few ideological differences between the incumbents and the 
opposition parties in Korea since the pre-democratization period. As will be discussed in 
the next chapter, all the major political parties have a charismatic personal leader with a 
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core regional base and they have not had much ideological legitimacy or substantial 
policy ideas even during the post-democratization period. Thus, we cannot observe 
significant differences in macroeconomic policies based on partisan politics in Korea. 
Second, the main object of this research is to test whether PBCs exist in South 
Korea and to test the effect of democratization, which is closely related to an increase in 
information, on political business cycles. Therefore, voters’ rationality problem, which 
cannot be fully explored by the traditional Nordhaus model is a crucial component of this 
study. Given that democratization has significantly alleviated the imbalance of 
information between voters and incumbents, the “rational model” rather than “myopic 
model” is more appropriate for testing the effect of democratization on the PBC. 
 
Policy Tool for  PBC 
PBC theory has also been divided according to the economic policy instruments 
used by incumbents, namely monetary or fiscal policy. Early models of PBC were based 
on monetary policy as the driving force. Nordhaus (1975) presented “how incumbents 
might use monetary policy to manipulate the well-known inverse relationship between 
inflation and unemployment (i.e., the Philips curve)” (Franzese and Jusko 2006: 475) to 
win votes from myopic voters. Expansionary monetary policy brings about a temporary 
economic boost, followed by a lag, and then an increase in inflation. According to this 
model, voters are naïve in the sense that “they favor incumbents who preside over low 
inflation and high employment/growth without fully appreciating this economic 
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relationship and that they weigh recent outcomes more heavily in their retrospective 
evaluations” (Franzese and Jusko 2006: 476). Criticizing the assumption of opportunistic 
incumbents in Nordhaus’s model, Hibbs argued that left-wing parties systematically 
prefer low unemployment at the expense of higher inflation, while right-wing parties 
have the opposite preference. 
The PBC model based on monetary policy has been criticized conceptually and 
empirically. First, its assumption that the president controls monetary policy is 
inconsistent with Central Bank Independence theory. According to Franzese (2002b), 
Clark (2003) and Way (2000), election cycles are more apparent when central banks are 
relatively dependent. However, “the notion that the president can easily use monetary 
policy as an electoral tool” (Drazen 2001: 3) does not fit with the institutional facts about 
the relationship between the president and the central bank. Drazen also pointed out that 
monetary policy as the driving force for electoral cycles is not a useful description in that 
it assumes politicians control monetary policy. 
Second, empirical support for the monetary based PBC is limited or mixed. 
Alesina, Cohen, and Roubini (1992) found only weak evidence of a political monetary 
cycle in the postwar period. The same conclusion was reinforced in Alesina, Roubini, and 
Cohen’s (1997) study on the period 1949-1994. Faust and Irons (1999) observed that 
Democratic administrations have lower average inflation than Republican administrations 
in the first half of their terms, but inflation has risen under Democrats and fell under 
Republicans. Beck (1987) and Grier (1989) also discovered that there were no cycles in 
monetary instruments for instance reserves or the federal funds rate during an U.S. 
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election year. They found that passive political monetary cycles were caused by fiscal 
instruments. 
An alternative approach is to view fiscal policy as the key driving force of pre-
electoral manipulation in developed countries. Tufte (1978) showed a number of clear 
incidents of pre-electoral opportunistic manipulation of fiscal transfers including both 
social security payments and veterans’ benefits. Keech and Pak (1989) detected an 
electoral cycle for veterans' benefits in the United States during the 1961-1978 periods. 
Similarly, Alesina (1987) showed that there was an electoral cycle in net transfers during 
the 196-1985 period, but the electoral effect disappeared when the sample incorporated 
periods going back to 1949. Alesina, Cohen, and Roubini (1992) as well as Alesina and 
Roubini (1997) also presented evidence of an opportunistic cycle in transfers, although 
they argued that there was no evidence of a fiscal cycle in fiscal policy except for that 
involving transfers. As illustrated in detail later in this chapter, recent research has found 
that fiscal policy is also strong in developing countries. 
A reasonable interpretation for the above empirical results is that fiscal policy, 
including fiscal transfers and public spending increases, is the preferred vehicle for policy 
makers to boost their popularity before elections, given that the policy typically has a 
direct and immediate impact on voters’ welfare (Schuknecht 1996). At the same time, 
compared with monetary policy, fiscal policy can be easily used by incumbents without 
interference from a monetary authority such as the central bank. Models that investigate 
economic manipulation through monetary policy are theoretically limited and empirically 
weak. By contrast, models that focus on fiscal policy manipulation provide a more 
 12 
convincing theoretical and empirical framework (Drazen 2001, Franzese and Jusko 2006, 
Schuknecht 1996, Shi and Svenssen 2002). Thus, Drazen (2001) proposed the “Active-
Fiscal and Passive-Monetary” model for the analysis of both developed and developing 
countries, arguing that the role of monetary policy in a political business cycle is more 
“passive.” Building on recent research, this study focuses on fiscal policy as an electoral 
tool for incumbents.  
 
PBC from the Perspective of Economists 
Stabilization, alongside allocation and distribution, is the main function of fiscal 
policy. Government budgets, especially the use of taxes and expenditures, can cause a 
fluctuation or business cycle in a country’s overall economic activity. As shown in Figure 
1-2, a typical business cycle is comprised of four parts: contraction, expansion, peak and 
trough (blue line). The two most notable problems in the macro-economy are inflation 
and unemployment. The unemployment rate increases during a contraction but decreases 
during an expansion, while inflation tends to move in the opposite direction.   
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Figure 1-2. Regular Business Cycle and Stabilized Business Cycle  
 
 
Most PBC literature employs the term “manipulation” when referring to fiscal 
policy before elections since the kinds of incumbent responses that use fiscal policy 
before elections are against mainstream macro-economic prescriptions. Standard 
Keynesian theory argues that a government should use counter-cyclical policies to lessen 
the impact of the business cycle as shown in the above Figure 1-2 (red line). In other 
words, the government should either increase spending or reduce tax rates during 
recessions in order to stimulate aggregate demand and partially prevent the economy 
from under-employing resources for prolonged periods of time. During expansions, the 
government must do the opposite in order to “cool off” the economy and contain 
inflationary pressures (Hibbs 1977).  
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According to the neoclassical tradition (Barro 1979, Lucas and Stokey 1983), 
spending programs and tax rates should be set based on long-term considerations and 
should not respond to business cycle movements. Thus, fiscal policy should not be used 
for demand management purposes. During expansion when both economic activity and 
tax revenues are high, the budget surplus should improve and debt should be retired, 
while during recessions, both economic activity and resulting deficits should be financed 
by issuing debt. 
Taking into account both the mainstream Keynesian and neoclassicist concerns, 
we reach the conclusion that incumbents’ use of PBC to enhance their prospects for 
reelection likely hurts a country’ macro-economy in the long-run. 
 
PBC from the Perspective of Political Scientists 
Given that reelection is the most critical concern for politicians and political 
business cycles are unavoidable, political scientists should focus on the institutional, 
structural, and strategic context of PBC in their contributions of the analysis. The current 
wave of studies on PBC has shifted to understanding how PBC may be conditioned by 
different institutional arrangements (Alt and Lassen 2006, Brender and Drazen 2005, 
Clark and Hallerberg 2000, Chang 2008, Franzese 2002a, Franzese and Jusko 2006, 
Persson and Tabellini 2003, Shi and Svensson 2003). Specific hypotheses regarding 
context-dependent political economic cycles are proposed in three different trajectories. 
First, politicians’ fiscal policy incentives with respect to electoral rules and electoral 
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accountability are examined (Persson and Tabellini 2003). Persson and Tabellini show 
that wasteful spending is smaller and tax cuts are greater in a single member district 
(SMD) electoral system than in a proportional representation (PR) system. Persson and 
Tabellini explain this with a “career concern” model of policy making by politicians. In 
other words, since politicians in SMD systems are more individually accountable than are 
politicians in PR systems where they are collectively accountable via party lists, the 
former have a tendency to reduce wasteful spending whereas the latter, tend to increase 
wasteful spending reflecting a common pool problem. Advocates of this approach argue 
that electoral rules determine the nature of public spending and contrast broad spending 
programs versus geographically targeted programs (Chang 2008, Lizzeri and Persico 
2001, Persson and Tabellini 2003). Politicians in PR systems have a selective affinity 
with broad spending programs, such as social welfare and national public goods, while 
politicians in SMD systems tend to employ geographically targeted programs, such as 
targeted transfers and local public goods, because the two systems encourage politicians 
to seek different groups of supporters. The politicians’ concern in a PR system is to gain 
support from a larger group in the national electorate via broad spending programs, while 
politicians in SMD systems are more narrowly focused on a smaller electorate group in a 
specific region.  
The final addition to the scholarship is the veto players approach (Chang 2008, 
Franzese 2002, Tsebelis 2002). Since electoral budget cycles imply changes in the 
existing budgetary structure during elections, incumbents are less capable of 
manipulating budgetary cycles in a multiple veto player environment. Following this line 
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of thought, a PR system has more veto players than a SMD system because a PR system 
leads to a multi-party system and a SMD system induces a two-party system, as 
Duverger’s theorem indicates. This means that electoral cycles are less likely to occur in 
a PR system which has a higher number of veto players than in a SMD system with a 
lower number of veto players. This argument contradicts the wasteful spending theorem 
(Persson and Tabellini 2003). Although Chang (2008) does not explicitly draw out the 
contradiction between his reasoning and Persson and Tabellini’s (2003), he tries to 
resolve this contradiction by employing Tsebelis’(2002) categorization of veto players. 
According to Tsebelis, there are two types of veto players: partisan veto players, which 
are the political parties in the ruling coalition; and institutional veto players, which are 
constitutionally formal organs related to policy making. Chang (2008) argues that “the 
incumbent’s potential for changing an existing policy outcome is negatively related to the 
number of veto players and the ideological distances among these players.” Thus, Chang 
argues that, in general, “the budgetary cycles take the form of higher district spending 
under the SMD systems and higher social welfare spending under the PR systems.” He 
adds that the magnitude of budgetary cycles is reduced under a multiple veto player 
structure. He does not explain explicitly, but it can be inferred that if the ideological 
schism among parties in a coalition government is small, then a PR system has weak or 
no social welfare spending cycles. In a similar vein, if incumbents under a SMD have 
multiple veto players in the process of budget policy making, the SMD system has weak 
or no district-specific spending cycles.           
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These models have been widely used to analyze developed democracies, but they 
have rarely been applied to cases of developing or newly-democratized countries because 
most PBC theories assume that PBC requires electoral competition as an incentive 
structure for politicians. Thus, there has been a tendency to exclude developing countries 
in PBC analysis, given that most developing countries have low levels of electoral 
competition. However, there are ample reasons to examine the possibility of PBC in 
developing or pre-democratic countries. Intuitively, if rational incumbent politicians have 
both an incentive and ability to manipulate economic conditions before elections, there 
are no reasons for them not to do so. Empirical analyses also support this intuition. While 
evidence of PBC in OECD countries has been mixed (Alesina et al. 1997; Kiefer 2000), 
some studies on less developed countries have found empirical evidence that is consistent 
with the opportunistic model of PBC theories (Block 2000, 2002; Schuknecht 1996; 
Drazen 2001; Gonzalez 2002, Shi and Svensson 2002). In sum, since most of the PBC 
literature has focused on incentive structures rather than on combining incentive and 
constraints for PBCs, the PBC models in developing countries have not been fully 
explored.    
 
(2) Election-Motivated Distributive Politics: Targeted Spending 
 
From the incumbent’s perspective, distributing transfers toward a specific region 
or group may be more advantageous than macroeconomic policies in bringing about 
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desired political effects. Put simply, particularistic goods are more efficient tools than 
programmatic goods in buying votes.  
Targeted Spending and Electoral Institutions 
Two questions can be raised here. First, what conditions are most favorable for 
targeted spending? Second, for electoral purposes, which groups should be targeted? We 
discussed the first question in the previous section, focusing on the relationship between 
electoral rules and the nature of public spending before elections. A PR system has a 
selective affinity with broad programs, such as social welfare and national public goods, 
while the SMD system leans toward geographically targeted programs, such as targeted 
transfers and local public goods (Chang 2008, Lizzeri and Persico 2001, Persson and 
Tabellini 2003). The above discussion is relevant to PBC theory, but the main logic can 
be applied generally to distributive politics.  
District magnitude or the number of members of the legislature elected per district 
is also important with regard to this question. According to Carey and Shugart (1995), 
district magnitude is negatively associated with targeted spending. If legislators are 
elected under a multi-member system and a closed-list proportional representation 
system, then the president may have difficulties in helping certain regional candidates 
with local selective goods, while if legislators are elected under a single-member plurality 
system, then the president will be able to help his/her supporters’ claim credit for local 
selective goods.  
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Core Suppor ters vs. Swing Voters 
What is important for the purpose of our discussion here, however, is the second 
question – whom to target. The literature regarding this question divides the electorate 
into three groups – core supporters, swing voters, and opposition backers (Cox and 
McCubbins 1986, Horiuchi and Lee 2008). These groups differ in the degree of affinity 
between voters and parties. The literature on electoral effects and distributive patterns in 
resource allocation has produced two varying theoretical propositions. Some scholars 
have suggested that incumbents are better off allocating public expenditures to their core 
support group (Cox and McCubbins 1986), while others argue that targeting swing voters 
is better for the incumbents since this group are more likely than other groups to “swing” 
contingent on targeted material benefits (Dixit and Londreagan 1996). Schady (2000) 
discusses these competing arguments with the following function: 
 
“Define Ri to be the change in the probability that voter i will vote for the 
incumbent as a result of a unit change in net transfers. Ri is therefore a measure 
of the "political productivity" of net transfers to different voters:  
 
Ri=  g(yi, ai)  - (1) 
 
where yi is income, and ai is a time-invariant measure of the "affinity" between 
voter i and the incumbent. This affinity could include voter i's perception of the 
incumbent's character, or the ideological proximity between voter i and the 
incumbent. I assume that the parameter ai ranges from -∞ to∞, which represent 
strong dislike and like for the incumbent, respectively.”  
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The “core supporters” model suggests that the net value of the political elasticity 
of the targeted transfers is greater among core electoral supporters. Ri is largest when 
economic resources are transferred to voters with a positive and large value of ai. That is, 
the likelihood of voting for the incumbent is highest when transfers are made to loyal 
voters. The above explanation suggests two insights. First, this model assumes that 
incumbents are risk-averse since they know the core supporters’ preferences and desires 
quite well, while they do not know the swing voters’ and opposition backers’ preferences 
and desires (Schady 2000). Thus, transferring economic resources to the core voters is a 
safe investment, while transferring them to swing voters or opposition backers is a riskier 
proposition. Second, this model can be inefficient given that the likelihood of betrayal of 
core supporters is relatively low when they are not the beneficiaries of the transfer. In 
sum, the “core supporters” model predicts that incumbents favor their core electoral 
supporter groups. Instead of targeting voters whose affinity is less likely to be close to the 
incumbent, office-seeking politicians always choose to strengthen the electoral base they 
have cultivated over time. 
The “swing voters” model argues that politicians should avoid core supporters 
and instead target swing voters because this is a more efficient strategy. Using Schady’s 
function above, the net value of Ri is largest when transfers are made to swing voters with 
a value of ai close to zero. That is, the net value of political elasticity of targeted transfers 
is greater among swing voters. The basic assumption of this model is that the core 
supporters and opposition backers are less responsive to material benefits. In addition, 
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even though this strategy is somewhat risk-acceptant from the incumbents’ perspective, 
swing voters are ideologically indifferent to the incumbents and more responsive to 
material incentives (Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987; Dixit and Londregan, 1996). 
Proponents of the model contend that the incumbents need not waste precious resources 
on rewarding core supporters who (it is assumed) share the same underlying ideological 
motivation and thus will vote for them anyway. Rather, the amount of transfers a region 
receives from the central government is expected to be positively correlated with a higher 
density of swing voters.  
As the name implies, swing voters are typically defined as voters that swing back 
and forth between parties. Broadly speaking, there are two ways to identify core or swing 
voters in an empirical analysis. One is to use survey data with a scale that measures each 
voter’s comparative assessment of major candidates or parties. In American politics, the 
Democratic standard bearer is located at one end of the scale (-100, for convenience) 
while the core Republican is located at the other side of the scale (+100). By contrast, 
swing voters usually occupy the area at or near zero on the scale. They may like or dislike 
both candidates equally; thus, they have a more even or balanced set of attitudes toward a 
candidate or a party. In this vein, swing voters often overlap with median voters. 
However, a median voter’s group reflects the general pattern of voters’ attitudes towards 
a candidate or a party and thus can be understood as a static concept, whereas a swing 
voters group that swings back and forth on different issues due to ideological indifference 
can be seen as a dynamic concept that describes voters’ behavioral patterns.  
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The second way of identifying core or swing voters is to use aggregate voter 
returns from previous elections (Schady 2002, Dahlberg and Johanson 2002, Hiskey 
2003, Calvo and Murillo 2004, Magaloni 2006, Magaloni, Diaz-Cayeros and Estevez 
2006).  As Selb (2009) points out, “because ex ante information such as forecasts based 
on pre-election polls are usually not available for all the districts of a given electoral 
system, there is virtually no alternative to using ex post measures.” Thus, swing voters 
are usually inferred from the margin of victory, assuming that “tight electoral races would 
signal a greater density of swing voters” (Diaz-Cayeros 2008: 132). Although this 
measure is not perfect,1
Much effort has gone into testing the validity of these two competing models, but 
the empirical evidence has diverged. Some studies including those by Stein and Bickers 
(1994), Shady (2000), Dahlberg and Johansson (2002), Denemark (2000), and Stokes 
(2005) find empirical support for the “swing” hypothesis, while others including 
Ansolabehere and Snyder (2003), Hiskey (2003), and Diaz-Cayeros, Estevez, and 
Magaloni (2008) report evidence that validate the “core” model. These two competing 
models each has a solid logic. Political parties in the “swing” model are motivated by 
short-term considerations to expand their electoral base at election time, while parties in 
the “core” model are motivated by long-term concerns to maintain their electoral 
coalitions with core supporters over time. As a result, parties in the both models face a 
strategic dilemma. When they try to expand their electoral base by attending to groups 
 it is the most widely used approach in empirical analyses.  
                                                 
1 For further discussion on the imperfect proxies, see Stokes (2005), Diaz-Cayeros (2008), Diaz-Cayeros, 
Estevez, and Magaloni (2008).  
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outside the core, parties may risk losing the loyalty of their core supporters. By contrast, 
if they focus on attending to the core, parties may risk losing elections in the short term in 
order to strengthen their electoral base in the long term. Given the zero-sum relationship 
between these two models, the decisions of political parties regarding targeted spending 
depend on the strategy that political leaders set based on their political objectives. An 
interesting finding from this line of research is that there has been little effort to 
investigate how these two competing theories may be conditional upon different 
institutional arrangements and political objectives of the incumbents under certain 
conditions. This will be discussed in detail in a later section of this chapter. 
 
2. Hard Cases for  Election-Motivated Economic Policy: East Asian 
Developmental States 
 
(1) Bureaucratic Dominance Thesis 
 
The developmental state theory has been a dominant approach to explaining the 
remarkable economic success of East Asia’s newly-industrialized countries (NICs). 
Johnson (1982), the pioneer of the concept of developmental state, defines the 
developmental state as a “plan-rational” as opposed to a “market-rational” state in which 
the state’s “orientation is developmental rather than regulatory.” In these countries, 
economic success did not stem from free market policies as the neo-classical economists 
have argued. According to Amsden (1989), Korea is the prototype case of a “guided 
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market economy” in which market rationality has been constrained by the priority of the 
state’s ends. The state has been a key player in this process. The role of the state goes far 
beyond the prescription of neo-classical economists. In addition to providing 
fundamentals and regulating the market for fair competition, the state has performed a 
strategic role in “taming domestic and international forces and harnessing them to 
national economic interest” (Onis 1991).  
A central component of the developmental state model is strategic industrial 
policy. From the perspective of neo-classical economics, the NICs have few comparative 
advantages. The survival strategy that the NICs have adopted is export-oriented 
industrialization. The states choose which industry to develop for the sake of future 
competitiveness in the world market and select who will enter the industry. Using various 
policy instruments, the NICs have established incentives to promote exports and barriers 
to protect targeted industries. In order to realize their goals, they often pick “winners,” 
and they even “make winners.” They often intervene in price setting by deliberately 
distorting prices to induce the private sector to make decisions that serve the 
government’s goals. Policy instruments that these states employ range from credits to 
incentives, import and export controls, control of foreign exchange, subsidies, and so on. 
Based on Johnson’s (1982) analysis, Amsden (1989) and Wade (1990) explored East 
Asian industrial policy and proposed a “governed market” or “guided market” theory that 
characterizes these states’ actions. As the remarkable economic growth in the 
developmental states shows, the state-led industrial policies have yielded positive 
outcomes. As a result of successful industrial policies, the East Asian NICs have been 
 25 
highly competitive in the world markets and have adapted themselves with flexibility to 
exogenous changes in economic environments.  
How can developmental states intervene successfully in industrial policy? 
Scholars have responded to the above question using the concepts of “state capacity” and 
“state autonomy” (Johnson 1982, Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol 1985, Wade 1990, 
Amsden 1989, Haggard 1990, Deyo 1987). Although “state capacity” and “state 
autonomy” have been defined in various ways in different theoretical and empirical 
contexts, they are defined here as follows: “State capacity” is the ability to administer 
programs and extract resources (Skocpol 1985). According to Johnson (1987), state 
capacity depends largely on the policy instruments of a government. “State autonomy” 
simply means that the state can achieve “relative independence or insulation from the 
demanding clamors of special interests (whether class, regional or sectoral) and that it 
both can and does override these interests in the putative national interest” (Leftwich 
1995: 408).  
The relationship between a state’s autonomy and its capacity has been rather 
ambiguously defined. As Crone (1988) notes, sometimes capacity is equated with 
autonomy, and sometimes the terms are explained separately. Regarding this ambiguity, 
it should be noted that “autonomy” in many cases does not mean isolation. As Evans 
(1995) points out, the reality is more like “embedded autonomy.” That is, state 
bureaucracies have become embedded “in a progressively dense web of ties with both 
non-state and other state actors (internal and external) through which the state has been 
able to coordinate the economy and implement developmental objects” (Evans 1992). 
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Going back to the case of developmental states, proponents of this line of thought argue 
that state intervention that has been effective in implementing strategic industrial policy 
has resulted in an unusually high degree of bureaucratic autonomy and public-private 
cooperation. In the Korean case, a competent bureaucracy should cooperate with big 
business corporations or the so-called “chaebol” to encourage the corporations to invest 
in targeted industries to meet the state’s long term goals, using various policy 
instruments. At the same time, an autonomous bureaucracy should favor the long-term 
national interest over individual or collective private interests. Therefore, the 
developmental states’ successful industrialization has been ascribed to the strong and 
competent bureaucratic dominance over the parochial interests of the private sector 
(Johnson 1982, Evans, Rueschemeyer and Skocpol 1985, Wade 1990, Amsden 1989, 
Haggard 1990, Deyo 1987).         
From a comparative perspective, therefore, the coexistence of an unusually high 
degree of bureaucratic autonomy and public-private cooperation in the East Asian 
developmental states is a rare and unique phenomenon. How did the bureaucracy attain 
autonomy? Why does the bureaucracy not seek rent as is very common in other contexts, 
regardless of its close relationship with the private sector such as the chaebol?  
Johnson (1987) proposes an answer to the first question. First, political leaders 
(presidents) are concerned that politicians will politicize policy formation if they become 
involved in the process because politicians will seek popular support to ensure their 
political survival for a short period of time by attempting to manipulate economy. To 
avoid this problem, political leaders depoliticize economic policymaking process by 
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delegating their policymaking power to the hands of economic bureaucrats. Second, 
economic bureaucrats are qualified elites, employed through an extremely meritocratic 
form of recruitment. Furthermore, compared with other politicians, they have more 
expertise in their committed fields. The president or political leaders, then, can monitor 
and check up on the mini-sized economic bureaucracy.  
Johnson’s explanation, however, is somewhat biased towards the president’s point 
of view--that is, Johnson’s president or political leader is too altruistic. Given that the 
president is also a politician, the assumption that all politicians, except the president, are 
opportunistic seems unrealistic.  
The second question is related to the inherent tension between autonomy and 
accountability in a bureaucratic system and how this tension can be alleviated. According 
to the developmental state literature, developmental states have implemented several 
mechanisms to deal with the fact that power granted to bureaucratic elites may be 
misused in the absence of an external monitoring and a check-and-balance system 
(Johnson 1982; 1987, Evans 1989; 1995, Wade 1989, Amsden 1990, Onis 1991). First, 
pilot agencies, such as the Economic Planning Board (EPB) in Korea and the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI) in Japan, constituted by an extremely small 
number of elite bureaucrats were established in adherence to international standards 
(Onis 1991). The small size of the pilot agency helps to consolidate the elite position of 
economic bureaucrats in society, on the one hand, while allowing the president to easily 
exercise control over them (Evans 1995). Second, the implicit political division of labor 
between politicians and bureaucrats alleviates the tension between autonomy and 
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accountability in a bureaucratic system. As Johnson (1982: 20-21) points out, “politicians 
reign while bureaucrats rule.” Thus, an elite bureaucracy “makes most major decisions, 
drafts virtually all legislation, controls the national budget, and is the source of all major 
policy innovations in the system,” while politicians “provide the space for bureaucrats to 
rule by holding off special interest claimants who might deflect the state from its main 
developmental priorities, and … legitimate and ratify the decision taken by bureaucrats.” 
Third, certain elements of civil society restrain the bureaucrats’ power to an extent in 
spite of the inherent weakness of civil society in the East Asian context. Amsden (1990), 
for example, demonstrated the relatively strong influence of hyperactive student 
movements in Korea in checking the abuses of bureaucratic and governmental powers.   
To sum up, bureaucratic dominance theorists conclude that economic bureaucrats 
in the East Asian developmental states have been able to make main decisions based on 
long-term development objectives without taking into account short-term political 
considerations or pressures from politicians as well as the private sector. Therefore, the 
ability of developmental states, especially Korea, to achieve successful industrialization 
has been ascribed to strong and competent bureaucratic dominance over the parochial 
interests of the private sector.  
 
(2) Demise of Developmental States? 
 
As the twentieth century drew to a close, developmental states in East Asia faced 
tremendous challenges regarding economic management. In short, Japan faced a decade-
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long slump, while South Korea suffered from a financial crisis and Taiwan experienced a 
recession. According to various scholars, two factors, by and large, have explained this 
drastic downturn (Moon 1999, Cheng and Krause 1991). First, democratization 
introduced electoral competition in Korea and Taiwan and altered the countries’ 
macroeconomic policy priorities from growth promotion to growth plus redistribution, as 
the previously neglected segments of society began to voice their demands and needs. 
Second, globalization has eroded the ability of governments to strategically intervene in 
the economic domain for the purposes of achieving international competitiveness. The 
weakening of developmental states is related to, but nonetheless separate from, 
democratization and globalization. Although the shocks are critical for understanding the 
decline of the developmental state (Kim 1993), Korea experienced these three 
phenomena—democratization, globalization, and the decline of the developmental 
state— concomitantly from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s.  
Critiques of the developmental state literature, especially those that focus on the 
“bureaucracy dominance” thesis, can be divided into two positions for convenience. The 
first position suggests that bureaucratic dominance in developmental states has been 
undermined, but not entirely eliminated, by external challenges, such as globalization, or 
internal challenges, such as democratization. The second position stipulates that 
bureaucracy dominance is an illusion regardless of challenges. 
 The first position argues that developmental states have declined as a 
consequence of external and internal challenges. In the case of Japan, a growing number 
of scholars acknowledge the decline of the developmental state which had once enjoyed a 
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miraculous economic development. By the 1980s, Pempel (1987) claimed that Japanese 
policy making was far more complex and less coherent than two decades earlier. 
According to him, the hegemonic powers of the bureaucracy decreased while the 
influence of the ruling LDP increased. In a similar vein, Callon (1995) argued that 
MITI’s industrial policy regime collapsed as the Japanese economy transformed from a 
“catch-up” follower to a “caught-up” economic superpower in the period of 1975-1985. 
Simply put, the advantage of the latecomer (Gerschenkron 1962) has expired. As a result, 
the paradigm of coherence and cooperation that had marked the relationship between 
MITI and private companies was replaced by competition and conflict.      
In the case of Korea, democratization and globalization simultaneously eroded the 
developmental state. Electoral politics is said to be a negative side-effect that 
democratization has introduced to macroeconomic policy-making decisions in a 
developmental state (Cheng and Krause 1991, Moon and Kim 1995, Kim and Mo 1999). 
In other words, without the assurance of long-term tenure, politicians in new democracies 
have little incentive to implement a long-term vision of policy-making (Chu 1989, Kim 
and Mo 1999). The autonomous and competent bureaucracy insulated from political 
influence was regarded as a positive characteristic during the previous developmental 
period. By contrast, the risk of losing power that democratization has introduced has 
eroded the autonomy of bureaucrats from political interference. 
As noted above, the first approach falls within the boundaries of Johnson’s 
argument and focuses mainly on the degree of bureaucratic dominance in different policy 
sectors or in different external environments. The second position, by contrast, casts 
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doubt on the existence of bureaucracy dominance itself. However, the most provocative 
challenge to the bureaucracy dominance thesis comes from rational choice approaches. 
Ramseyer and Rosenbluth (1993) directly subvert Johnson’s thesis, arguing that Japanese 
bureaucrats are nothing more than the agents of ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 
politicians. Whereas Callon (1995), Calder (1988) and Pempel (1982) claimed that 
bureaucracy was dominant during Japan’s high-economic growth period but gradually 
lost prominence afterward, according to Ramseyer and Rosenbluth, bureaucracy 
dominance did not exist even before the 1970s.  
Ramseyer and Rosenbluth employ a “principal-agent” model in explaining 
Japanese policy making. According them, political actors are principals while bureaucrats 
are agents. These two actors compete in a political market to maximize their self-interests 
as rational actors. The principal (LDP) delegates power to the agent (bureaucrats) who 
make and carry out policies that adhere to the principal’s aims and strategies. Bureaucrats 
seem to be dominant, taking the initiative in making policy and drafting legislation, 
because they have more knowledge and expertise in their fields. In reality, however, they 
are just allowed to do so by the principal. The principal (LDP) can monitor and control 
their actions, and even punish bureaucrats if they act inconsistently with its interests. 
Sanctions are a vital condition for the principal to ensure that the agent complies with the 
conditions of the contract. The principal has various tools for control. Those include veto 
power over the bureaucrats’ policy proposals and legislation, and control over the 
bureaucrats’ careers through promotions and postings even post-retirement. In this sense, 
 32 
according to Ramseyer and Rosenbluth, Japanese bureaucrats are never dominant. Rather 
they are just the agents of LDP politicians.  
Ramseyer and Rosenbluth’s theoretical explanation is supported by McCubbins 
and Noble’s (1995) empirical study that examines differences in policy making in the 
U.S. and Japan. McCubbins and Noble emphasize the distinction between the 
“abdication” of authority by politicians to bureaucrats and “managed delegation.” 
According to Johnson (1982), bureaucratic dominance is the abdication of authority. 
However, as McCubbins and Noble point out, politicians delegate the authority to 
bureaucrats and they can control, manage, and withdraw authority in any case. Whereas 
politicians reign while bureaucrats rule under Johnson’s bureaucratic dominance thesis, 
politicians reign and rule in terms of the rational choice approach.  
Another challenge to the conventional bureaucracy dominance thesis is Kang’s 
(2002) study. He criticizes the bureaucracy dominance thesis by citing numerous 
corruption cases in Korea where money and political considerations dominated policy 
making. Kang (p.172) argues that “politics drove policy choice even at the height of Park 
Chung Hee’s rule, bureaucrats were not independent of political interference in setting 
policy, and business and political elites wrestled with each other over who would reap the 
rents to be had.” He argues that money politics was more pervasive in Korea than the 
conventional wisdom allows. According to Kang, the reality of corruption and 
politicization of bureaucrats was concealed or was dismissed out of hand because 
economic growth was so spectacular.  
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Kang’s research is regarded as a direct challenge to the conventional bureaucracy 
dominance thesis in that it shows that the politicization of the bureaucracy was 
widespread at the height of the developmental state in Korea. However, Kang also 
observes that democracy boosted the role of money politics after 1987. In other words, 
the bureaucracy was certainly politicized during the pre-democratization period but, 
politicization of the bureaucracy was aggravated by democratization. This argument is 
comparable to the “decline of developmental states” thesis that the bureaucracy was 
neutral and depoliticized during the pre-democratization period but politicized after 
democratization. It is also different from Ramseyer and Rosenbluth (1993) and 
McCubbins and Noble (1995) who criticize Johnson’s bureaucracy dominance thesis 
regardless of the time period. 
 
(3)  No Electoral Politics in Developmental States? 
 
So far in this chapter, I have examined the possibility of the existence of a 
“politicized” developmental state in East Asia against the critics that suggest the 
otherwise. Very few studies, however, have focused on the PBC in East Asian 
developmental states (An 2002, Kwon 2005). As noted earlier, this is because 
conventional wisdom has long given credence to the “bureaucratic dominance” theory in 
explaining the political economy of these countries. Moreover, most of the literature on 
both the developmental state and PBC has treated electoral effects on economic policy as 
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inconsequential because these countries seemed to have relatively low levels of electoral 
competition under authoritarianism. 
However, it should be noted that these countries typically had periodical elections 
even under authoritarian regimes, unlike most authoritarian countries in Latin America. 
In these countries under authoritarianism, elections had been viewed as “the principal 
means of obtaining and exercising political authority” (Levitsky and Way 2002) although 
democratic rules were widely and often violated by authoritarian incumbents in the form 
of electoral fraud, political repression, and manipulating the rules of representation and so 
on (Case 1996, Joseph 1998, Schedler 2002a, Schedler 2002b). In recent studies, these 
types of political regimes are referred to and classified as “electoral authoritarianism” or 
“competitive authoritarianism.” Although these regimes have low levels of electoral 
competition, the incumbents have regularly tried to “distort and control the electoral 
process in order to minimize the risk of defeat” (Schedler 2002a). Given that 
authoritarian governments in the East Asian countries did have elections and were under 
pressure to perform economically (Yap 2005), we can speculate that the authoritarian 
incumbents had greater incentives for PBC than conventional theories hold. Furthermore, 
since the characteristics of developmental states have changed due to the spread of 
democratization and globalization, there are reasons to reexamine the effects of electoral 
politics on economic policy before and after the democratization era. 
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3. Alternative Theoretical Explanation to General Theory on Election-Oriented 
Economic Policy 
 
This section outlines alternative approaches to a general theory of election-
oriented economic policy. Based on the theoretical discussion presented in the previous 
section of this chapter, I propose alternative approaches to Political Budget Cycles and 
Distributive Politics in relation to the democratization effect on the election-oriented 
economic policy and its subsequent institutional changes.   
 
(1) Alternative Approach to Political Budget Cycles 
 
Before proposing an alternative approach to the application of PBC theory to 
developmental states in East Asia, I will first identify the key questions at hand: 
 
- Can PBC occur without electoral competition or with a low level of 
electoral competition?  
- As the bureaucracy dominance thesis argues, were bureaucrats in pre-
democratic developmental states actually autonomous and apolitical?  
- Are the PBCs in these countries a new phenomenon that came into being 
only after democratization?  
 
As I discussed in Section 1, applications of PBC models have focused mostly on 
developed democracies rather than on developing countries or newly democratized 
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countries. This is because most PBC theories assume that PBC requires sufficient 
electoral competition to create the appropriate incentive structure for politicians. 
Moreover, mainstream PBC theories implicitly assume an executive has full discretion 
over a nation’s fiscal policy, neglecting the impact of check-and-balance mechanisms, 
such as that practiced by the legislature in the budget process. The check-and-balance 
role can also be played by civil society which may monitor the budget through the media 
during an election campaign. Recent studies have begun to challenge the above 
assumptions. While empirical evidence of PBC in OECD countries has been mixed 
(Alesina et al. 1997, Kiefer 2000), studies on less developed countries, which have a low 
level of electoral competition, have found empirical evidence that is consistent with the 
opportunistic model of PBC theories (Shi and Svensson 2002, Block 2000). 
The above findings cast doubt on the existing theoretical framework which has 
focused exclusively on the incentive structure for PBCs. Alternatively, we can derive a 
PBC function as Pi=f (Ii, Ci), where Pi is the individual politician’s action for PBCs; Ii is 
the incentive for PBCs; and Ci indicating the constraint in maneuvering PBCs (checks 
and balances). If Ii >  Ci, we can expect that incumbents will try to manipulate economic 
conditions. Otherwise, the likelihood of PBC will decrease. Simply put, the magnitude of 
difference between incentives and constraints will determine the likelihood of PBC.  
This framework will allow us to detect the existence of PBCs in developing 
countries or newly democratized countries that have low levels of electoral competition. 
Following this framework, we expect that PBC can occur in a political environment with 
a low level of electoral competition under non-democracy only if incentives for PBC are 
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greater than constraints. Indeed, the incentives for PBC under non-democracy are smaller 
than under democracy, but the constraints on PBC under non-democracy are also smaller 
than under democracy. The main constraint on PBC is a strong legislature. Excercising 
fiscal control through budget review and overseeing executive activities and law-making, 
are the most important responsibilities of the legislature. However, the legislature’s 
power to exert fiscal control under authoritarian rule is generally very restricted, and as a 
result, they are often labeled “rubber stamp” Legislatures. As will be discussed in 
Chapter 2, authoritarian leaders in Korea tried every possible means to diminish the 
power of the legislature including its power to conduct budget reviews. Authoritarian 
leaders in some Latin American countries such as Argentina and Chile even abolished the 
legislature. In addition to the legislative body, free press and civil society associations 
that monitor the activities of administrative organs and the council also constrain the 
political manipulation of economy. Free press in particular alleviates the asymmetric 
information between voters and politicians and therefore can play a significant role. 
With this model, we can test whether there have been PBCs in the case of 
developmental states in the East Asian countries which have been regarded as “hard” 
cases for detecting PBC. This study predicts that PBCs existed under authoritarian rule 
and that democratization did not have a significant impact on PBCs because the increased 
constraints (checks and balances) offset the increased incentives (electoral competition) 
after democratization.  
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(2)  Identification of Target Groups 
 
As we have seen in Section 1, the “swing voters” model and the “core supporters” 
model used to explain an incumbent’s target spending both have a solid logic behind 
them. Furthermore, scholars have tested and found empirical data that validate both 
competing models. In order to break this deadlock, we need to evaluate how these two 
competing theories may be dependent on the different institutional arrangements and 
political objectives an incumbent faces.  
One of this dissertation’s main goals is to analyze and compare patterns of 
targeted spending between authoritarianism and democracy using South Korea as a case-
study. Therefore, the objectives of an incumbent in control of an authoritarian regime 
who allows regular elections must be understood before delving into the targeted 
spending analysis. According to recent studies, elections under authoritarian regimes 
have various objectives (Joseph 1999, Bratton and van de Walle 1997, Gandhi and 
Przeworski 2006, Magaloni 2006). Elections in an autocratic regime function as a means 
to regularize the share of power among ruling party politicians. In addition, elections 
disseminate public information about the regime’s dominance so as to discourage 
defections from and challenges to the ruling party. By holding regular elections that 
guarantee a landslide win for the ruling party every time, the ruling party generates a 
public image of invincibility. In turn, the elections provide information to the regime 
about supporters and opponents. Thus, for a hegemonic-party regime, an election is used 
for gathering information about the extent of citizens’ support and its geographical 
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distribution. Lastly, elections serve the pragmatic goal of trapping the opposition within 
the existing system so that it will not resort to a violent means of protest. By selectively 
co-opting its opponents through elections, an autocracy prevents its opponents from 
forming a unified front and rebelling against the regime.  
Drawing from previous research, we can speculate that an autocratic regime 
would employ varying election strategies depending on the regime’s objectives. In an 
autocratic regime, elections are often tampered with through the manipulation of electoral 
rules, gerrymandering, and electoral fraud, and therefore, the regime rarely loses power in 
elections. There are many reasons an autocratic regime holds elections, but there are 
mainly two advantages it could gain from election results. If the purpose of the 
authoritarian regime to hold an election is to intimidate the opposition by showing its 
superiority through a landslide victory, the regime would discriminate against the 
opposition in allocating material expenditures. This could weaken and eventually 
eliminate the opposition. Counter-intuitively, however, this could also motivate the 
opposition to unify and consolidate. If, on the other hand, the purpose is to coopt the 
opposition, the regime would concentrate material expenditures on swing voters and 
opposition backers. 
In addition, the degree of core supporters’ loyalty also influences an autocratic 
regime’s targeted spending decisions. Early studies on targeted spending assumed that 
partisan loyalty is exogenous to the decision to channel resources to core supporters. 
According to Cox and McCubbins (1986: 380), “core support groups will be totally 
unresponsive to material benefit.” However, as Cox and McCubbins (1986: 382) 
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acknowledge, “it seems irrational in the long-run for any group to be totally unresponsive 
to redistributions of welfare.” According to a study that analyzed redistributive politics in 
Mexico between 1970-1988, “poor voters in vast areas of the developing world not only 
respond more to transfers than to ideology, but their partisan loyalties are significantly 
more responsive to these transfers than to symbolic appeals” (Diaz-Cayeros, Estevez, and 
Magaloni 2008: p.7). Under conditions of “high electoral volatility or where a party’s 
base of support is likely to fade away unless the party delivers benefits to keep them 
loyal,” (p.42) the ruling PRI delivered more transfers to their core support groups. 
Core supporter’s loyalty in Korea during the autocratic era was stronger than in 
Mexico. As we will see in Chapter 2, the yeochon-yado phenomenon (support for the 
ruling party in rural areas and for the opposition in urban areas) during this period was 
almost unbreakable. The ruling Democratic Republican Party (DRP), witnessing the rapid 
urbanization of the country, recognized that it was necessary for its political future to 
build up support in urban areas. The authoritarian presidents Park Chung Hee and Chun 
Doo Hwan feared mass protests in the cities such as Seoul and Busan, and wanted more 
support from urban voters in coopting the opposition within the existing system. 
Moreover, the presidents associated the cities with modernity and thus felt that winning 
urban support was crucial to their legitimacy. Under such political circumstances, the 
N=2 Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) system was adopted so that the ruling party 
could win the second seat in urban areas. As a result, the authoritarian regime in Korea 
thought it necessary to concentrate its distributive transfers on urban areas. The regime 
calculated that even if the core support from rural areas might be weakened due to the 
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greater expenditures allocated to urban areas, the N=2 SNTV system would buffer the 
negative short-term electoral effects. Box 1-1 summarizes main arguments of this study 
about targeted spending under authoritarian rule. 
 
Box 1-1. Summary of Main Arguments about Targeted Spending under Authoritarian 
Rule 
 
 
1. Presidents were mostly concerned about National Assembly elections in allocating 
transfers because presidential elections under authoritarian rule were just political rituals 
with no competition. 
 
2. The political goal of presidents was to increase urban representation due to electoral 
pressures stemming from increasing urbanization, escalating mass protests in urban 
areas, and the authoritarian leaders’ obsession with modernity.  
 
3. Urban areas under SMD before the adoption of N=2 SNTV were low support areas 
(Region L), for the ruling DRP, with a wide electoral margin between the 1st place 
winner (opposition) and the 2nd place finisher (DRP) in urban areas.  DRP candidates 
had a very low possibility of being elected under SMD.    
 
4. To win more seats in in urban areas, Park Chung Hee adopted the N=2 SNTV electoral 
system. Under this system, the DRP had a very strong likelihood of winning the 2nd seat 
in each district.  
 
5. The new system (N=2 SNTV) transformed the rival’s turf (Region L, urban areas) into 
a swing voters region with narrow electoral margins. There was often only a small vote 
margin between the ruling party and independent candidates in the competition for the 
seat awarded to the second place finisher. 
 
6. Under the N=2 SNTV, rural areas remained strongholds (Region H) of the ruling party 
which typically carried them by wide electoral margins. This wide electoral margin 
meant that the ruling party would gain little from concentrating resources in rural areas 
since they were likely to finish in first place regardless. 
 
7. As a result, both the electoral margin and political support for the ruling party should 
be negatively correlated with total transfers. 
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The political interests and objectives of an incumbent president have changed 
significantly after the democratization. Even though the president is still the predominant 
actor in distributive politics, the five-year single term presidency introduced with the 
democratization greatly influences the president’s identification of target groups for 
allocation of transfers. The incumbent president and the ruling party’s candidate in the 
next presidential elections both want to channel resources to core supporters but for 
different reasons. The incumbent president will adopt a risk-averse “core supporters” 
strategy to protect himself/herself during the latter part of term and after retirement. By 
contrast, the ruling party’s and the ruling party candidate’s short-term goal is to unify the 
core supporters in order to win the next election. The simple majority rule in presidential 
elections in Korea motivated the ruling party and its presidential candidate to focus on 
unifying their core support group. While wide electoral margin the ruling party reached 
up in its stronghold,  did not increase its seats under the N=2 SNTV, it did help ensure 
its victory in simple majority presidential elections. As the elections since 
democratization results indicate, it has been nearly impossible for the presidential 
candidate to win without concentrated support from the core group. (See Table 2-4.) As a 
result, targeted spending for the core support groups has been the first priority of 
presidents and ruling parties since democratization.  
Intuitively speaking, however, a president who has a single-term limit or who has 
already served his/her second term is less concerned with winning another election than 
an incumbent or the ruling party’s candidate. This may lead to a divergence in targeted 
spending strategy between the president and the ruling party. A president whose political 
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priority is set on securing graceful retirement and preventing early lame-duck status may 
invest in the opposition for insurance in order to forestall potential political retaliation 
once he or she steps down. During his/her term, fierce resistance from opposition backers 
may hinder the smooth operation of the government. Because of strong regional rivalries 
in Korea, presidents often adopt a campaign strategy that focus on using regional rivalries 
to unify the core supporters group and gain electoral advantages. Such a strategy, 
however, causes problems by also motivating opposition backers group to unify and 
hinder the smooth operation of the government after the elections. This means that the 
president had an ample reason to consider the opposition backers for targeted spending to 
ensure smooth presidency and/or graceful retirement. This strategy is not a rational 
choice in the short-term from the perspective of the ruling party or the ruling party’s 
candidate because those allocations of resources rarely transform into political support in 
the next election.  Moreover, it sometimes led to a conflict between the president and 
the ruling party’s candidate, but the president has always had predominance in budget 
allocation, so his/her preferred spending strategy has prevailed. Box 1-2 summarizes 
main arguments of this study about targeted spending under democracy. 
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Box 1-2. Summary of Main Arguments about Targeted Spending under Democracy 
 
1. Presidential elections are more important than legislative elections in analyzing 
targeted spending after democratization because presidential elections under democracy 
are competitive and the president is the dominant actor in budget allocation. (Empirical 
analysis in Chapter 4 indicates that having a National Assembly member from the ruling 
party has on impact on the distribution of transfers.)   
 
2. Because presidents in South Korea are limited to a single five-year term, the president 
has three main goals: 1) Retaining influence throughout his/her term in order to preempt 
early lame-duck status; 2) Obtaining a graceful retirement that prevents political 
retaliation after s/he leaves office; and 3) Ensuring the smooth operation of government 
by obtaining cooperation from rivals during his/her term.  
 
3.President’s first target for spending are his/her core supporters who are crucial to 
ensuring that the president continues to have influence throughout his term and who can 
defend him from any potential political problems after retirement. Regarding core 
support group, the incumbent president and the ruling party’s candidate in the next 
political elections share the same political goal. 
 
4. The president’s second most important target are opposition backers. The president 
targets them in order to try to get them to cooperate during his/her term and to persuade 
them not to seek political retribution after his/her retirement. This strategy, however, is 
not a rational choice in the short-term from the perspective of the ruling party or the 
ruling party’s candidate in the next elections because those allocations of resources rarely 
transform into political support in the next election.  
 
5. As a result, the relationship between the political support of ruling party and total 
transfers would be a U-shaped curve. In this case, the coefficient of the squared term of 
the ruling party’s vote share should be positive (beta2 >0). Beta1 should be negative 
because core voters would get more resources rather than opposition backers in this case 
 
The existing “swing voters” and “core supporters” models, as shown above, do 
not fully address this conflict in political objectives. This dissertation thus adopts an 
approach that would demonstrate that target identification may vary according to 
changing institutional arrangements and incumbent’s political objectives in each period 
investigated here. 
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III. TESTABLE HYPOTHESES 
 
1.  PBC in Developmental States Hypothesis 
 
PBCs occurred in developmental states.  
 
The bureaucracy dominance thesis as applied to developmental state theory 
maintains that there were few, if any, PBCs—short-term manipulations of economic 
policies for political gains—in developmental states because macroeconomic 
management by autonomous and competent bureaucrats was implemented on the basis of 
purely long-term goals.  However, as Pempel (1999) suggests, the assumption about 
apolitical bureaucrats in developmental states needs to be tested empirically. In addition, 
a recent empirical study shows that governments in less-democratic NICs are more 
sensitive to their economic performance than what existing theories suggest (Yap, 2005). 
Although these states are considered to be authoritarian, even an authoritarian regime 
may not be able to avoid bargaining with its citizens when economic conditions are weak 
or less-than-optimal. Citizens may also act rationally and strategically choose to 
withdraw resources including labor or production investment during periods of economic 
hardship. Considering these factors and observations, we have theoretical reasons to 
suspect that manipulation of the economy before elections may occur even in a 
developmental state. In sum, to avoid impressionistic assertions about autonomous 
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bureaucrats and pure long-term vision of policy-making in developmental states, I will 
test the above hypothesis.  
 
2. Democratization’s Effect on PBC Hypothesis 
 
The degree of PBCs in Korea did not change after democratization because the 
increased constraints offset the increased incentives for manipulation.  
 
“The demise of developmental states” thesis has focused on the challenges 
developmental states have faced in changed internal and external environments (Weiss 
and Hobson 1995, Cheng and Krause 1991, Moon and Kim 1995). This approach 
suggests that democratization eroded the institutional characteristics of developmental 
states, which implies that after democratization political and economic institutional 
configurations became much more susceptible to PBC.  
While this line of thought contends that PBC emerged as a result of 
democratization and especially because of increased electoral competition, my research 
challenges the conventional assumption that PBC requires electoral competition as the 
necessary condition for expansionary policies during election periods. It suggests that 
PBC hinges not on just incentives (electoral competition) but also on constraints (checks 
and balances). The constraints of PBC include the check-and-balance activities of a 
viable opposition party, an independent central bank, free press, and civil associations, 
etc. Within this framework, we can revise PBCs’ function as Pi=f (Ii, Ci), where Pi is an 
individual politician’s action for PBCs; Ii, incentive for PBCs; and Ci, constraint in 
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maneuvering the PBCs (checks-and-balances). If Ii >  Ci, we can expect that incumbents 
will try to manipulate economic conditions. Otherwise, the likelihood of PBC will 
decrease. Simply put, the magnitude of difference between incentives and constraints will 
determine the likelihood of PBC occurrence. This research predicts that the increased 
constraints (checks and balances) offset the increased incentives (electoral competition) 
for PBC after democratization. In conclusion, I propose that democratization might have 
not changed the degree of PBCs in spite of widespread concerns about the negative 
consequences of democratization on economic policy. I will test the above hypothesis by 
examining whether democratization has affected the prevalence of PBCs in Korea. 
 
3. Inversely Proportional Relationship Hypothesis 
 
The swing voters group in urban areas with low incumbent party support and 
narrow electoral margin under the N=2SNTV received more benefits during the pre-
democratization period. The relationship between government transfers and electoral 
margin/ incumbent party support has an inversely proportional relationship 
 
 
The swing voter groups are equated with margin of victory in a recent election 
based on the existing measure for identifying swing voter group (Dahlberg and Johanson 
2002, Diaz-Cayeros, Estevez, and Magaloni 2008). While swing voter group under the 
SMD system conventionally coincides with the medium support group (Region M) with a 
narrower electoral margin, Region M is not always aligned with the swing voter group. 
From the perspective of the ruling DRP, urban areas under the SMD were low support 
areas (Region L),  with wider electoral margin measured by the difference of vote share 
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between 1st place winner (opposition) and 2nd place finisher (DRP). DRP candidates had 
very low possibility to be elected under the SMD.  To win the second place in 
opposition strongholds in urban areas, Park Chung Hee adopted the N=2 SNTV. The new 
system (N=2 SNTV) transformed his rival’s turf (Region L, urban areas) with wider 
electoral margin into swing voters group with narrower electoral margin (but still Region 
L). As a result, the DRP candidate had medium or high possibility to be elected as the 
2nd place winner under the N=2 SNTV. Table 1-1 summarizes the ruling party’s 
perspective regarding the change of electoral system.  
 
Table 1-1. The Ruling DRP’s Perspective regarding the Change of Electoral System 
 SMD  
(~1971) 
N=2 SNTV  
(1973~87) 
Rural Area Urban Area Rural Area Urban Area 
Support for  
Ruling Party 
High 
(Region H) 
Low 
(Region L) 
High 
(Region H) 
Low 
(Region L) 
Competitiveness Low Low 
High 
(Competition for 
2nd seat  among 
oppositions and 
independents) 
High 
(Competition for 
2nd seat among 
ruling party, the 3rd 
party and 
independents) 
Electoral Margin 
 
Wide 
(1st - 2nd) 
Wide 
(2nd – 1st) 
Wide 
(1st – 3rd) 
Narrow 
(2nd – 3rd) 
Possibility to Win 
 
High 
(1st seat) 
Low 
(1st seat) 
High 
(1st, at least 2nd 
seat) 
Medium 
(2nd seat) 
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If the Lindbeck-Weibull and Dixit-Londregan prediction is correct, the total 
transfers tended to be delivered to swing provinces. However, my analysis suggests a 
diverging result in that the swing provinces that received more benefits from the central 
government was Region L with the least support rather than Region M with evenly 
divided political support to incumbent. We can speculate that the DRP, which seeks to 
increase urban representation, will most likely provide greater economic support to the 
urban districts to maximize the likelihood of winning the second seat under the N=2 
SNTV system.  
 
4. U-Shaped Curve Hypothesis 
 
Both the incumbent’s own turf and the rival’s turf have received a larger benefit 
package under SMD during the post-democratization period. As a result, the relationship 
between government transfers and incumbent party support has resembled a U-shaped 
curve.  
 
The incumbent president in democratic Korea has two objectives when designing 
distributive policies. First, the president seeks to strengthen core supporters’ loyalty as 
noted by Cox and McCubbins (1986). Therefore, an incumbent president’s priority is to 
allocate a larger amount of resources to his own region to prevent his successor in the 
ruling party from discrediting the incumbent in the next administration. To ensure a 
graceful retirement and prevent early lame-duck status, the president may therefore 
devise a risk-averse strategy targeting the high support group (Region H). Another 
objective of the incumbent president, however, is to pacify the opposition in a rival 
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region to ensure a smooth presidency. Given the strong presence of political regionalism, 
the incumbent has a strong incentive to distribute relatively more resources to the rival 
party's region – Region L – to achieve “blame avoidance” (Balla, Lawrence, Maltzman, 
and Sigelman 2002). This strategy is not a rational choice in the short-term from the 
perspective of the ruling party or the ruling party candidate because those allocations of 
resources rarely transform into political support in the next election. However, it might be 
impossible for an incumbent president to ensure an uninterrupted and smooth 
administrative operation of his government without material benefits being allocated to 
the rival party's region.  
Table 1-2 summarizes main hypotheses and theoretical expectation.  
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Table 1-2. Hypotheses and Theoretical Expectation 
Hypotheses Variable My Expected Effect 
Existing 
Explanations 
 
1. PBC Fiscal expansion 
+ 
(pre- and post-
democratization 
period) 
n/a 
 
+ 
Bureaucracy Dominance Thesis 
 
Kwon (post-democratization) 
2. Democratization 
effect on PBC Democratization +  + 
n/a  + 
 
 
 
?  + 
“Demise of Developmental States” 
Thesis 
 
 
Kwon 
3. Distributive 
pattern under 
SNTV 
(Non-
Democracy) 
 
 
Electoral support 
 
Inversely 
proportional 
relationship 
 
 
n/a 
Revised Dixit-Landreagan, Kwon 
(Swing voters) 
4. Distributive 
pattern under 
SMD 
(Democracy) 
 
 
Electoral support 
 
 
U-shaped  
curve 
 
 
U-shaped 
curve 
 
 
Horiuchi and Lee 
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IV. EXPECTED THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTION  
 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 pose a theoretical challenge to the conventional wisdom that PBC 
requires electoral competition as the necessary condition for expansionary policies during 
election periods. As discussed in the Testable Hypotheses section, my research suggests that 
the PBC hinges not only on incentives (electoral competition) but also on constraints (check-
and-balance). Given that the difference between incentives and constraints determines the 
likelihood of PBC, we can postulate that the increased constraints after democratization have 
counterbalanced the increased incentives for PBCs in Third Wave Democracies. This tradeoff 
in incentives and constraints may help solve the apparent contradiction between the mixed 
empirical results in analyses of developed democracies and the consistent results in analyses 
of developing or non-democratic countries.  
Second, regarding hypothesis 2, the evidence of this research suggests that the degree 
of manipulation during the pre-democratization period might have been at least as great as the 
degree of manipulation during the post-democratization period. Macroeconomic policies 
under a democratizing government are not likely to be as inconsistent and inflationary as 
some of the democratization literature suggests. The likely explanation is that any increase in 
incentives for manipulation after democratization may be offset by increased constraints.  
Third, hypotheses 1, 2, 3 and 4 imply that electoral incentives for incumbents to 
manipulate the economy existed during the pre-democratization period in developmental 
states. That is, greater politicization occurred in developmental states than the bureaucracy 
dominance thesis suggests. Although my findings may not directly disconfirm the 
53 
 
developmental states thesis, this study provides a “revisionist” view of bureaucracy 
dominance thesis. 
Fourth, hypotheses 3 and 4 suggest that taking into account the incumbents’ political 
goals in a given situation and the institutional configuration they face would help bridge the 
gap between “core supporter” theory and “swing voters” theory. 
Finally, regarding hypothesis 3, resource allocations that were focused on the urban 
areas facilitated the “crisis of success” in developmental states. Even though developmental 
states deserve credit for the rapid economic growth that fueled urbanization, city dwellers, the 
main beneficiaries of rapid economic growth, became increasingly critical of authoritarian 
rule over time. As a result, they started to side with the opposition parties (Kim 2000). The 
developmental state, ironically, lost electoral support from the urban population in spite of 
disproportionate and active material support poured into the area by the government. This 
was the “crisis of success.”  
 
V. RESEARCH DESIGN  
 
I have chosen South Korea for an in-depth case study for several reasons. First, Korea 
presents a hard case for detecting political manipulation of the macro-economy (Kwon 2005). 
South Korea provides a useful environment to test the developmental states presumption that 
“politicians merely reign, whereas the bureaucrats actually rule” (Johnson 1982), and to see 
whether the bureaucracy in these countries has been contaminated by politicians’ strategic 
use of policy tools. Second, South Korea possesses the necessary conditions for PBCs: 
presidential systems and fixed timing for elections. Some empirical analyses suggest that 
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governments in parliamentary system such as Japan opportunistically manipulate the timing 
of elections rather than the economy (Ito 1990). Therefore, the fixed timing of elections under 
South Korean presidential systems allows us to avoid the complicated question of whether 
elections cause PBCs or whether economic expansions trigger elections. Also, South Korea 
has experienced relatively manageable and stable economic conditions. Whereas economic 
instability in Latin America has constrained the macroeconomic policy options of incumbents 
(Remmer 1993), South Korea, by contrast, has had favorable conditions for examining what 
kinds of macroeconomic policy options incumbents chose to adopt for the purpose of 
reelection. Third, South Korea was part of the third wave of democratization. Its democratic 
opening and subsequent consolidation have produced new incentive and constraint structures 
for PBCs. Thus, I expect that South Korea can provide a useful case study for analyzing the 
effect of democratization on PBCs.  
South Korea also provides a suitable case to study targeted spending. First, the 
country’s pattern of bloc voting based on strong regionalism makes it easier to identify which 
group should be targeted from the perspective of incumbents. Given the general limitations of 
information about voters’ behavior, incumbents in Korea have a “fairly high level of certainty 
about voters’ behavior in his own or his rival’s region” (Horiuchi and Lee 2008: p.868) 
without a survey of the potential electorate. Second, the N=2 Single Non-Transferable Vote 
(SNTV) system introduced during the pre-democratization period and the Single Member 
District (SMD) system introduced during the post-democratization period in Korea enable me 
to study the effect of institutional changes on targeted spending. There has been little effort to 
investigate how targeted spending may be conditional upon different institutional 
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arrangements. The varying electoral institutions in Korea provide a good opportunity to do 
so.  
To explore how democratization changes incumbent politician’s preferences on 
manipulating macroeconomic policy and targeted spending, this study compares the specific 
institutional and political conditions Korean presidents faced during the pre-and post-
democratization period. It examines how PBCs and targeted spending worked as an effective 
political strategy in each period.  
I employ several sets of statistical tests to obtain empirical evidence from South 
Korea. The purpose of the first test is to see whether PBCs occurred in a developmental state. 
The second test examines whether there has been a significant difference in pre-electoral 
economic manipulation during the non-democratic and the democratic period. In this test, the 
dichotomous democracy variable becomes the main independent variable. To see whether we 
observe time-varying effects, I use: 1) a dataset divided into two periods; 2) an interaction 
term that measures the timing of elections and democracy; 3) a Chow-type Wald test; and 4) 
a moving regression analysis. To take into account the problem of serial correlation of error 
terms, I employ the ARIMA (Auto-Regressive Integrated Moving Average) model as the 
basic time series regression model for the above two tests. The third test is to compare the 
distributive pattern of government spending between the two periods. The basic model is the 
System Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) for dynamic panel data model.  
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VI. ORGANIZATION OF DISSERTATION 
 
The rest of the dissertation unfolds as follows. Chapter 2 provides some historical 
background on PBCs and target spending in South Korea, focusing on the incentive and 
constraint sides of election-oriented macroeconomic policy. It shows that authoritarian 
leaders in Korea faced few constraints and had incentives to intervene in the country’s macro-
economic conditions before elections mainly to increase the ruling party’s urban 
representation.  After democratization, incumbent presidents had even greater incentives for 
PBC and targeted spending than did the previous authoritarian leaders. At the same time, 
however, the structural constraints imposed on the president’s ability to manipulate the 
macro-economic conditions for political purposes also increased. The increased constraints 
(greater checks and balances) offset the increased incentives (greater electoral competition) 
after democratization. 
Chapter 3 presents empirical analyses of the degree of politicization of 
macroeconomic policy in developmental states and the effects of democratization on PBCs. 
This chapter provides two key empirical findings regarding the effects of elections on fiscal 
policy. First, there is strong evidence of expansionary fiscal policy before elections and 
contractionary fiscal policy after elections. Second, democratization did not affect the degree 
of PBCs in statistical terms. These findings suggest that the pattern and degree of 
manipulation of economy before elections showed no significance differences before (1970-
1987) and after (1988-2000) democratization. 
Chapter 4 explores how distributive policies changed in Korea due to 
democratization. First, I examine the relationship between the incumbent party’s electoral 
support (and electoral margin) and transfers from the central government to provinces during 
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the pre-democratization period (1976 to 1988). Then I present statistical findings showing 
that spending was focused on both the incumbent's own turf and rival areas in the democratic 
period (1988 to 2008).  
Chapter 5 summarizes the main findings and arguments of this study and discusses 
their theoretical implications.   
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Chapter  2. Contextual Approach to Political Budget Cycles and Target 
Spending in Korea: Incentive and Constraint Structures 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine how democratization in South Korea 
changed the incentives and constraints underlying election-induced macroeconomic policy. 
The main assumption of this chapter is that the magnitude of the difference between 
incentives and constraints will determine the likelihood of political budget cycles and 
targeted spending as discussed in the previous chapter.  
This chapter asks whether and in what way authoritarian leaders in Korea had 
incentives to manipulate macroeconomic conditions before elections and to distort their 
official goals of “even development across the regions” in allocating transfers. To answer the 
question, this chapter discusses the challenges authoritarian leaders faced, and then explores 
the political strategies they employed to help overcome these difficulties and ensure their 
regime’s survival.  It shows that authoritarian leaders were motivated to target spending to 
urban areas because of increasing urbanization, escalating mass protests in urban areas, and 
the authoritarian leaders’ obsession with modernity. It also discusses how authoritarian 
presidents loosened their constraints on macroeconomic policy by weakening the ability of 
the legislature to oversee the allocation of the budget.    
This chapter also explores how democratization changed the incentive structure of 
presidents, focusing on the impact of increased electoral competitiveness, regional 
realignments, and divided government. I also examine whether and in what way the Korean 
president, as the dominant actor in allocating public resources, has had different political 
preferences from the candidate next in line from the ruling party, specifically with regard to 
targeting political groups for tactical spending. I speculate that a five-year single term 
president would have been motivated to target both his/her core support groups as well as 
backers of the opposition. This chapter also discusses the increased incentives for PBC and 
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targeted spending due to escalating electoral pressure after democratization, but at the same 
time it pays attention to the increased constraints on the president’s ability to manipulate 
economy. I will examine how the National Assembly has been granted greater control over 
the budget making process during the democratization period by boosting its organizational 
capacity and financial authority.  
The chapter is organized as follows. Sections 1 and 2 explore the electoral politics of 
the pre- and post-democratization periods respectively, focusing on the incentives that 
presidents had to engage in political budget cycles and targeted spending during each period. 
Section 3 examines the constraints on election-oriented economic policy during the 
authoritarian period and the effect that democratization had on these checks and balances, 
focusing specifically on legislative-executive relations. I conclude this chapter with a 
discussion about how increased constraints offset the increased incentives after 
democratization. 
 
 
I. ELECTORAL POLITICS: PRE-DEMOCRATIZATION PERIOD (1972-1987) 
 
South Korea was under a military dictatorship led by Park Chung Hee (1961-1979) 
and his successor, Chun Doo Hwan (1979-1987), for twenty five years before a democratic 
transition began in 1987. Even though South Korea during this period achieved remarkable 
economic development, administrations under Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan were 
never free from accusations surrounding their legitimacy, which was marred by the military 
coup d’état that they used to come to power. One of the important political cleavages in this 
period was democratic-authoritarian cleavage, which was translated into a voting behavior 
pattern described as yeochon-yado, which emphasized the strength of the ruling party in rural 
areas and greater support for the opposing party in urban areas. Upon finishing his first two 
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four-year presidential terms, Park Chung Hee was successfully sworn in for his third term in 
1971 which was made possible by a 1969 amendment to the Korean constitution. After just 
one year, Park Chung Hee declared the Yushin Constitution (Revitalizing Reforms 
Constitution) in 1972 and substantially undermined the competitiveness of presidential 
elections by enforcing repressive rule. In turn, the importance of National Assembly elections 
became even more apparent, and the introduction of a new election system altered the 
dynamics of electoral politics (Mo and Brady 1999).   
 
(1)  Political Challenges to the Park Regime 
 
Well aware of his vulnerability due to the fact that the legitimacy of his regime had 
been undermined by his military coup d’état, Park Chung Hee pursued economic 
development as the foremost priority on his national agenda. Even though the South Korean 
economy got back on track, lack of public trust surrounding his regime legitimacy remained, 
particularly in urban areas such as Seoul where a concentrated population of students, 
academics, or the so-called middle class group resided were the locus of anti-Park Chung Hee 
forces. Park Chung Hee found it especially discomforting and upsetting that residents of 
those areas that stood to reap the most benefits from his economic development policy were 
the strongest opponents of his policies. As his second presidential term neared the end, in 
1969, Park Chung Hee pushed for an amendment to the constitution that limited presidents to 
two consecutive terms (four years for each term). Park Chung Hee tried to convince the 
public that in the next four more years with him serving as the president, he could achieve the 
final goals of his economic development policy. 
Park Chung Hee barely won a third term in 1971 with 51% of votes. In the National 
Assembly election held in the same year, Park’s ruling Democratic Republican Party (DRP) 
also succeeded in winning a majority. However, Park Chung Hee was aware that the victories 
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in the presidential and National Assembly elections in 1971 were closer than they should 
have been, considering the overwhelming amount of organizational manpower and illegal 
political funds he had poured into the campaigns as well as efforts at gerrymandering 
favorable to his ruling party. 
The percentage of seats in rural districts held by Park Chung Hee’s ruling DRP 
decreased from 94.1% in the 1967 election to 71.1% in the 1971 election. Only 17.9% of the 
seats in urban districts belonged to the DRP (See Table 2-2). If one takes into consideration 
that urbanization had decreased the number of voters in the rural areas and increased the 
number of voters in the urban areas, the future of Park Chung Hee and his DRP was grim 
(Lee 1999). 
Therefore, Park Chung Hee could not be satisfied with winning a third term. Upon his 
inauguration for the third presidential term, Park secretly executed a strategy to secure a life-
long seizure of power for himself. In 1972, Park Chung Hee declared martial law and 
imposed the Yushin Constitution (Revitalizing Reforms Constitution). Under the Yushin 
Constitution, the National Conference for Unification (NCU), an electoral college led by Park 
Chung Hee, would elect the president instead of the citizens. The Yushin Constitution further 
strengthened Park Chung Hee’s control over the political system by allowing him to appoint 
one-third of the National Assembly members and organize the so-called Yujonghoe, or the 
Friends of Government association, and to declare emergency decrees and martial laws. Park 
Chung Hee established personal dominance over the legislative system by creating and 
manipulating the Yujonghoe. Another main feature of the Yushin system was the change of 
the National Assembly Election Laws from the M=1 Single Member District (SMD) system 
to the M=2 Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) system. After the establishment of the 
Republic of Korea in 1948, eight National Assembly elections were held under M=1 plurality 
rule until the adoption of M=2 SNTV in 1972.  
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Even though Park tried to justify the Yushin Constitution on the grounds of national 
security and economic development, it was in practice a political device to enable Park 
Chung Hee to hold onto power permanently. 
 
(2)  Limitation of Existing Electoral System  
 
There may rise two questions concerning Park’s declaration of Yushin system. First, 
why did Park Chung Hee maintain National Assembly elections? If one only looks at the 
repressive nature of the Yushin system, abolishing National Assembly elections may appear 
to be a logical step for Park at that time. Second, why did he abandon the SMD and adopt the 
N=2 SNTV instead? The SMD system would seem to have provided an equally stable system 
as the N=2 SNTV for Park’s control over the National Assembly, considering the previous 
practices of gerrymandering and the organizational manpower and financial resources 
available to the DRP. 
The reasons behind Park Chung Hee’s decision to maintain National Assembly 
elections while enforcing a repressive rule under the Yushin system are as follows. First, as 
Joseph (1999), Bratton and Van de Walle (1997) explain, autocratic regimes often need to 
adopt the façade of elections in order to deceive international donors of foreign aid. That is 
the reason why politicians in some of the poorest single-party autocracies in Africa accepted 
multi-party elections. Park was well aware of the potential for international backlash. 
Abolishing the National Assembly elections while changing the presidential elections to an 
indirect electoral system and eliminating the limits on the presidential terms would invite 
criticism abroad. Because he relied on credits from Western countries to promote export-
oriented industrialization, Park Chung Hee was understandably concerned about potential 
criticism from the international community regarding the abolishment of the National 
Assembly elections. Human rights disputes in the 1970s, as a result of Park Chung Hee’s 
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repressive measures to silence criticism and to put down student protests, seriously strained 
U.S.-South Korean relations (Kim 2011). In reality, the human rights dispute between South 
Korea and the United States centered on congressional hearings during the Ford 
administration. The Carter administration in the late 1970s imposed pressure on Park Chung 
Hee by linking South Korea’s human rights problems and withdrawal of the U.S. forces from 
the Korean peninsula. To avoid the backlash from international community, Park had an 
ample reason to maintain National Assembly elections.  
At home, it was also necessary to maintain the opposition party through elections, 
albeit ones with limited competition. As Gandhi and Przeworski (2006) point out, dictators 
protect themselves by providing particular groups of the potential opposition with a place in 
the legislature. By selectively co-opting the opposition, the dictator “prevents its opponents 
from forming a unified front to rebel against the regime” (Magaloni 2006). As Park Chung 
Hee tightened his grip on political society, the anti-Park movement grew both in numbers and 
in intensity, especially in Seoul.  
Without the presence of the opposition party, it was difficult to measure the degree 
and scope of the anti-Park resistance as well as to absorb anti-Park forces into the system. 
Therefore, the presence of a somewhat compliant opposition party was necessary for Park 
Chung Hee and his system from a long-term perspective, which in turn necessitated the 
National Assembly elections. As explained below, Park could expect that a new electoral 
system for the National Assembly election would serve to divide the opposition between the 
“loyal opposition” and radical activists.  
Then what was the reason behind Park Chung Hee’s decision to change the previous 
SMD election system? First, there was an increase in electoral pressure. The conversion ratio 
of vote share to seat share continuously decreased under the SMD system. Because the SMD 
system is based on plurality, it tends to be more favorable to major parties. As Rae (1967) 
explains, large parties’ advantage in seat allocation is thought to be greater in districts of 
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lower magnitude. Furthermore, under the SMD system in South Korea, the conversion rate, 
which switches votes to seats, worked to the advantage of the ruling party. The problem, as 
can be seen in Table 2-1, was that the conversion rate for Park Chung Hee’s DRP continued 
to fall (2.0 in the 1963 election, 1.5 in the 1967 election, 1.2 in the 1971 election). 
Additionally, the primary opposition party called the New Democratic Party (NDP) was 
mobilized in opposition to the DRP, and the NDP managed to win 42.5% of seats in the 1971 
National Assembly election. The NDP’s successful take-off in the 1971 election acted as a 
significant threat to Park Chung Hee’s DRP. If the SMD system were maintained, it was 
predicted that it would be difficult for the DRP to secure a stable majority of votes in the 
forthcoming election. Moreover, Park Chung Hee’s perceived sense of threat was heightened 
because he barely won reelection in the 1971 presidential election with 51.2% of the vote. 
 
Table 2-1. SMD’ Effect of Conversion Ratio  
 Ruling Party Opposition Party 
 Seats(%) Votes(%) Conversion 
ratio 
Seats(%) Votes(%) Conversion 
ratio 
1963 67.2 33.5 2.0 20.6 20.1 1.0 
1967 77.9 50.6 1.5 21.4 32.7 0.7 
1971 56.2 48.8 1.2 42.5 44.4 1.0 
Source: National Election Commission,  http://info.nec.go.kr/  
 
Second, an increase in the urban population due to economic development accelerated 
the yeochon-yado phenomenon (i.e., support for the ruling party in rural areas and for the 
opposition party in urban areas), and this was perceived to be a fatal blow to the support base 
of the DRP from a long-term perspective. As can be observed in Table 2-2, the percentage of 
urban district seats won by the DRP was 46.7% in the 1963 election, but it decreased to 
23.3% in the 1967 election. In 1971, the percentage did not even reach 18%. On the other 
hand, the percentage of urban district seats held by the opposition party was 53.3% in the 
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1963 election, but it increased to 76.7% in the 1967 election. In the 1971 election, it was over 
82%. Urbanization due to economic development was irreversible. The economic 
development that began in the early 1960s brought a rapid increase in the urban population 
due to the influx of rural residents to urban areas in search of better employment 
opportunities and higher living-standards. This demographic change was rather obvious: in 
the 1960s, the ratio of urban population living in cities with more than 50,000 residents to the 
total population was only 28%, but it increased to 40% by the 1970s. The population of Seoul 
was 2.4 million in 1960, and it doubled in 1970, reaching 5.4 million. By the early 1980s, 
about 10 million people were living in Seoul. While the number of voters in Seoul was 
3,794,959 in 1967, it increased by 34% in four years, reaching up to 5,089,969 in the 1971 
election. As the number of urban voters increased dramatically, the ruling DRP’s preferences 
with regard to electoral districting began to diverge from the opposition. The ruling DRP 
preferred to respect the existing municipal boundaries in determining seats rather than 
ensuring that each district had the same population.  The declining population in rural areas 
would lead to a decrease in the number of seats in rural areas and an increase in the number 
of seats in urban areas under the “equal population” system, which would hurt the ruling 
party. Therefore, the DRP preferred to respect existing administrative boundaries in 
allocating seats. As a result of negotiations, however, the number of electoral districts in 
Seoul increased from 14 in 1967 to 19 in 1971. Park and his ruling DRP could not avoid the 
trend of drastic urbanization. If one takes all these facts into consideration, the prospects for 
Park Chung Hee and DRP were not bright in the long run. 
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Table 2-2. National Assembly Seat Ratio (Urban vs Rural area) 
Election Year  Ruling Par ty Opposition Par ty 
Urban Area Rural Area Urban Area Rural Area 
1963 
1967 
1971 
1973 
46.7% 
23.3% 
17.9% 
47.1% 
75.2% 
94.1% 
71.1% 
50.9% 
53.3% 
76.7% 
82.1% 
44.1% 
24.8% 
5.9% 
28.9% 
49.1% 
Source: National Election Commission,  http://info.nec.go.kr/ 
 
(3)  Expected outcome of N=2 SNTV 
 
What were the potential political impacts expected by Park Chung Hee if the N=2 
SNTV system were implemented? Let us consider the Yujonghoe, one of the main 
mechanisms of the Yushin Constitution. If the Yujonghoe system that allowed the president to 
designate one-third of the National Assembly were safely implemented, was there a need to 
abolish the SMD and adopt the N=2 SNTV system instead? The N=2 SNTV would not have 
been an appropriate choice if Park intended to increase only the number of seats in the 
National Assembly (Lee 1999, Mo and Brady 1999).  
Park Chung Hee’s motivation for N=2 SNTV must have been something other than 
electoral benefits for seat maximization because Park was willing to pay a high price for the 
new system (Lee 1999). First, under the N=2 SNTV system, the reduction in the number of 
rural districts was greater than the increase in the number of urban districts. There were 117 
rural districts in the 8th National Assembly Election, which was held using the SMD system, 
whereas there were 55 districts with 110 seats in the 9th National Assembly Election, which 
used the N=2 SNTV system. By contrast, there were 36 urban districts in the 8th National 
Assembly Election under the SMD system, whereas there were 16 districts with 32 seats in 
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the 9th National Assembly Election, which was conducted under the N=2 SNTV system. 
Since the DRP decided to nominate one candidate per district under the N=2 SNTV system, 
the maximum number of seats it could gain from the rural areas was 55. The maximum 
number of seats it could win in urban areas, assuming that DRP candidates finished at least in 
second place in all urban districts, was 16. This means that the total number of seats of the 
ruling DRP under the N=2 SNTV might be smaller than that of the DRP under the SMD. 
Given that the number of the urban seats was less than one-third of the rural seats, it is a 
plausible scenario.  
In the 1963, 1967, and 1971 elections, the DRP respectively produced 11, 23, and 32 
runners-up in urban areas. (See Table 2-3) Thus, the new M=2 SNTV system served the DRP 
by electing the first two vote-getters, instead of one, in a district. In fact, the DRP under the 
new system won 15 of the 32 urban seats (47.1 percent) in the 1973 election. It was a definite 
improvement over the previous election in 1971, in which the DRP had won only 17.9 
percent of urban district seats. As expected, most DRP candidates, 13 out of 16, were elected 
as runners-up under the new system. However, the DRP’s gain in urban areas under the N=2 
SNTV was less than the opposition’s gain in rural areas. The opposition won an average of 
49.1 percent of rural seats under SNTV. Given that the number of rural districts outnumbered 
the number of urban districts by about three times in the previous elections, the opposition’s 
gain in the rural area under the new system was a great improvement.  
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Table 2-3. Numbers of Election Rankings in the Urban and Rural Area during Pre-Democratization Period 
 Ruling Party Opposition Party 
1963 1967 1971 1973 (M=2) 1963 1967 1971 1973(M=2) 
1st 2n
d 
1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2n
d 
1st 2n
d 
1st 2nd 1st 2n
d 
1st 2nd 
Seoul 
Busan 
Incheon 
Daejeon 
Gwangju 
Daegu 
 
Urban 
subtotal 
 
Rural 
 
Total 
2 
6 
1 
0 
1 
4 
 
14 
 
 
74 
 
88 
7 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
 
11 
 
 
25 
 
36 
1 
2 
0 
0 
1 
3 
 
7 
 
 
95 
 
102 
13 
5 
2 
1 
1 
1 
 
23 
 
 
6 
 
29 
1 
2 
2 
1 
0 
1 
 
7 
 
 
79 
 
86 
18 
6 
1 
1 
2 
4 
 
32 
 
 
35 
 
67 
3 
1 
0 
1 
0 
2 
 
7 
 
 
36 
 
43 
4 
3 
1 
0 
1 
0 
 
9 
 
 
21 
 
30 
12 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
 
16 
 
 
27 
 
43 
7 
6 
1 
0 
1 
4 
 
19 
 
 
76 
 
95 
13 
5 
2 
1 
1 
1 
 
23 
 
 
6 
 
29 
1 
2 
0 
0 
1 
3 
 
7 
 
 
95 
 
102 
18 
6 
1 
1 
2 
4 
 
32 
 
 
35 
 
67 
1 
2 
2 
1 
0 
1 
 
7 
 
 
79 
 
86 
5 
3 
1 
0 
1 
0 
 
10 
 
 
18 
 
28 
3 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
 
5 
 
 
21 
 
26 
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There is another reason why Park Chung Hee’s motivation for N=2 SNTV must have 
been something other than electoral benefits. This is the fact that the DRP did not intend to 
win a majority in the district-level elections by adopting the SNTV because one-third of the 
Assembly was to be appointed by the president (Lee 1999, Lee, S.M 2004). Thus, the DRP 
needed only to secure one-sixth of the district seats in order to maintain a majority, and it 
would not be difficult to secure one-sixth of the district seats under the SMD system.  
The most plausible interpretation of President Park’s intentions in adopting the SNTV 
was to increase the DRP’s urban representation in order to enhance the legitimacy of his 
regime (Choi 1973, Lee 1999, Mo and Brady 1999). As Korea achieved rapid economic 
development, it was desirable for the ruling party to establish an image of modernity by 
building urban support. The DRP tried to enhance urban representation at the cost of reducing 
the number of seats it held in rural areas, while still maintaining a majority. The DRP’s 
nomination policy also supports this argument. The DRP had a policy of nominating one 
candidate per district in most cases regardless of its overwhelming dominance in the rural 
areas, while the opposition New Democratic Party nominated two candidates per district in 
the urban areas.  
Another reason for Park Chung Hee’s implementing the N=2 SNTV was to 
undermine opposition forces by instigating a competition among the opposition parties. In 
essence, the N=2 SNTV was more favorable to a multi-party system than was the SMD 
(Duverger 1980). Furthermore, allowing independent or third-party candidates to run in 
elections, which was previously prohibited, intensified the competition among the opposition 
forces. The opposition forces, which were relatively weaker at coordinating between different 
candidates in comparison to the ruling party, soon lost momentum. Candidates who lost the 
bid for the opposition party nomination entered elections as independent candidates, and the 
appearance of a number of independents certainly took votes away from existing opposition 
parties. In fact, the number of independent candidates in the 1973 election was about 34 
percent of the total, and they won 19 of the 146 seats in the elections.  
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The N=2 SNTV system was also expected to facilitate cooperation between the ruling 
DRP and the New Democratic Party (NDP), the primary opposition party. For example, DRP 
and NDP candidates consciously averted confrontation with each other despite apparent 
differences in party platforms. This was because the candidates representing the same district 
would share the same interest of securing reelection based on their ability to bring in more 
funds from the central government. Furthermore, DRP and NDP candidates would even 
collaborate as a coalition against the Democratic Unification Party (DUP), another opposition 
party, and other independent candidates during the campaign period (Lee 1999). The 
“alliance” between the ruling DRP and the primary opposition party, NDP, as well as the 
intensified competition within the opposition forces, contributed significantly to governing 
stability and the continued rule of Park Chung Hee administration. In this regard, the N=2 
SNTV worked as an important mechanism for Park Chung Hee to manage the opposition 
forces. 
 
(4) Urban bias:  
Urban areas, in particular, capitals have been thought of as politically more relevant 
than rural areas (Ades and Glaeser 1995; Bates 1981; Lipton 1977). From the perspective of 
dictators, capitals are even more dangerous as protestors possess proximity to the seat of 
power (Wallace 2013). These concerns shaped Park Chung Hee’s choice of N=2 SNTV 
system. It is indubitable that the primary motivation behind Park Chung Hee’s adoption of 
the N=2 SNTV was to increase urban representation. Then why had Park Chung Hee become 
so focused on urban representation? As Choi (1973) illustrates, urban areas in South Korea 
have been the very epitome of modernity and modern values. As such, in times of political 
turpitude or turbulence, leaders have always looked at the urban areas first for both cause and 
solution. During the Park Chung Hee regime, the DRP’s legitimacy was undermined by its 
lack of support in the urban areas. This, in turn, led to the DRP’s adoption of the N=2 SNTV 
as a way to increase its urban representation. For Park Chung Hee, who tried to secure his 
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regime’s legitimacy through economic development and modernization, the significance of 
urban areas, especially Seoul, was unquestionable. Park tried to get the urban areas to support 
him based on his performance in terms of economic development or modernization; however, 
the results did not live up to his expectations. In the presidential election of 1963 right after 
the coup d’état, Park Chung Hee won by only 160,000 votes. In the 1967 presidential 
election, he won in a landslide with a margin of one million votes. This easy victory after 
four years could be perceived as evidence that his economic development policy had finally 
had made an impact on the society. However, even in the 1967 election, the vote share for 
Park Chung Hee in Seoul was a mere 47%, significantly lower than the nation-wide vote 
share for Park, which was 55%. This became a worrisome issue for Park Chung Hee. Park 
had expected that he would win in Seoul, and expressed deep disappointment at the result of 
the 1967 presidential election vote share in the city (Gab-je Cho 2001). 
Another interpretation for Park Chung Hee’s “obsession” with urban representation is 
his fear that the anti-Yushin mass movements would strengthen in urban areas (Hwang 2013). 
In fact, the Park Chung Hee regime was established partly in order to eliminate the instability 
caused by mass movements in urban areas. Park Chung Hee organized and carried out a 
military coup d’état called the May 16 Coup to render powerless the explosive nature of mass 
movements after the April 19 Revolution, which were identified as “anarchic.”2
                                                 
2 Park Chung Hee, who was a martial law commander in Pusan at the time of the April 19 Revolution, later 
recounted his fear as follows: “I was very afraid of the mass. When the public is mobilized to create instability, 
only military forces can calm the environment. I witnessed that during the April 19 Revolution. I donned the 
military uniforms, walked in front of the mass, and told them to ‘Let’s all proclaim manse.’ And that’s how I 
was barely able to calm them down” (Gab-je Cho, 2001).  
 During his 
terms, Park Chung Hee faced the anti-Yushin mass resistance across the urban areas. After his 
inauguration, such mass movements in the urban areas became a huge concern for Park 
Chung Hee. Student protests in Seoul in opposition to the normalization of the Korea-Japan 
relations advocated by Park Chung Hee in mid-1960s were one such urban mass movement. 
Tae-il Jeon’s suicide by setting himself on fire was a significant incident for the Korean 
workers’ rights activism. Labor disputes, which numbered 165 in 1970, increased by more 
than ten-fold, reaching 1,656 in 1971. The mass movement against the 1971 constitutional 
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amendment presented the biggest challenge for Park who sought to extend his presidency to a 
third term.  
 
(5) Conclusion: Electoral Interest of DRP under  N=2 SNTV 
 
As can be seen above, it did not prove difficult for the DRP to have one candidate 
elected into office in the rural areas under the N=2 SNTV system. Problems arose when the 
DRP tried to place its candidate in second place in urban areas. Urban voters became swing 
voters. If DRP candidates in the urban areas did not win second place, the very purpose 
behind the adoption of the N=2 SNTV became meaningless. The DRP thus had strong 
incentives to concentrate a considerable amount of available resources in urban areas in order 
to increase its vote share in these areas. 
There is an argument that the adoption of the SNTV system undermined the 
competitiveness of elections altogether. Advocates of such an argument emphasize that the 
N=2 SNTV system contributed to weakening the competitive environment since districts 
regularly elected one ruling candidate and one opposition candidate. This, however, is far 
from the truth. Competitiveness is properly measured through the difference in vote share 
between first- and second-place winners for the SMD and between second- and third-place 
winners for the N=2 SNTV. A larger difference in vote share indicates less competitiveness 
in district elections. In the 1971 election, the competitiveness measure for Seoul was 22.8% 
under SMD. However, under the N=2 SNTV system, the competitiveness measure for Seoul 
was 9.9% in the 1973 election. A larger difference in vote share at the district election during 
the 1971 election under the SMD demonstrates that the district elections were more 
competitive under the N=2 SNTV system than under SMD. This is so because the N=2 
SNTV system encouraged independent candidates to run for office and consequently made 
the district election more competitive. 
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II. ELECTORAL POLITICS: POST DEMOCRATIZATION PERIOD (1987-PRESENT) 
 
South Korea has regularly held free and competitive elections to elect presidents and 
lawmakers to the National Assembly since the democratic transition began in 1987, after two 
and one half decades under military authoritarian rule. Elections became “the only game in 
town” (Przeworski 1991). From the perspective of the minimalist definition of democracy set 
forth by Schumpeter, Korean politics definitely has been consolidated since that time. Korea 
also passed the so-called “two turnovers test” (Huntington 1993), which represents a major 
milestone for democracy. In 1997, after 10 years of democracy, Kim Dae Jung, a life-long 
opposition leader, was elected as the president. Ten years later in 2007, Lee Myung-bak and 
his conservative party, the Grand National Party (GNP), retook the presidency and the 
National Assembly again. 
 
(1)  Main Character istics of the Electoral politics in Korea after  democratization    
 
Return of electoral competitiveness 
 
It is not an exaggeration to state that before democratization, any result or outcome of 
presidential elections, which were without exception conducted in an indirect election 
system, was predetermined before the actual voting. Both Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo 
Hwan were elected into office with almost 100% of the vote. On the other hand, the five 
presidential elections that were conducted by direct popular vote after Korea’s 
democratization in 1987 all were extremely competitive, producing outcomes with a narrow 
margin of victory. Most of the winners did not win a majority of the vote. Roh Tae Woo won 
only 36.6% votes in the 1987 election; Kim Young Sam earned 42% in the 1992 election; 
Kim Dae Jung won 40.3% in the 2002 election; and Roh Moo Hyun earned 48.9% of the vote 
in the 2007 election. In the 2012 election, current President Park Geun-hye was elected into 
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office with 51.5% of the vote, making her the only president who received a majority of the 
vote. However, the difference in the vote shares between the winner and runner-up in the 
2012 election was only 3.5%. The 1997 and 2002 elections produced 1.6% and 2.3% margins 
of votes respectively. Except for the 2007 election, it was difficult for anyone to predict the 
outcome of presidential elections before the tallying of the returns. Electoral competitiveness, 
which had disappeared during the authoritarian regime, was restored, and Korea was 
introduced to so-called “institutionalized uncertainty” (Przeworski 1991), a key point of 
democracy. 
 
 Realignment of Regionalism  
 
Regionalism was also prevalent under the authoritarian Park and Chun regime. As 
discussed, the dominant voting pattern under military rule was the urban-rural cleavage 
(yeochon-yado), reflecting the strong anti-authoritarian sentiment among the urban middle 
class (Cho 1998). Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung, who were prominent opposition 
leaders from different regions, cooperated against the authoritarian regime. As a result, anti-
authoritarian votes were not concentrated in specific regions except for urban areas such as 
Seoul. 
The urban-rural cleavage began losing power after the democratic transition in 1987, 
but another form of regionalism has served as a critical factor in terms of shaping voting 
patterns in South Korea (Cho 1998; Choi 1993; Moon 2005). All the major political parties 
have a core regional base and they draw heavy support from their respective region with the 
help of charismatic personal leaders. Since the democratization began in 1987, “four 
regionally-based political groups and their changing alignments have had a dominant 
influence on Korean party politics” (Wang 2012: 138). The military incumbents, Chun Doo 
Hwan, and his successor, Roh Tae Woo, had their support base in north Gyongsang and 
Daegu. Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam established their support bases in their home 
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regions, Jeolla and Gwangju (the Honam region), and south Gyongsang and Busan (the 
Youngnam region), respectively. Kim Jong Pil, a number two man of the Park Chung Hee 
military regime, had a stronghold in Chungchong. Kim Dae Jung, Kim Young Sam, and Kim 
Jong Pil were known as the “three Kims. (Im 2012)” 
The four main political factions that were created upon the democratic transition did 
not have major ideological differences except for their positions on the military regime (Kang 
2010). Political factions and parties were based on regionalism, which did not have 
ideological legitimacy or substantial policy ideas (Kim 2000). Regionalism, along with the 
personal charisma of political leaders, created and intensified political competition. 
Therefore, political parties tended to rely more on their leaders than on their policy platforms 
or organizations. As a result, political parties were often used as a tool that politicians would 
create and abolish when preparing for national elections (Steinberg & Shin 2006). 
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Table 2-4. Presidential Candidates’ Vote Shares during the Post-Democratization Period (%) 
 
 1987 Election 1992 Election 1997 Election 2002 Election  
 RTW KYS Margin KYS KDJ  Margin KDJ  LHC Margin RMH LHC Margin 
Seoul 
Busan 
Daegu 
Incheon 
Gwangju 
Daejeon 
Ulsan 
Gyunggi 
Gangwon 
Chungbuk 
Chungnam 
Jeonbuk 
Jeonnam 
Gyeongbuk 
Gyeongnam 
Jeju 
29.43 
31.65 
69.80 
38.74 
4.77 
25.34 
 
40.66 
57.94 
45.67 
25.50 
13.71 
7.96 
64.83 
40.38 
48.47 
28.64 
55.18 
23.97 
29.53 
0.51 
21.66 
 
27.02 
25.50 
27.50 
15.62 
1.46 
1.12 
27.51 
50.27 
26.08 
0.80 
23.53 
45.83 
9.21 
4.26 
3.68 
 
13.64 
32.43 
18.18 
9.88 
12.25 
6.83 
37.32 
9.90 
22.39 
35.99 
72.65 
58.86 
36.76 
2.11 
34.69 
 
35.80 
40.79 
37.53 
36.15 
5.61 
4.15 
63.57 
71.46 
39.32 
37.31 
12.41 
7.73 
31.32 
95.12 
28.33 
 
31.50 
15.24 
25.55 
27.94 
88.01 
91.07 
9.45 
9.13 
32.38 
1.32 
60.24 
51.13 
5.44 
93.01 
6.36 
 
4.30 
25.54 
11.98 
8.21 
82.40 
86.92 
54.12 
62.34 
6.94 
44.30 
15.10 
12.40 
38.00 
96.30 
44.40 
15.20 
38.70 
23.30 
36.70 
47.20 
90.70 
92.90 
13.40 
10.80 
39.80 
40.40 
52.60 
71.70 
35.90 
1.70 
28.80 
50.70 
35.00 
42.40 
30.20 
23.00 
4.50 
3.10 
60.60 
54.00 
35.90 
33.90 
37.50 
59.30 
2.10 
94.60 
15.60 
35.50 
3.70 
19.10 
6.50 
24.20 
86.20 
89.80 
47.20 
43.20 
3.90 
51.00 
29.60 
18.50 
49.50 
94.70 
54.70 
35.00 
50.30 
40.90 
49.80 
51.40 
90.70 
92.20 
21.30 
26.70 
55.30 
44.70 
66.30 
77.10 
44.30 
3.60 
39.50 
52.40 
43.90 
51.80 
42.40 
40.60 
6.10 
4.60 
72.20 
66.60 
39.40 
6.30 
36.60 
58.60 
5.20 
91.10 
15.20 
17.50 
6.40 
10.80 
7.40 
10.80 
84.60 
87.60 
50.90 
39.90 
15.90 
 
Source: National Election Commission 
RTW = Roh Tae Woo, KYS = Kim Young Sam, KDJ = Kim Dae Jung, LHC = Lee Hoi Chang, RMH = Roh Moo Hyun 
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Table 2-5. Seat Shares (%) of Parties in the National Assembly by Region 
Year party Seoul Gyeonggi Chungchong Youngnam Honam Other 
1992 DLP 47 57 75 5 47 DP 42 9 0 95 0 
1996 
NKP 56 11 67 3 75 
NCNP 31 0 0 97 0 
ULD 5 86 13 0 13 
2000 
GNP 41 17 98 0 33 
MDP 58 33 0 86 58 
ULD 1 46 0 0 0 
2004 GNP 30 4 88 0 55 Uri 70 79 6 81 45 
2008 
GNP 73 4 68 0 27 
UDP 23 33 3 81 45 
LFP 0 58 0 0 0 
Source: National Election Commission  
 
Regionalism has been one of the most powerful factors that influenced voters’ 
decisions. Politicians started to take regionalism into account and tried to utilize a 
geographically-concentrated mobilization strategy as a tool to winning an office. Political 
regionalism and distributive policies are closely related in this regard. 
 
Divided Government and Reverting to Majority   
 
After democratization, electoral competitiveness was restored. It brought about the 
emergence of divided government after the 1988 National Assembly elections for the first 
time since the democratic breakthrough in 1987. From this moment onward, divided 
government has become a sign of normalcy rather than an exception.  
Out of the six National Assembly elections that took place after the country’s 
democratization, four elections gave rise to divided government. (Table 2-6) Among the two 
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National Assembly elections in which the ruling parties won the majority of votes, the Uri 
Party received 152 seats out of 299 seats in the 2004 election. However, when it was 
discovered right after the election that it violated election laws, the Uri Party lost three seats 
and this led to divided government once again. The GNP’s victory in the Eighteenth National 
Assembly Election in 2008 is the only instance when the ruling party won the majority. Even 
in this instance, the ruling party won 153 out of 299 seats, barely topping 50%. (See Table 2-
6.)  
 
Table 2-6. Number of Ruling Party’s Seats in the National Assembly Elections 
Year Ruling Party Seats Total Seats
13rd 1988 DJP 125 299 Divided Government 
14th 1992 DLP 149 299 Divided Government 
15th 1996 NKP 139 299 Divided Government 
16th 2000 NMDP 115 299 Divided Government 
17th 2004 Uri 152 299
18th 2008 GNP 153 299  
Source: National Election Commission 
In fact, divided government is not an uncommon phenomenon in Western democracy 
(Fiorina 1992, Laver and Shepsle 1991, Alesina and Rosentahal 1995). From the perspective 
of a president, this could pose a problem in governing the country since it is difficult for the 
minor ruling party to provide legislative support. However, there is no way to overturn the 
voters’ decision once it is confirmed via election results. In the case of a new democracy such 
as Korea, however, this was not entirely true. Presidents were not constrained by election 
results or representatives’ formal party affiliations; they did not have much of a problem 
forging majorities in the National Assembly. As discussed above, divided government can be 
created via general elections, but a minority ruling party can become a strong majority 
through various means. During the Roh Tae Woo and Kim Young Sam (1993-1998) 
79 
 
administrations, the ruling party led by the presidents was able to gain a majority of national 
assembly seats for much of their presidential terms by merging with opposition parties, 
recruiting national assemblymen from other parties, and/or co-opting legislators without any 
party affiliations. 
In 1990, the Democratic Justice Party led by Roh Tae Woo, the Reunification 
Democratic Party led by Kim Young Sam, and the New Democratic Republican Party led by 
Kim Jong Pil merged to form the Democratic Liberal Party (DLP) in order to win the 
legislative majority. By doing so, they successfully launched a two-party system. The DLP 
played the role of a grand conservative coalition by uniting the moderates among civilian 
activists and military bureaucrats. Noteworthy is the fact that the Party for Peace and 
Democracy (PPD) led by Kim Dae Jung was excluded from the alliance. In the Fifteenth 
National Assembly Election in 1996, when Kim Young Sam’s NKP became the minority 
ruling party, Kim Young Sam admitted the opposition party members into his NKP within 
two months and managed to turn his party back into a majority ruling party. Likewise, when 
Kim Dae Jung was elected into the presidential office in 1997, he made an alliance with the 
United Liberal Democrats (ULD) led by Kim Jong Pil, recruited and admitted opposition 
party members into his party, and succeeded in changing his party from being a minority to 
the majority ruling party. 
In most of the National Assembly elections, the ruling party failed to receive a 
majority of the vote. However, presidents were able to change the status of their parties from 
a minority to the majority ruling party through various means outlined above. The president 
employed the Prosecutors and National Tax Offices to uncover dirt on opposition and non-
partisan assembly members, and it pressured them to join the ruling party. By doing so, the 
inherent problem of political decision-making process arising from the oppositional 
legislative majorities that could hinder institutional efficacy and political stability in any 
presidential system, was settled. 
 
80 
 
 
(2) Janus Faces of Korean Presidency: Imper ial but Fragile Presidency  
 
The Korean presidency is oftentimes called an “imperial presidency.” At the same 
time, the Korean presidency is very fragile because it possesses characteristics stemming 
from the institutional arrangement of the constitution such as single-term limits and 
complicated election timing. 
 
Imperial presidency 
 
The “Imperial presidency,” a term describing unbridled presidential power, emerged 
as one of the most serious obstacles to the consolidation of democracy in Korea (Croissant 
2003, Im 2004). Excessive use and abuse of presidential powers is not uncommon, especially 
in a fledgling and nascent democracy, including that of Korea (O’Donnell 1994, 1998).  
Korea’s constitutional structure bestows power in the hands of a single person, the president. 
As in other presidential systems, the Korean president wears two hats as both the head of 
state and head of the executive branch.  
However, the “imperial presidency” in Korea is not a legally fixed concept (Im 2004). 
The President’s power is based mostly on external sources rather than the constitutional 
provisions that outline a president’s formal responsibilities, functions, and duties. It is derived 
from the very fact that the country’s president holds the top position in a highly disciplined, 
efficient ruling party and is the leader of a regional voting base. The president automatically 
assumes the position as the head of the political party that elects him/her to presidency, 
thereby granting him/her the power to select candidates for National Assembly elections and 
to finance their electoral campaigns. By using non-statutory political power and his/her 
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partisan, regional base, a president can extend his/her influence over the legislature. The 
extension of a president’s power makes the Korean presidency into an imperial presidency.  
Because of these characteristics, a Korean president has wielded unrivaled influence 
over distributive policy, especially budget allocation, before and even after the country’s 
democratization. The budget is highly centralized in Korea so much that the budget 
compilation process is completely dominated by the Presidential Office, and the Ministry of 
Strategy and Finance (Park 2004, Horiuch and Lee 2008). Furthermore, a president’s power 
is rarely marred by any challenges or restrictions from the National Assembly during the 
budgetary review process. Control and influence of the executive branch over the legislature 
is firmly rooted, as the National Assembly seldom makes modifications or corrections to the 
executive’s budget proposal. The relation between the presidential/executive branch and the 
National Assembly will be discussed further with a specific focus on this budget process. 
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Fragile Presidency 
 
Figure 2-1. Presidential Approval Rates in Korea 
 
Source: Gallup Korea, http://www.gallup.co.kr/   
 
As seen from the Figure 2-1, four presidents who came into the office after the 
country’s democratization started losing support during the middle of their administrations 
and faced lame-duck phenomena early on. Kim Young Sam’s approval rate, which was over 
80% at the start of his administration, fell to a single digit percentage of 6.1% at the end of 
his five-year term. Other presidents showed a similar trend. During the early stage of their 
administrations, their approval rates were around 60-70% due to the honeymoon effect; two 
years into the presidential term, approval rating of the presidents all fell below 50%. Kim Dae 
Jung recorded an approval rating of 54% after being recognized for his contribution to the 
improvement of South Korea-North Korea relations during his third year in office, but it soon 
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plummeted to 30%. No president won over 30% of approval rating during the fifth year of his 
term. What then caused the “imperial presidency” to turn into a fragile presidency all of a 
sudden? 
 
 
a. Five-year terms and single-term limit 
One important institutional characteristic of the Korean presidential system is the 
five-year term and single-term limit. The constitution not only concentrates power in the 
hands of the president, but also limits the term of presidency to the five-year single term. The 
President’s single-term limit was negotiated through a compromise among the leading 
players in the making of the 1987 constitution. Ironically, three leading players in that 
decision – Roh Tae Woo, Kim Young Sam, and Kim Dae Jung – were all elected into the 
presidential office under this very constitution on which they had helped to reach 
compromises. According to Im (2004), “The 1987 constitution has been known as the 
constitution of, by and for two Kims and Roh Tae Woo.”  
The five-year, single-term limit has been criticized for being ineffective and lacking 
in accountability and reliability. In the first place, the single, five-year term made the 
president vulnerable to the lame-duck phenomenon, thus diminishing his authority (Kihl 
2013). Every president’s approval rating plummeted at the end of his term. One possible 
explanation for this is that government officials and bureaucrats were no longer bound to 
show loyalty to the president in the later part of his/her term unlike during the earlier part. 
Single-term limits also placed the president under heavy criticism and attacks from the 
opposition parties who were no longer afraid of the president’s power by the end of his/her 
term.   
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b. Non-concurrent election timing  
The 1987 introduction of the five-year-term presidency which was not always 
compatible to the four-year-term National Assembly membership, made the time span 
between elections short and irregular. As a result, the securing of democratic accountability 
through ‘regular’ elections was rendered impossible.  
From the president’s perspective, the fact that his/her ruling party suffers a defeat 
more often during a midterm election than during a simultaneous election presents a more 
severe problem because this increases the likelihood that a divided government will emerge 
(Conley and Borrelli 2004, Gershtenson 2006). In Korea, at least one or two National 
Assembly elections occur during a president’s five-year term. As we have already seen, a 
divided government was disadvantageous for the ruling party. Therefore, the president’s 
authority may be weakened due to an inter-party conflict if the president’s ruling party loses 
the majority in an election held during the president’s term.  
Independent of the electoral outcome, frequent and irregular elections make it difficult 
to achieve the kind of democratic accountability guaranteed by regular elections. Moreover, 
the elections discourage governments from setting long-term goals and addressing collective 
and nation-wide interests. Instead, they make them focus on shortsighted policies that would 
attract potential voters.  
 
c. President’s exit from ruling party  
A president’s withdrawal from his/her party can been seen as the ‘last stop’ in the 
lame-duck phenomenon. That is, a president withdrawing from his/her party due to pressure 
imposed by the press and the ruling party cannot be beneficial to securing political 
accountability, especially when we consider that this withdrawal is comparable to an 
involuntary expulsion. In Korea, such withdrawals became a common practice since the 
introduction of the five-year term, with the former presidents Roh Tae Woo, Kim Young 
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Sam, Kim Dae Jung, and Roh Moo Hyun all withdrawing from their parties during their term 
in office. The explanation behind this is simple. “Neither the ruling party’s presidential 
candidate nor its legislators had strong incentive to cooperate with a lame-duck president.” 
(Haggard 2000)  
 
Table 2-7. President’s withdrawal from ruling party and Non-Party Governance (1987-2008) 
President Period Days
Roh Tae Woo Sep.9. 1992 - Feb.25. 1993 160
Kim Young Sam Nov.7. 1997 - Feb.25.1998 110
Kim Dae Jung May 6. 2002 - Feb.25.2003 295
Roh Moo Hyun Feb.28. 2007 - Feb.25.2008 362  
Source: Park 2013 
 
The first president to withdraw from his party during his term, an unthinkable event 
during the authoritarian or pre-democratization period, was Roh Tae Woo. President Roh 
withdrew from the DLP with the agenda of ‘eliminating government interference in elections’ 
in September 1992, five-years into his term in office. In reality, however, the conflict 
between the president and the then-head of the DLP, Kim Young Sam, and allegations of 
corruption led to the withdrawal. Behind the scene, Kim Young Sam was pushing the 
president about succession. Kim also walked the same path and withdrew from the ruling 
party near the end of his presidency. In November 1997, five years into office, President Kim 
expressed his harsh disapproval of politics in Korea and withdrew from his party. Again, 
what really led to this was the pressure imposed by his son Kim Hyun Chul’s arrest and the 
conflict with Lee Hoe Chang, then the presidential candidate of the NKP, who openly 
demanded the president’s withdrawal in October 1997.  
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Former President Kim Dae Jung also followed this ‘tradition’ and withdrew from the 
ruling party in May 2002, also five years into his term, as a gesture of apology for his three 
sons’ corruption allegations. Although presidential candidate Roh Moo Hyun’s party never 
openly demanded the president’s withdrawal, it was anticipated. After President Roh was 
defeated during local elections, voices from within the minority party demanding withdrawal 
increased. In February, 2007, five-years into his term, President Roh also withdrew.  
 
d. Political Retribution  
Finally, political retribution has also been a characteristic of Korean politics, 
especially since democratization. Koreans believe that they have not had any successful 
presidents. All presidents since democratization in 1987 have been involved in political 
scandals at the end of their terms or after stepping down from office. It is not surprising, then, 
that graceful retirement is of crucial interest to an incumbent president in Korea. Two former 
presidents, Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo, were arrested by the Kim Young Sam 
administration on charges of corruption and participation in military coups in the process of 
seizing political power. Presidents Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung, were not themselves 
charged, but suffered the imprisonment of their family members and political attendants, who 
were involved in corruption scandals either during or after their terms. Another President, 
Roh Moo Hyun, committed suicide after his term, while he was being investigated under the 
Lee Myung-bak’s administration. Oftentimes, a change of power has led to belittlement of 
policies advanced by the previous administration. For example, the Sun Shine policy had 
been praised as one of the most important achievements of Presidents Kim Dae Jung and Roh 
Moo Hyun; however, after the right-wing party took over, the policy was criticized as a 
failure that only helped sustain the North Korean regime. The fear of an ungraceful 
retirement, which became common among former presidents after democratization, has led 
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the ruling party and presidents to try to take care of the political opposition, even during their 
terms.  
 
(3) Conclusion: Political Interest of “Imper ial but Fragile” President 
The five-year single term president’s incentives cannot perfectly match with that of 
the candidate next in line or the members of the ruling party because the president does not 
pursue reelection. PBC takes as its premise an incumbent politician’s desire for reelection 
(Alesian 1987). This is also the case for election-oriented targeted spending. In other words, 
incumbent politicians with the absolute goal of reelection can employ a risk-acceptant 
strategy. This is the reason why politicians seeking office can adopt the "swing voter" 
strategy even though it is somewhat risk-acceptant (Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987; Dixit and 
Londregan, 1996). Swing voters are ideologically indifferent to the incumbent and more 
responsive to material incentives. In other words, there is no reason for them to protect a 
weakening president who will step down after five years. Rather, it is those “swing voters” 
who cause the decline in the presidential approval rate. From experience, swing voters who 
withdraw their support in mid-term cannot be the target of a five-year single term president. It 
is true that core supporters are less responsive to material benefits than swing voters are (Cox 
and McCubbins 1986). Therefore a 5-year single term president must avoid risk since he/she 
knows the core supporters' preference and desires (Schady 2000). 
If a five-year single term president cannot avoid risk, then he/she has to at least 
diversify it. That is why a president ‘targets’ political backers of his/her political rivals as an 
insurance measure against early lame-duck status due to the institutional arrangements, 
pressure to withdraw from his/her party, the fear of an ungraceful retirement and political 
retribution. The logic behind this is that instead of being accused of unfairness by 
concentrating all his/her political resources on the core support groups, such ‘insurance’ will 
allow a president to preempt blame that would befell on him/her (Balla et al. 2002). 
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 To summarize, a five-year single term president in Korea since democratization 
would have the dual incentive to target both his/her core support group (for risk-avoidance) 
and opposition backers (for risk-diversification). 
 
III. CHECKS AND BALANCES: LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE RELATIONS 
 
(1) Constitutional and Legal Constraints  
 
 The Constitutions of Yushin and the Fifth Republic under Park Chung Hee and 
Chun Doo Hwan guaranteed the presidents’ predominance over the National Assembly. 
Although Korean presidents continued to dominate the National Assembly after 
democratization, presidential authority over the legislature before and after the 
democratization is significantly different. Under authoritarian rule, the legislative-executive 
relations were much more lopsided toward the latter.    
 
Dissolution of the National Assembly  
   
 One notable difference between a parliamentary system and a presidential 
system is whether the head of the executive has the right to dissolve the legislature (Linz 
1994, Shugart and Carey 1992). Under a parliamentary system, the prime minister is 
authorized to dissolve the Assembly whereas under a presidential system the president does 
not typically have the authority to dissolve the National Assembly because this would 
undermine the separation of powers. Although the Constitution of Korea established a 
presidential system, it nevertheless granted the power to dissolve the National Assembly to 
the authoritarian president during the pre-democratization period. The president had the right 
to dissolve the National Assembly whenever the leader considered it necessary for national 
security reasons. In case of serious turmoil, the president could exercise emergency measures 
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covering the entire range of national affairs. Under the constitution of the authoritarian 
regime, the president enjoyed unquestionable predominance over the National Assembly. The 
mere fact that the constitution granted the authority to dissolve the National Assembly to the 
executive power signified that the authority of the National Assembly was seriously 
undermined since the power to guarantee a National Assemblyman’s term is an indicator of 
the independence and autonomy of the National Assembly.  
 Park Chung Hee dissolved the National Assembly twice and and Chun Doo 
Hwan did it once. The Fifth National Assembly was illegally dissolved by Park as a result of 
his military coup in 1961. The Eighth National Assembly was disbanded with the emergence 
of the Fourth Republic under the name of the Yushin Constitution. The Tenth National 
Assembly was illegally closed by a military coup led by General Chun Doo Hwan in 1980 
after Park Chung Hee’s assassination in 1979. Because the president’s authority to dissolve 
the National Assembly was legally protected by the constitution even though he gained 
power through an anti-constitutional military coup d’état, the National Assembly was, in 
essence, under the president’s influence. The national constitution of the Sixth Republic, 
which was enacted in 1987 during the democratization process, abolished this right and 
guaranteed the National Assemblymen’s office terms. By doing so, this new constitution 
provided an institutional framework that secured the independence of the National Assembly.  
 
Formation of the National Assembly: President’s Appointment 
   
A president’s right to form a part of National Assembly through the appointment of 
Proportional Representation (PR) members also supports the argument that the National 
Assembly was under the influence of the president. As discussed in the previous section, 
under President Park Chung Hee’s Yushin Constitution, one-third of the National 
Assemblymen were, in practice, appointed by the president through Yujonghoe (“Friends of 
Government Association), not by the voters. This Yujonghoe system went against the basic 
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characteristics of a presidential system that emphasizes the importance of a functioning check 
and balances among the three branches of government. During the Fifth Republic under the 
Chun Doo Hwan regime, the Yujonghoe system was abolished. However, the president’s 
predominance over the National Assembly still continued in some other forms. In the 
National Assembly elections conducted in the N=2 SNTV system, two-thirds of PR seats 
were assigned to the majority party. This was lopsidedly advantageous to the ruling party. In 
fact, many of the officers who participated in the military coup d’état led by Chun Doo Hwan 
in 1979 had a chance of joining the National Assembly through this system. The PR system, 
which was designed to maintain professionalism and expertise of the National Assembly, was 
downgraded to a system easily abused for placing the president’s aides in the National 
Assembly. This was actually in stark contrast to its intended purpose and failed to provide 
and protect a check and balance system between the National Assembly and the executive 
power.  
Election law regarding the allocation of PR seats was amended after democratization 
and took effect with the Fourteenth National Assembly in 1992. From the Fourteenth to the 
Sixteenth National Assembly Elections, the PR seats, 46 to 62 out of 299 seats, were assigned 
to each party according to the number of seats won in the SMD system. Since the 
Seventeenth National Assembly Election in 2000, the “one-man, two-votes” rule in which 
voters cast one vote for a candidate in each district (under the SMD system) and another for 
the political party (under the PR system) was adopted. The new PR system increased the 
political representativeness. As a result, for the first time in the Korean politics, the 
Democratic Labor Party (DLP), which can be defined as a truly leftist party in the Western 
sense, was able to enter the National Assembly. Although the DLP won only two seats in the 
SMD election, it became a third-place party with ten seats in total by winning eight more PR 
seats through the newly adopted electoral rule. 
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After democratization, the president lost the authority to appoint PR members which 
comprised of one-third of the total seats. Instead, the PR members of the National Assembly 
were elected by the public votes. As a result, in terms of legislature formation, the 
independence and autonomy of the National Assembly have drastically improved. While the 
PR system in Korea still remains questionable in terms of political representativeness, the 
legitimacy of the PR system under democracy has improved significantly in comparison to 
under the authoritarian rule.  
 
Parliamentary Inspection of Government Office  
 
While parliamentary inspection of government office was the main tool for the 
National Assembly to check and balance the executive branch under the separation of 
powers, it was abolished in 1972 when the Yushin Constitution was introduced. The meaning 
behind a parliamentary inspection of government office is as follows. First, the National 
Assembly prevents government’s arbitrary use of its authority by exposing or rectifying any 
wrongdoings of the executive branch through inspection of government offices. Second, the 
National Assembly gathers information they need for legislative activities and budget 
assessments through the inspections. Third, the National Assembly plays the role of a 
representative body by suggesting new policy alternatives or incorporating them into 
legislative bills or budget. Fourth, inspection of government offices gives the public access to 
a tremendous amount of information and data across diverse areas of government affairs. 
Therefore, the abolition of the parliamentary inspection of government offices led the 
National Assembly to essentially give up its role of checking and balancing the executive 
under the authoritarian rule. 
After democratization, the Thirteenth National Assembly reestablished the 
parliamentary inspection of government offices, an effective way for the National Assembly 
to exercise its authority and check the unilateral actions of the executive. The inspection still 
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has some limitations and room for improvement in terms of effectiveness, such as the little 
time allowed for the inspection, overestimation of the number of the subjected government 
offices, excessive demands from the Assembly for supporting documents, and lack of 
scrutiny on the part of the inspected agencies. In order to resolve these problems, measures 
including the introduction of a year-round parliamentary inspection or cooperation with the 
Board of Audit and Inspection have been proposed. The restoration of the parliamentary 
inspection of government offices has made it possible for the National Assembly to check 
and balance the executive in spite of the above mentioned limitations. Given that the 
parliamentary inspection of government offices is usually conducted in September, just prior 
to the National Assembly’s annual budget review session in October, the inspection has been 
recognized as a prerequisite for effective fiscal control by the legislative branch.  
 
 
Length of Legislative Sessions 
   
Under authoritarian rule, the length of legislative sessions was legally restricted. 
While there was no restriction imposed on the year-round legislative sessions before the 
Yushin Constitution, the number of days per year during which the National Assembly was in 
session, including plenary sessions and special sessions, was limited to one hundred and fifty 
days under the Yushin Constitution. This restriction contributed to limiting the National 
Assembly’s influence and independence since there were no sound reasons behind it other 
than to undermine the activities of the National Assembly. Legislative sessions, which 
increased by ten days after democratization in 1987, changed to a year-round system with the 
abolition of the relevant clause during the Seventeenth National Assembly in 2000. This has 
allowed legislative activities to be conducted 365 days a year.  
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In conclusion, Korea’s authoritarian regimes undermined the authority of the National 
Assembly to check and balance executive power by imposing institutional restrictions with 
the aim of expanding the president’s power. Presidential authority to dissolve the National 
Assembly and to appoint PR members, the abolition of parliamentary inspection of 
government offices, and the restriction on the legislative sessions, were the institutional tools 
used to significantly undermine the independence and autonomy of the National Assembly. 
However, after democratization, the main institutional obstacles to the National Assembly’s 
exercise of its authority were abolished.  
 
 
(2) Law-Making 
 
Constitutional or legal restrictions on the role of the National Assembly imposed 
under the authoritarian rule had a significant impact on law making activities, regarded as one 
of the key functions of the National Assembly. There are two indicators that demonstrate this. 
The first indicator is the proportion of the bills introduced by the National Assembly 
members relative to the number of bills actually passed. Under the constitution of Korea 
adopted since 1948, both the members of the National Assembly and the executive branch 
can introduce legislative bills. As the far right column of Table 2-8 shows, the proportion of 
bills introduced by National Assembly members during the authoritarian rule was only 3% in 
the Tenth National Assembly, and 29.7% in the Twelfth National Assembly. In other words, 
it can be inferred that legislation was heavily concentrated around the bills introduced by the 
executive branch. 
During the early period after democratization, no significant change occurred in the 
proportion of the bills introduced by the legislature. In the Thirteenth National Assembly, the 
first assembly since the democratization, the proportion of the bills introduced by the 
National Assembly was 34.8%, but it fell down to 18.1% in the Fourteenth National 
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Assembly. Subsequently, however, it increased to 40% in the Fifteenth National Assembly, 
54.5% in the Sixteenth National Assembly, and reached the 70% range in the Seventeenth 
and Eighteenth National Assemblies. This fact demonstrates the initiative of National 
Assembly members in law making activities since democratic consolidation. 
Another indicator showing the legislative-executive relations is the passage rate of 
government-sponsored bills. From the Eighth to Twelfth National Assemblies, which were 
under the authoritarian rule, the passage rate of government-sponsored bills was over 90% on 
average. In contrast, the passage rate of legislator-sponsored bills was only around 40% on 
average except for during the Tenth National Assembly, which was dissolved by General 
Chun’s military coup d’état in 1979. The fact that among ten government-sponsored bills, 
nine of them were passed made it hard for the National Assembly not to be labeled as a 
“rubber stamp” institution.
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Table 2-8. Executive-Legislative Relations in Law Making   
 
 
Source: National Assembly Secretariat http://korea.assembly.go.kr/secretary/  
 
(A) % (B) % (C) % (B/C)
8th ('71-'72) 35 33 94.3             14 7 50.0             40                17.5             
9th ('73-'79) 479 460 96.0             154 84 54.5             544              15.4             
10th ('79-'80) 125 98 78.4             5 3 60.0             101              3.0               
11th ('81-'85) 287 257 89.5             204 84 41.2             341              24.6             
12th ('85-'88) 168 156 92.9             211 66 31.3             222              29.7             
13th ('88-'92) 368 321 87.2             570 171 30.0             492              34.8             
14th ('92-'96) 581 537 92.4             321 119 37.1             656              18.1             
15th ('96-'00) 807 659 81.7             1144 461 40.3             1,120           41.2             
16th ('00-'04) 595 431 72.4             1912 517 27.0             948              54.5             
17th ('04-'08) 1102 563 51.1             6387 1352 21.2             1,915           70.6             
18th ('08-'12) 1693 690 40.8             12220 1663 13.6             2,353           70.7             
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In the early period after the country’s democratization, there was no significant 
change in the passage rate of government-sponsored bills. During the Thirteenth and 
Fifteenth National Assemblies, the passage rate was around 80-90%, which was not much 
different from the passage rate during authoritarian rule. The passage rate fell to 72.4% 
during the Sixteenth National Assembly, 51.1% in the Seventeenth National Assembly and 
40.8% in the Eighteenth National Assembly. In other words, under authoritarian rule, over 
90% of the bills introduced by the government were passed in the National Assembly. 
However, its proportion fell to around 40% with democratic consolidation and it can be 
interpreted that the National Assembly has properly played its role as a veto power in the 
legislative process. 
There are two factors that help explain how the National Assembly came to play an 
important role in checking and balancing the power of the executive branch in legislation. 
First, after democratization, the emergence of divided government worked to restrict the 
unilateral power and influence of the executive branch over legislation. Second, democratic 
consolidation greatly improved the professionalism of the National Assembly with regard to 
legislation. During authoritarian rule and the early period of democracy, the expertise and 
information-gathering capacity of the executive branch was superior to that of the National 
Assembly, which led to the dependency of the National Assembly on the executive power in 
the legislative process. The creation of the National Assembly Research Services (NARS) in 
2005 contributed to the improvement of the legislative expertise of the National Assembly. 
Modeled after the Congressional Research Service (CRS) in the U.S., NARS was established 
to assist and support the National Assembly’s legislative expertise from a nonpartisan point 
of view. The main function of the NARS is to support the National Assembly in checking and 
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balancing the executive branch.3
In conclusion, the legislative capacity of the National Assembly was significantly 
inferior to that of the executive branch during authoritarian rule. A comparison between the 
passage rate of legislator-sponsored bills and that of government-sponsored bills clearly 
indicates the superiority of the executive branch. Legislative-executive relations, which 
showed no significant difference in the areas of law-making during the early period of 
democracy, has been transformed as Korean democracy has become consolidated. Divided 
government and the improvement of the National Assembly’s legislative expertise after the 
establishment of NARS have contributed significantly to this development.  
 It can be inferred that the decrease in the passage rate of 
government-sponsored bills in the Seventeenth National Assembly by 20% is related to the 
legislative support provided by the newly-established NARS.  
 
(3) Fiscal Control: Budget Review 
 
Fiscal control through budget review, together with the oversight of executive 
activities and law-making, is one of the most important responsibilities of the National 
Assembly. As might be expected, the National Assembly’s fiscal control was very restricted 
under authoritarian rule. Although these restrictions were actually removed after 
democratization, studies conducted in the early 2000s conclude that there has not been 
significant changes in the fiscal control of the National Assembly since the country’s 
democratization (Park 2003, Shin 2003). This section will review some of the challenges 
facing the National Assembly’s fiscal control that were highlighted by previous studies and it 
will seek to evaluate the changing environments and institutional reforms that have occurred 
during these past ten years.  
                                                 
3 “When NARS discovers any violations of laws by the executive administration or identifies cases where laws, 
regulations, systems, or administrative affairs require improvement, it reports the results of the related research 
and analysis to the relevant standing committees” (NARS 2013). 
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Institutional perspective 
 
 As a result of political developments, budgetary institutions have experienced 
reforms and changes. However, budget actors and processes have remained intact. As in most 
other countries, “the budget process [in Korea] involves both the executive and legislative 
branches of government and follows the typical budget stages of executive preparation, 
legislative review, execution and audit, and program evaluation” (Jung and Clark 2010). The 
budgetary process in the National Assembly begins once the executive submits its budget 
proposal to the legislature. The budgetary process in the National Assembly can be divided 
into three stages: (1) each standing committee’s preliminary review, (2) comprehensive 
review by the (Special) Committee on the Budget and Accounts (CBA), and (3) final 
approval in the plenary session.   
 Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan, who came into power through military 
coup d’états, attempted to strengthen the control of the executive branch and to weaken the 
power of the National Assembly over budget review. To the authoritarian leaders, the 
legislature’s active involvement in the budget process was presumed to be detrimental to 
fiscal discipline. According to Von Hagen (1992), many economists also have been skeptical 
of legislative participation in budgeting, because they thought that weak legislatures have 
selective affinity with fiscal discipline. Not surprisingly, a decline in influence of the 
legislature over budget policy occurred in most developed countries as a result of this 
skepticism (Coombes 1976, Schick 2002). In developmental states in East Asia, particularly 
in Korea, this trend was particularly pronounced. Top leaders in these countries trusted and 
relied on economic technocrats who were insulated from external pressures, rather than on 
politicians who were vulnerable to the election results. Based on this orientation of 
authoritarian leaders in Korea, the government and the ruling party pre-determined the budget 
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through the party-government policy consultation system and tried to pass the budget with 
minimal revision by the National Assembly (National Assembly Secretariat 2008, Kim 
1993).     
As a result, during authoritarian rule, systemic attempts were undertaken to 
undermine the National Assembly’s influence over budget review. First, the status of the 
CBA responsible for conducting budget assessment within the National Assembly was 
undermined. Park Chung Hee transformed the CBA, which had been one of standing 
committees, into a temporary Special Committee after the military coup d’état in 1961. It was 
organized on an ad hoc basis whenever a budget came on the legislature’s agenda, and then it 
was dissolved soon after the final budgetary approval. Second, President Chun Doo Hwan 
abolished preliminary review of the budget by each standing committee and attempted to pass 
the budget reviewed instead by the temporary special CBA in the plenary session. The 
National Assembly’s budget process, which had involved the standing committee and the 
CBA, was changed so that the only Special CBA would review the proposal. This decision 
was influenced by the public opinion that the budget review system of the standing 
committee was representative only of the viewpoint of each government agency. Abolition of 
the standing committee’s authorization over the pre-assessment was, on the surface, an effort 
to dismantle the strategic alliance between the standing committee and the executive branch 
agencies and to govern the National Assembly based on the notion of development and 
efficiency. However, it eventually led to the weakening of the National Assembly’s capacity 
to check and balance executive power. In the end, the budget revision was left in the hands of 
the special CBA, which was convened on a temporary basis without any assistance or 
information from the legislative bodies. This thereby created a system in which any actions of 
the executive branch could be carried out without much counter-balancing in the legislative. 
Third, the length of budget review by the National Assembly was reduced. Immediately after 
his inauguration, Park Chung Hee changed the deadline for the submission of budget 
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proposal by the executive to the National Assembly from 120 days prior to the start of the 
fiscal year to 90 days prior. It can be inferred that this was reflective of political efforts to 
undermine the capacity of the National Assembly to conduct an effective budget review. 
Lastly, as discussed previously, the abolition of the parliamentary inspection of government 
offices had a negative impact on the National Assembly’s budget review. Since the executive 
branch controlled the budget-related data and information, abolition of the inspection led to 
the weakening of the National Assembly’s ability to access that data and information. As a 
result, the National Assembly’s budget review became a merely perfunctory procedure.  
After democratization, most of the measures that undermined the National 
Assembly’s authority over the budget review were rectified. The parliamentary inspection of 
government offices was restored in the Thirteenth National Assembly which served as the de 
facto first National Assembly after democratization in 1987. The inspection usually began 
around September and reviewed activities of government institutions and agencies including 
budget implementation. Information gathered from this process was used in the budget 
review that usually began in October. Preliminary review by the standing committee was also 
reinstated after democratization.  
However, it took quite a long time to restore a permanent (as opposed to a temporary 
and irregular) CBA due to the ruling party’s resistance. There was a significant difference in 
perceptions between the representatives of the ruling and opposition parties on whether or not 
the CBA should be permanent in order to strengthen the authority of the National Assembly 
vis-à-vis the executive branch. For the ruling party, minimizing the problems within the 
boundaries of the current system took priority, while the opposition party focused on making 
the CBA permanent. The different preferences stemmed in part from the fact that the ruling 
party was able to incorporate its interests in the budget formulation process through party-
government consultation, whereas the opposition party could participate in the budget process 
only through the budget review by the National Assembly. In other words, from the 
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perspective of the opposition party, a permanent CBA would have provided an opportunity to 
be more involved in the budget appropriation and assessment process. After a long debate, 
the CBA was finally made permanent after the Sixteenth National Assembly in 2000.  
 
Institutional Reforms 
Aside from normalizing the National Assembly’s fiscal control by abolishing the 
aforementioned restrictions, institutional reforms were also enacted to increase the National 
Assembly’s capacity to check and balance the executive branch that had previously 
dominated the budget process.  
 
a. NABO 
 
The most noteworthy reform was the establishment of the National Assembly Budget 
Office (NABO) in 2004. The NABO was established in order to assist the National Assembly 
members in compiling and analyzing data and information on fiscal policy and the budget. 
Modeled after the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) of the United States, the NABO was 
established as a nonpartisan legislative support agency. As of 2012, the NABO consisted of 
125 experts--it is the second largest budget-related government support agency after the CBO 
of the U.S., which has around 250 experts (OECD 2012).  
Before the establishment of the NABO, the executive branch controlled access to 
information which made the National Assembly depend entirely on the executive for any 
information including revenue and expenditure forecasts. This dependency prevented the 
Assembly from properly conducting budget reviews. With the establishment of the NABO, 
however, the National Assembly members could get professional support with the budget 
review.   
As observed in Figure 2-2 below, the number of cases in which individual National 
Assembly members asked the NABO for expert support with budget-related issues has 
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dramatically increased since the 2004. In 2004, the year the NABO was founded, such 
requests amounted to 221 cases, but they doubled to 439 in 2007 and then reached over a 
thousand cases annually in 2009 and 2010.    
 
 
Figure 2-2. Number of Cases of Professional Support from NABO 
 
 
Source: National Assembly Budget Office 
 
The influence of the NABO is demonstrated by an analysis of reductions and 
increases that derived from the budget review in the National Assembly. Table 2-9 below 
shows the rate of reduction or increases that stemmed from NABO recommendations on 
individual items in the Nineteenth National Assembly’s budget proposal. From 2009 to 2012, 
the total amount the government cut from the budget following NABO’s recommendations 
was 21.9 % in 2009, 15.2 % in 2010, 20.0% in 2011 and 22.2% in 2012. This is 20.3% on 
average during this period. By contrast, the government increased an average of only 3.3% on 
individual budget items as a result of recommendations by NABO. This means that the 
NABO typically provided information and recommendations that called for reductions rather 
than increases in the budget review by the National Assembly. In other words, the NABO’s 
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activities prevented unrestricted budget expansion that could result from a coalition between 
line ministries in the executive and the National Assembly’s standing committees.  
 
Table 2-9. Budget Amendment by the National Assembly and Contribution of the NABO 
Decrease Increase Total
Amendment
Decrease Increase Total
Amendment
 (a) (b) (│a│+b) ( c ) (d) (│c│+d)
896,840     4,860        901,700     
21.9% 0.1% 11.2%
421,310     12,079      433,389     
15.2% 0.3% 6.4%
627,897     161,636    789,553     
20.0% 8.2% 15.5%
1,006,588  285,769    1,292,357  
22.2% 7.1% 15.2%
2,952,635  464,344    3,416,979  
20.3% 3.3% 12.0%
Amendment by National Assembly NABO's Contribution to Final Amendme
Year
Gov. Budget
Proposal
2009 4,094,194   3,955,376   8,049,570  
2010
2011
2012
Total
248,336,839    
253,354,507    
264,462,918    
283,215,152    
1,049,369,416  
2,769,416   4,049,236   6,818,652  
3,132,915   1,960,304   5,093,219  
4,525,848   3,998,033   8,523,881  
14,522,373 13,962,949 28,485,322 
 
Source: Shin 2014 
 
According to Jae Wan Park (2013) who had served as the Minister of Strategy and 
Finance, the NABO played a significant role in securing fiscal discipline in Korea. Advanced 
countries implemented an expansionist policy immediately after the 2008 global financial 
crisis and, as a result, greatly impaired their fiscal discipline. Compared to them, Korea 
implemented a relative prudent fiscal policy to maintain fiscal soundness. Gross public debt 
in the OECD countries rose on average from 74.3% of GDP in 2008 to 108.5% in 2009 and 
120% of GDP in 2011. By contrast, in Korea, the ratio of gross public debt to GDP remained 
steady with a slight increase from 30.7% in 2008 to 34.8% in 2009. In the latter half of 2011, 
Korea maintained its debt ratio in the 30% range and has the second lowest ratio of gross 
public debt after Austria (See Figure 2-3). Park (2013) observed that the NABO’s 
professionalism and expertise has helped maintain fiscal discipline by suppressing the 
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expansionist desires of line ministries in the executive and the standing committee in the 
National Assembly.     
  
Figure 2-3. Gross Public Debt in OECD Countries 
 
 
Source: OECD 
 
b. Control of Public Funds 
 
Another institutional reform that has greatly improved the National Assembly’s 
capacity was the measure that gave it control over all public funds and special accounts. 
Public funds were managed at the discretion of the executive branch before 2000, with no 
role for the National Assembly. In general, special accounts were managed separately from 
general revenue and expenditures (Ha 1997, Ko 2000, Nam and Jones 2003). Public funds are 
used to finance a project if it necessitates long-term financing or administrative discretion 
over expenditures. Government offices prefer to use public funds which are relatively more 
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flexible and do not require detailed supporting documents. Financial operation details were 
not reported to the National Assembly and the use of public funds did not require the 
National Assembly’s approval. As a result of Korea’s budget reforms of 2002, the National 
Assembly gained control of public funds regardless of whether the funded projects were 
financed by the general fund or special funds in the form of earmarked revenues (Lienert and 
Jung 2004). The National Assembly’s control over all public funds and its authority to review 
the use of public funds signify an improvement in public accountability.   
 
 
c. Accounting and Budgeting System  
 
The expansion of the National Assembly’s authority over budget-related matters led 
to reforms in the accounting and budgeting system. The purpose of budgetary reforms under 
the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo Hyun administrations had been to install a transparent, 
efficient, and results-based budget process that would ensure the accountability of 
government agencies and individuals responsible for budget-related affairs (Ha 2004). In 
order to achieve this, the following fiscal reforms were introduced. First, a medium-term 
expenditure framework (National Fiscal Management Plan) and multi-layered budgeting 
were developed. Second, a top-down budgeting strategy was introduced. Third, a 
performance management system was introduced. Fourth, a digital budget information 
system—this included a shift from a line-item budget to a program budget structure and the 
use of accrual accounting—was implemented. These reforms, adopted as part of the National 
Financial Management Law in January 2007, granted the Assembly access to information 
that was previously monopolized by the executive branch. It also restricted regulations and 
codes that had been left under the discretion of the executive branch.   
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(4) International Compar ison  
 
Regarding the above reform measures, two points need be emphasized here. First, it is 
interesting to note that the need to implement policy reforms had surfaced at the outset of the 
democratization period, but the actual reforms were delayed due to the strong resistance of 
the executive branch, in particular from the bureaucrats. What changed in the 2000s that 
rendered the budget system reforms possible? According to Von Hagen (2007), financial 
crisis acted as a facilitator of these reforms. This explanation can easily be applied to the case 
of Korea. During the financial crisis of 1997, Korea had to rely on financial assistance and 
rescue loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which were issued in November 
1997. The IMF’s restructuring requirements demanded that Korea reform its fiscal, monetary, 
and government policies, which might not have been possible without external pressure. Even 
with the utmost efforts by the National Assembly to reform the budgetary system, it usually 
faced fierce opposition and resistance from the executive branch. However, during the 
financial crisis, public opinion was easily mobilized in support of the reforms, thereby 
minimizing resistance to the budgetary system reforms.    
Second, budget-related policy reforms played an important role in helping the 
National Assembly check the executive branch. According to Streb et al. (2009), PBCs 
should be larger in countries with few legislative checks and balances or with low observance 
of the rule of law. For their veto powers to be effective, the legislature also needs oversight 
and enforcement capacity to insure that the executive complies with the approved budget law. 
In this respect, the National Financial Management Law, which included all the budgetary 
system reforms, was crucial for the National Assembly’s efforts to check the executive 
branch.   
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Amendment Authority 
 
 
Figure 2-4. Amendment of Budget by the National Assembly 
 
Source: National Assembly Budget Office 
 
Another important point that merits our attention is the amendment authority of the 
National Assembly. Many studies have argued that the National Assembly’s capacity to 
review the budget has not changed significantly since democratization because it has limited 
powers to make amendments (Park 2003, Shin 2004). For them, the most apparent evidence 
of the fact that the National Assembly is not properly playing its role in the budget review is 
the number of budget amendments. As can be seen in Figure 2-4, the amendment rate of the 
National Assembly in the budget draft proposed by the executive branch is low. From 1976 to 
1987, which were periods under the authoritarian leadership, the net change by the National 
Assembly within the total budget was 0.4% on average, and it fell to 0.3% after 
democratization (1988-2010). If one looks at the total change, which includes budget 
increases and decreases, the trend is somewhat different. The average level of total change 
during the pre-democratization period was 1.0%, and it increased to 2.2% after 
democratization. This increase in total change was basically the only noteworthy change. 
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Because of this limited role by the National Assembly in amending the budget, criticisms 
such as that “the National Assembly thus far has failed to exercise considerably increased 
policy leverage over budget matters relative to the executive” (Park 2003: p.520) have gained 
a firm ground.  
 
Table 2-10. International Comparison of Legislative Influence  
 With no changes With minor changes 
only 
With significant 
changes 
Australia X   
Austria  X  
Canada X   
Czech Republic   X 
Denmark   X 
Finland  X  
France  X  
Germany  X  
Greece X   
Hungary   X 
Iceland  X  
Ireland  X  
Italy  X  
Japan X   
Korea  X  
Mexico  X  
The Netherlands  X  
New Zealand X   
Norway  X  
Poland  X  
Portugal  X  
Spain  X  
Sweden  X  
Switzerland  X  
Turkey  X  
United Kingdom X   
United States   X 
Total 6 17 4 
Percent of total 22% 63% 15% 
Source: Wehner (2004), OECD (2002). 
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There is a need to analyze whether such criticism is sound through a comparative 
perspective. As can be seen in Table 2-10, according to studies by the OECD in 2002, among 
27 member countries of the OECD, there are only four countries (Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Hungary, United States) in which “the legislature generally approves the budget as presented 
by the government ‘with significant changes.” This represents 15% of the total number of 
countries. The majority of OECD members, specifically 17 countries including Korea or 63% 
of the total, have legislatures that approve the budget “with minor changes only.” Six 
countries, including countries with Westminster-type parliaments (Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, and United Kingdom), Japan, and Greece, typically approve the budge “with no 
changes.”  
 
F iscal Prudence  
 
It should be noted that there are significant constitutional constraints on the authority 
of the National Assembly to finalize the budget in Korea. According to the Constitution, the 
National Assembly has no power to increase the total amount of the proposed budget and to 
add any new expenditure items in the budget without prior consent of the executive. This 
constitutional constraint on the amendment authority of the National Assembly reflects the 
history of fiscal prudence in Korea. As discussed earlier, Korea has a relatively low level of 
public debt and typically runs only a small budget deficit. Korea also has one of the lowest 
ratios of government spending to GDP among the OECD members. (See the below Figure 2-
5) 
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Figure 2-5. Government Spending and the Level of Income in 2011 
 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund 
 
We have pointed out that the National Assembly’s right to increase the budget is 
constitutionally constrained, but that when compared with other countries, the degree of 
amendments in Korea is not exceptional. It should also be noted that Korea has a very low 
ratio of government spending to GDP compared with other OECD countries, which reflects a 
lower level of social welfare spending. Under these circumstances, efforts by the National 
Assembly to reduce the budget as much as possible in an effort to increase its influence over 
the executive branch could decrease the quality of public services. This means that 
unrestricted authority by the National Assembly over budget amendments may not always be 
good for the public interest. In this vein, we need a more balanced and a comprehensive 
approach to evaluating the legislature’s role in the budget process.    
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F inancial Authority vs. Organizational Capacity 
 
Figure 2-6. Various Elements of Indices for Legislative Budget Institutions 
 
Source: Chunsoon Kim 2015 
 
As Wehner (2010) has pointed out, amendment authority is not the only way to 
measure the legislature’s impact on the budget. Since Von Hagen (1992) introduced the 
pioneering index of parliament’s impact on the budget, scholars have proposed additional 
indicators which include: the nature of the reversionary budget (Alesina et al. 1999); 
parliament’s role in approving medium-term expenditure parameters; the time available for 
the approval of the budget; the technical support available to the legislature; and restrictions 
on executive flexibility during budget execution (Lienert 2005). In addition to the 
development of the index, Wehner (2006, 2010) and Chunsoon Kim (2014) compiled indices 
for legislative budgetary institutions for international comparison: two global indices for 
‘financial authority’ and ‘organizational capacity’ and six sub-indices for each global index. 
The indicators of financial authority include amendment authority, a reversionary budget, and 
executive flexibility during implementation. The indicators of organizational capacity include 
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the amount of time given for scrutiny of the budget, the committee’s capacity and its access 
to budgetary information. (See Figure 2-6.) 
Based on these comprehensive indices for legislative budget institutions, Korea is 
ranked 14th, according to Wehner’s analysis (2010), and 10th according Kim’s analysis 
(2014) among the 60 countries investigated. (See Appendix 1 to Chapter 2) Note that Korea’s 
financial authority which includes amendment authority, a reversionary budget, and executive 
flexibility as its sub-indices, is relatively low, whereas its organizational capacity which 
includes sub-indices of time for scrutiny, committee capacity, and access to budgetary 
information is relatively high. A similar pattern is observed for Canada, the Czech Republic, 
France, Hungary, Israel, Kenya, Mexico, and Taiwan. On the contrary, countries such as 
Austria, Finland, Germany, Greece, and Italy display the opposite pattern, with high financial 
authority and low organizational capacity. Belgium, Brazil, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway, 
Sweden, and the United States exhibit both high financial authority and organizational 
capacity.  
According to Streb et al’s (2009) analysis, which focuses on checks and balances and 
political budget cycles, “checks and balances are effective when there is both a legislative 
veto player and high compliance with the law.” To measure the nominal presence of a 
legislative veto player, Henisz’s (2000) political constraints index POLCON3 is used in Streb 
et al’s study. To identify countries where laws are complied with, Streb et al (2009) employ 
the ICRG law and order index from Henisz (2000). If we apply these two indices to Korea, it 
would fall in the high-to-middle group as shown in Figure 2-7. Because Korea has a single 
legislative chamber, its score for a legislative veto player is 4.4, lower than Finland, Demark, 
and Luxembourg, which all have a two-chamber system. On the other hand, Korea’s score for 
the rule of law index is 5 points, again 1 point lower than the United Kingdom, Denmark, and 
Luxembourg which have 6 points. Therefore, we can see that Korea has few constraints on 
PBC only compared to the countries located in the upper-right side of the graph including 
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Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany and France. In other words, excluding those countries 
with particularly high levels of legislative veto power and rule of law, Korea falls into the 
group of countries with relatively high checks and balances.  
Figure 2-7. Political Budget Cycles and Check and Balance 
 
Source: Henisz (2013) POLCON Database (https://mgmt.wharton.upenn.edu/profile/1327)  
 
In sum, under authoritarian rule in Korea, legislative-executive relations were 
unilaterally lopsided toward the latter. The authoritarian regimes undermined the authority of 
the National Assembly to check and balance the executive’s power by imposing institutional 
restrictions including the right of the president to dissolve the National Assembly and to 
appoint a portion of the National Assembly’s members, the abolition of parliamentary 
inspection of government offices, and the restrictions imposed on the legislative sessions. As 
a result, the legislative capacity of the National Assembly was significantly inferior to that of 
the executive branch during the pre-democratization era. After democratization, major 
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institutional obstacles to the National Assembly’s exercise of its authority were abolished. 
Legislative-executive relations became tilted towards the National Assembly after the 
consolidation of democracy as it assumed a greater role in terms of lawmaking. The National 
Assembly’s fiscal control, based on its budget review and its ability to the check the activities 
and law-making decisions of the executive branch, has also improved with democratic 
consolidation. In spite of the criticism that the National Assembly’s capacity to amend the 
budget in Korea has not changed significantly even after the democratization, recent studies 
that have used updated and more comprehensive indicators show that Korea has relatively 
favorable conditions for checks and balances compared to most other countries, with high 
scores on organizational capacity in spite of relatively low scores of financial authority.  
 
 
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS: COMBINING THE INCENTIVE AND THE CONSTRAINT 
STRUCTURE 
 
We have so far discussed the incentive and constraint sides of election-oriented 
macroeconomic policy that includes political budget cycles and targeted spending. Contrary 
to the bureaucracy dominance thesis, authoritarian leaders in Korea had incentives to 
manipulate macro-economic conditions before elections to increase the ruling party’s urban 
representation. Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan attempted to target spending to urban 
areas in order to achieve their political objectives. Given their predominant position in the 
legislative-executive relations, Park and Chun both had almost no constraints in attempting 
political manipulation of macroeconomic conditions.  
After the democratization, the incentive structure for PBC and targeted spending 
became more favorable. Most presidential elections since democratization have been 
extremely competitive with a close margin of victory. Divided government has become a 
frequent phenomenon. This means that an incumbent politician, in particular the president, 
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have greater incentives for PBC and targeted spending since such spending may prove to be 
the difference between victory and defeat. An ‘imperial but fragile presidency’ during the 
post-democratization period led to a discrepancy in political interests and objectives between 
the incumbent president and the candidate next in line from the ruling party. As a result, we 
speculate that a five-year single term president of Korea would have incentives to target both 
his/her core support groups for risk-avoidance as well as backers of the opposition for risk-
diversification. However, it should also be noted that the incentives for PBCs and targeted 
spending increased as electoral pressure escalated due to potential threats in the next election. 
At the same time, however, the structural constraints on the president’s ability to manipulate 
macroeconomic conditions for political objectives increased. The stronger organizational 
capacity of the National Assembly regarding budget review reduced the degree and scale of 
the president’s discretion significantly.  
Thus, I find that the incentive for PBC and targeted spending under authoritarian rule 
in Korea were smaller than that under democracy, but constraints on PBC and targeted 
spending were also smaller under authoritarian rule than under democracy. Based on these 
findings, this study expects that the increased constraints (checks and balances) offset the 
increased incentive (electoral competition) after democratization. As a result, I expect 
political business cycles and targeted spending to be present in Korea during the authoritarian 
period as well as under democracy. In the next chapters, I will test the proposed hypotheses 
with empirical analyses.  
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Chapter  3: The Effect of Democratization on Political Budget Cycles  
 
This chapter examines the politicization of macroeconomic policy in developmental 
states and the effects of democratization on political budget cycles (PBCs) using empirical 
analyses. In Chapter 1, I proposed that greater politicization occurred in developmental states 
than what the bureaucracy dominance thesis holds. I argued that the degree of PBCs in Korea 
should not have significantly changed after the democratization because the increased 
constraints under democracy have offset the increased incentives for manipulation. In this 
chapter, I provide empirical evidence to support the arguments made in the previous chapters. 
This chapter, which consists of four sections, is organized as follows. First I begin with a 
brief review of empirical studies on PBCs in Korea, focusing on a comparison of their 
findings and the methodologies they employed. Next I explore the preliminary evidence of 
PBCs in Korea. Section 3 summarizes the testable hypotheses, and Section 4 tests the 
hypotheses using mainly time series analysis. I conclude with a discussion on the empirical 
findings and their theoretical implications.  
 
I. REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON PBCS IN KOREA 
It is not surprising that very few studies on PBCs have focused on developmental 
states in East Asia, given that developmental states in the region have been regarded as “hard 
cases” for detecting the effects of elections on economic policy. Here, I briefly survey the 
empirical analyses used in several key studies that explore the case of Korea. Table 3-1 
summarizes the results of the survey.  
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Table 3-1. Existing Empirical Studies on PBCs in Korea 
Author Dependent Variables Data Period for 
Analysis 
Methodology PBC 
Soh (1988) Government expenditure 
Money supply 
Not 
specified 
1962-1979 OLS Partially exists 
but not by 
election  
Kim (1999) Economic growth 
Inflation  
Money supply 
Stock price index 
Quarterly 1981-1996 Descriptive 
Statistics Not exists 
An (2002) Money supply 
Budget balance 
Quarterly 1963-1997 ARIMA Conditionally 
exists only in 
fiscal policy 
Kwon 
(2005) 
Government expenditure Quarterly 1988-1997 AR(1)  
(Prais-Winsten) Exists 
 
 
Koh (1988) tries to determine whether a political business cycle existed in Korea 
during the Park Chung Hee regime from 1962 to 1979. According to Koh, although Korea 
had a somewhat different election environment than Western democracies, there was no 
reason for an incumbent politician not to manipulate business cycles for the maximization of 
his or her political gain. The evidence presented in this work indicates that political 
disturbances were influenced by economic conditions, and economic policy measures seemed 
to reflect political considerations.  Although this study does not address the effect of the 
timing of elections on fiscal and monetary policies, it shows that political disturbances, 
including student demonstration and labor disputes, affected government expenditures and 
the money supply.  However, Koh’s argument is not supported by his empirical analysis 
because he employs an unsophisticated statistical method.  For instance, the regression 
results supporting his arguments include autocorrelation problem as he himself notes. Some 
Durbin-Watson statistics are 2.6000 and 0.243 because OLS is employed without addressing 
the serial correlation problem. 
Chae-Han Kim (1999), on the other hand, tries to examine the possibility of PBCs in 
Korea by using economic voting theory. According to him, since Korean voters do not have 
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strong beliefs regarding the incumbent party’s responsibility for the national economy, the 
government’s intentional manipulation of economy before elections is not demonstrated by 
his analysis. However, Kim’s study is limited in that he presents only some descriptive 
indicators without a systematic in-depth analysis.  
An’s (2002) study presents a major challenge to the bureaucracy dominance thesis in 
developmental states. This study suggests that Korean governments tend to manipulate fiscal 
and monetary policies only when faced with difficult economic and political conditions. The 
study also suggests implicitly that democratic governments tend to manipulate economy 
under electoral pressure.  An’s study is worthy of notice in that he tries to incorporate 
various political variables such as the incumbent party’s popularity, election rules, regime 
type, and closeness to elections. The statistical method is also more sophisticated compared 
with the previous studies. However, the limitations of this study are two-fold. First, the 
operationalization of some political variables seems arbitrary. For instance, no concrete and 
objective criteria are provided when he measures a government’s popularity, which is coded 
minus one (-1) for each political event that has a negative impact on the incumbent and plus 
one (+1) for each positive event.  He also categorizes a government’s popularity into three 
groups without considering combining numerical variables. Secondly, some statistical 
methods used are inappropriate for testing An’s hypotheses. For instance, he uses interaction 
terms to test the significance of interaction effect between an election and popularity, and 
between proximity and regime. However, he simply adds interaction terms, omitting the 
original individual variables in the equation. As Gujarati (1995) points out, without the 
original variables, we cannot estimate whether the simultaneous presence of the two 
attributes will attenuate or reinforce the individual effects of each attribute.  Despite his 
ambitious theoretical questioning of bureaucracy dominance thesis, the study’s arguments are 
insufficiently supported by his empirical analysis because of the inappropriate methodology.  
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Kwon (2005) tests the existence of political budget cycles in developmental states, 
and extends his analysis in an attempt to detect whether targeted spending was used for 
electoral purposes. With relatively parsimonious methods, this study provides clear evidence 
of the electoral manipulation of the macro-economy. In addition to the excellent literature 
review that combines PBC theories with developmental state theory, Kwon provides an 
appropriate interpretation of empirical evidence within the historical context. However, the 
empirical analysis falls short. The time period for his analysis extends from 1988 to 1997, 
which falls within the post-democratization era. During this period, electoral competition in 
the Korean politics was restored and bureaucrats were not free from the impact of electoral 
politics.  
In order to delve into Kwon’s thesis, we must first address the questions: what is the 
core assumption of the bureaucratic dominance thesis? Were the bureaucrats apolitical when 
they made major decisions and if so, why?  Could bureaucrats make major decisions based 
on the long-term development objectives without taking into account short-term political 
considerations, that is, the risk of losing election (Kim 1987, Haggard 1990, Chu 1989)? 
Given that the restriction of electoral competition was regarded as a prerequisite of successful 
economic growth in the developmental states, the main characteristic of the developmental 
states was eroded with democratization. As Kwon admits, “the findings of this paper may not 
be conceived to disconfirm the literature on the developmental state, which is presumed to 
have been at its height during the pre-democratization period.” Thus Kwon’s empirical 
analysis does not provide a “revisionist” view of the developmental state. If he has aimed to 
target the core of developmental states, he should have directed his attention to the pre-
democratization period. Otherwise, there is no difference between this study and the demise 
of developmental state thesis. In addition, the 10 years – 40 quarters – that are included in 
this analysis is not so long enough for time series regression.  
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It should be also noted that the dependent variables used in the previous studies have 
some limitations with regard to their ability to capture the incumbent’s intentional actions for 
political purposes because the variables include both cyclical factors in a market economy as 
well as factors that are at a government’s discretion. This will be discussed again in section 4.   
 
 
II. PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS  
In order to test the existence of a political budget cycle, a more sophisticated and strict 
statistical analysis is required. As will be further elaborated in the later sections, the statistical 
analysis used in this dissertation isolates GDP growth from economic cycles in order to 
determine whether an incumbent has discretion over the fiscal stance in a certain period. The 
timing of elections is the main independent variable of the analysis. Here, I will conduct a 
preliminary analysis by selecting critical cases of PBCs. This analysis becomes more 
substantial with the consideration of the political and economic environment in which an 
election is held and the issues that concerned policymakers. Using the preliminary evidence 
derived from this section, Section 4 will examine the occurrence and the degree of change in 
political budget cycles in South Korea before and after democratization.  
 In order to determine the occurrence of a PBC at this stage without statistical 
analysis, we must verify certain conditions.  First, an election held during a recession period 
is not appropriate when determining whether an incumbent has manipulated macroeconomic 
policy during an election. According to PBC theories, incumbents tend to increase 
expenditure right before an election and to decrease it right after an election. In a similar vein, 
incumbents tend to decrease tax revenue before an election and increase it after an election. 
However, when an election is held during a recession, it is difficult to determine whether an 
increase in expenditure or a decrease in tax revenue indicates a PBC or is caused by a 
counter-cyclical adjustment in the recession period without a statistical analysis with all other 
variables controlled. In contrast, during an expansion period when the economy is in 
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upswing, a government should take counter-cyclical policies that could “cool down” the 
economy as a stabilization policy.  Thus the counter-cyclical policies implemented during 
an economic expansion period tend to increase tax revenue and decrease expenditure. Hence, 
if we find evidence of decrease in tax revenue or increase in expenditure around an election 
period during an economic expansion, we can speculate that the fiscal policy during the 
period has been manipulated for political objectives. This is especially likely to be the case if 
Cooper and Haggard’s (1988) assertion that South Korean governments successfully manage 
counter-cycles is correct.   
I will first focus on the pre-democratization period. Presidential elections during the 
Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan regimes were rituals that lacked competitiveness, but 
the legislative elections were more competitive. The elections that provided incentives for the 
incumbents to manipulate fiscal policy included the National Assembly Elections held in the 
years 1973, 1978, 1981, and 1984. Except for the 1973 election, the other three elections 
were held during a recession period as defined by the Statistics Korea’s (KOSTAT) analysis 
of business cycles in Korea. Therefore, these elections are inappropriate for this preliminary 
analysis.4
 
 By contrast, the 9th National Election was held on February 9, 1973 during an 
economic expansion period and therefore can be used as a viable case study.  
                                                 
4 See Appendix 1 for the characteristics of fiscal policy around the three elections.   
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Figure 3-1. Business Cycles in Korea  
 
T: Trough, P: Peak  
Source: Korean Statistical Information Service, http://kosis.kr/   
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In a similar vein, eight elections held in the post-democratization period can be 
considered as viable case studies, including the 1992, 1997, 2002, and 2007 Presidential 
Elections and the 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004 National Assembly Elections. The 16th National 
Assembly Election (2000), which was held during a period of economic expansion, is adopted as 
a case-study.5
 
 As noted earlier, the other seven elections held during recession are excluded 
because there is no certain way to determine whether an increase in the expenditure or a decrease 
in the tax revenue during these elections indicates a PBC or caused by a counter-cyclical 
adjustment.  
1. Pre-democratization per iod: The ninth National Assembly Election in 1973  
 
The 9th National Assembly Election held in 1973 was the first election held under Park 
Chung Hee’s Yushin System. From Park’s perspective, it was an occasion to test the 
effectiveness of the N=2 SNTV, which was designed and implemented to increase the DRP’s 
urban representation and to soothe political conflicts with the opposition parties. Considering the 
political pressure that Park faced just after declaration of the Yushin Constitution, we can 
speculate that he had a strong incentive to manipulate fiscal policy for political objectives. 
South Korea’s economy was struggling with inflation during this period. The Guidelines 
for Budget Compilation for the fiscal year of 1972 reflects these concerns.6
                                                 
5 See Appendix 1 for the characteristics of fiscal policy around the seven elections.  
 The Guidelines for 
Budget Compilation for the fiscal years 1972 and 1973 urged the government to refrain from 
increases in public utility fees and wages to ease inflationary pressures. The guidelines 
demanded that only a limited number of key industries receive tax exemptions and that tax 
6 “The guidelines – annually drawn up by the Ministry of Finance and Economy and conveyed to other government 
ministries – effectively serve as an instruction to which each ministry refers during the budget-compilation stage. A 
president’s policy priorities – such as presidential campaign pledges – are well incorporated into” it (Horiuchi and 
Lee 2008). 
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exemptions should be cut in general to increase tax revenue. In addition, it sought to block the 
government from hiring new civil servants and placed restrictions on benefits paid to the civil 
servants. In short, the guidelines were calling for a counter-cyclical adjustment during a period of 
economic expansion.  
There is a difference between fiscal policy guidelines published by the government and 
the actual revenue and expenditure. The chart below shows the revenue and expenditure during 
the four quarters that preceded and followed the 1Q of 1973 when the 9th National Assembly 
Election was held. It indicates that the revenue had increased according to the guidance’s plan 
since the 1Q of 1972, four quarters before the election. The revenue in this quarter was 182.3 
billion Won, a 32.0% increase compared to the same quarter in the previous year (YoY). This 
trend in the revenue continued until the 3Q of 1972. In contrast, during the 4Q of 1972, right 
before the election, revenue reached 173.0 billion Won, a 3.5% decrease from the previous year 
(YoY). In the 1Q of 1973, when the election was held, revenue declined 0.6 % YoY but rapidly 
increased soon after the election. By the 4Q of 1973, it reached 40.5% YoY. This fluctuation in 
revenue—the decline observed before and during the election quarter—during a period when the 
economy did not experience any dramatic changes, leads us to speculate that this was a typical 
political budget cycle.  
Expenditure policies did not adhere to the government’s fiscal guidelines either. The 
records show quarterly increases of 35.7%, 25.1%, 42.7%, 36.9%, and 21.0% respectively from 
the 1Q of 1972 to the 1Q of 1973. Immediately after the election (1Q of 1973), expenditure was 
significantly reduced. By the 4Q of 1973, it fell to 1.6%. What we see here is a typical PBC. We 
discover the same pattern when we examine the fourth-quarter moving average (4QMA) and 
when we compare all revenue and expenditure in the previous quarter to the current quarter 
(QoQ).  
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Table 3-2. Revenue and Expenditure around the 9th National Assembly Election 
 
1972 1Q 1972 2Q 1972 3Q 1972 4Q
1973 1Q
Election
1973 2Q 1973 3Q 1973 4Q 1974 1Q
Revenue 182.3 188.8 200.8 173.0 181.3 206.4 249.4 243.1 320.9
YoY 32.0 22.5 32.7 -3.5 -0.6 9.4 24.2 40.5 77.0
QoQ 1.7 3.5 6.4 -13.8 4.8 13.9 20.8 -2.5 32.0
4QMA 7.5 5.5 7.5 -0.6 0.2 2.8 6.4 9.2 16.0
Expenditur 192.5 189.2 224.3 246.1 232.8 200.7 231.0 250.1 370.3
YoY 35.7 25.1 42.7 36.9 21.0 6.1 3.0 1.6 59.1
QoQ 7.0 -1.7 18.5 9.7 -5.4 -13.8 15.1 8.3 48.1
4QMA 8.0 5.9 9.6 8.4 5.3 2.3 1.4 1.0 14.4  
 
Source: Ministry of Strategy and Finance 
 
To summarize, as demonstrated by the figures below, revenue during the period followed 
the government’s fiscal guidelines in general and displayed evidence of counter-cyclical 
adjustments. However, we can also observe a drastic decline in tax revenue just before the 
election, and then a rapid recovery just after the election. Another finding is that while the 
Guidelines for Budget Compilation for fiscal years 1972 and 1973 called for budget austerity, 
expenditures increased until the first quarter of 1973. The expansionary expenditure continued 
during the election period and plummeted just after the election. The trend shows pro-cyclical 
adjustments before the election and then a return to counter-cyclical adjustments after the 
election. Such short-term manipulation can only be explained by intervention for political gains. 
In other words, it is highly probable that the Park regime manipulated revenue and expenditure 
policy during this period in order to rally support in the short term.  
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Figure 3-2. Budget Cycles around the 9th National Assembly Election 
 
Source: Ministry of Strategy and Finance 
 
2. Post-democratization per iod: The sixteenth National Assembly Election  
 
The 16th National Assembly Election held in 2000 was the first election after the 
peaceful transition in 1998 led by President Kim Dae Jung. Although President Kim won the 
election through a successful coalition with Kim Jong Pil’s ULD party, the coalition remained a 
minority at his inauguration. The Kim administration resolved the divided-government issue by 
gaining a majority through an artificial political reorganization just as his predecessors had. Kim 
Dae Jung faced many challenges including a political rivalry with minority parties as well as 
unresolved problems from the 1997 financial crisis. When Roh Tae Woo, Kim Young Sam, and 
Kim Jong Pil attempted to merge their parties in 1990, Kim Dae Jung’s PDP resisted vigorously. 
The 16th Election held in April 2000 hence presented a critical opportunity for the Kim 
administration to rescue the President’s reputation, which was impaired by his use of the very 
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undemocratic practice he himself had once criticized. Thus, the Kim administration had 
sufficient incentives for political manipulation of fiscal policy for the election.  
The 1999 budget was the first budget set by the Kim administration after he took office. 
The Guidelines for Budget Compilation for fiscal years 1999 and 2000 reflected the difficulties 
the Kim administration was facing. President Kim took office in the immediate aftermath of the 
1997 financial crisis and thus was faced with low growth, a decrease in consumption, a high 
unemployment rate, and a decline in corporate profits, to name a few of the problems. In order to 
effectively support the restructuring of the financial sector, it was necessary to increase tax 
revenue but this was difficult to achieve. 
 
Table 3-3. Budget Cycles around the 15th National Assembly Election   
1999 3Q 1999 4Q 2000 1Q
2000 2Q
Election
2000 3Q 2000 4Q
Revenue 23044.3 16586.9 26533.3 31025.3 27291.6 25311.1
YoY -7.4 -33.0 -16.5 20.1 18.4 52.6
QoQ -10.8 -28.0 60.0 16.9 -12.0 -7.3
4QMA -0.4 -7.3 0.6 9.5 9.2 14.4
Expenditu 22870.8 26369.7 24765.5 27292.5 31226.4 32944.7
YoY -22.4 -25.2 -22.7 -13.3 36.5 24.9
QoQ -27.3 15.3 -6.1 10.2 14.4 5.5
4QMA -4.7 -5.7 -5.0 -2.0 8.5 6.0  
Source: Ministry of Strategy and Finance 
 
When we look at the actual budget, we see that revenues steadily decreased from 4 
quarters prior to the election to the 2Q of 2000 when the election was held. From the 3Q of 1999 
to the 1Q of 2000, the revenue declined quarterly by -7.4%, -33.0%, and -16.5% YoY 
respectively. What is interesting, however, is that revenue began to increase beginning with the 
2Q of 2000. In other words, the revenue that experienced a downturn until the second quarter of 
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2000, recovered after the election, increasing by 52.6% YoY in the 4Q of 2000. The reduction 
before the election might have been a response to the low economic growth and high 
unemployment rate. However, the fact that revenue increased immediately after the election 
leads us to suspect that these shifts were politically motivated.   
In sum, the two case-studies, one from the pre-democratization period and the other from 
the post-democratization period, were analyzed in this section to test for PBCs. We can infer that 
the government used fiscal policy for political ends during the 9th National Assembly Election 
held in 1973 under the Park regime. The delay in the revenue increase in 2000 and the timing of 
the 16th National Assembly Election held in 2000 under the Kim Dae Jung administration also 
suggests political motivations were at work.  
 
Figure 3-3. Trend of Revenue and Expenditure in the National Assembly Election in 2000 
 
Source: Ministry of Strategy and Finance 
 
 
-40.0  
-30.0  
-20.0  
-10.0  
0.0  
10.0  
20.0  
30.0  
40.0  
50.0  
60.0  
1999 3Q 1999 4Q 2000 1Q 2000 2Q 
Election  
2000 3Q 2000 4Q P
er
ce
nt
, Y
oY
 
Trend of Revenue and Expenditure:  
National Assembly Election Period in 2000  
Rev 
Exp 
129 
 
III. TESTABLE HYPOTHESES 
 
Two hypotheses are tested in this chapter. These hypotheses are based on the previous 
discussion about the possibility that PBCs may exist in a developmental state even before 
democratization and that these PBCs continued to exist, without much change, after 
democratization. 
 
1. PBC in Developmental States Hypothesis 
 
PBC occurred in a developmental state. 
 
The bureaucracy dominance thesis holds that few, if any, PBCs occurred in 
developmental states because macroeconomic management was conducted by autonomous and 
competent bureaucrats, who focused on the long-term policy-making. Therefore, it is believed 
that PBCs, a short-term manipulation of economic cycle for political gains, were either non-
existent or weak at best in these countries. 7
  
 However, as Pempel (1999) points out, the 
assumption about apolitical bureaucrats in developmental states is worth testing empirically. In 
addition, a recent empirical study shows that governments of a less-democratic newly-
industrialized country such as South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Malaysia are more sensitive 
to their economic performance than what conventional theories suggest (Yap, 2005). The 
government, even if it is authoritarian, might not be able to avoid bargaining with its citizens 
under weak or less-than-optimal economic conditions because citizens acting rationally and 
strategically may choose to withdraw resources such as labor and production investment.  
 
                                                 
7 Kwon (2005) finds empirical evidence of PBCs in South Korea, but, as noted earlier, his analysis deals only with 
the post-democratization period from 1988 to 1997.  
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2. Democratization Effect on PBC Hypothesis 
 
The degree of PBCs in Korea did not change significantly after democratization because 
the increased constraints under democracy offset the increased incentives for manipulation.  
 
The challenges developmental states have faced in dealing with changed internal and 
external environments have led to “the demise of developmental states,” according to some 
scholars (Weiss and Hobson 1995, Cheng and Krause 1991, Moon and Kim 1995). They suggest 
that democratization has eroded certain institutional characteristics of developmental states, 
making them much more vulnerable to PBCs. It then follows that PBCs emerge as a result of 
democratization, especially when electoral competition begins to toughen.  
This study, however, challenges the conventional wisdom that PBCs require significant 
electoral competition and instead proposes that PBCs are shaped not only by incentives (electoral 
competition) but also by constraints, such as the checks and balances exercised by a viable 
opposition party, independent central bank, free press, and civil society. From this perspective, 
we can re-write PBCs’ function as below: 
 
Pi=f (Ii, Ci), where Pi is individual politician’s action for PBCs; Ii, the incentives for 
PBCs; and Ci, the constraints against PBCs  
 
If incentives for PBCs are greater than constraints (Ii > Ci), we can expect that 
incumbents will try to manipulate economic conditions. Otherwise, the likelihood of PBCs will 
decrease. In other words, the magnitude of difference between incentives and constraints will 
determine the likelihood of PBC. Thus, this research hypothesizes that the increased constraints 
(checks and balances) offset the increased incentives (electoral competition) after 
democratization. As a result, I expect that democratization might not have significantly 
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influenced the degree of PBCs in developmental states, in spite of widespread concerns about the 
negative consequences of democratization on economic policy.  
Below, I test the above hypothesis by examining whether democratization has changed 
the degree of the PBCs in Korea. Table 3-4 compares my theoretical expectation with those of 
other authors.  
 
Table 3-4. Hypothesis and Theoretical Expectation 
Hypotheses Variable My Expected Effect Existing Explanations 
 
Existence of PBC Election Timing 
+ 
(pre- and post-
democratization period) 
n/a 
 
+ 
Bureaucracy Dominance Thesis 
 
Kwon (post-democratization) 
Democratization 
effect on PBC Democratization +  + 
n/a  + 
 
 
 
?  + 
“Demise of Developmental States” 
Thesis 
 
 
Kwon 
 
 
IV.  STATISTICAL ANALYSIS  
 
1. Data 
 Economic Data 
 
This chapter uses over 124 quarters of economic data from South Korea from the first 
quarter of 1970 to the fourth quarter of 2000. This time period is selected for the analysis 
because of the availability of quarterly fiscal data in Seoul. Quarterly or monthly budget data are 
used whenever possible in order to trace the impact of election timing on fiscal policy. The 
quarterly data are selected instead of yearly budget data not only because the latter provides too 
few number of observations for a reasonable time-series analysis, but also because annual data 
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cannot effectively detect short-term manipulations of the incumbent’s fiscal stance. The fiscal 
data in Korea has experienced some structural changes brought out by adoption of consolidated 
budget system in accordance with international criteria exemplified by A Manual on Government 
Statistics of the IMF (IMF 2001, 2003). Yearly data on consolidated central government budget 
have been compiled and disseminated by the Korean Government since 1979; quarterly data 
since the first quarter of 1994; and monthly data, since July 1999. Unfortunately, it was not 
feasible to use the quarterly data set that dates from 1994 because the data are too short for time 
series analysis and not suitable for a study that compares pre- and post- democratization periods.  
Given the discontinuous time series of fiscal data in Korea, I instead use quarterly 
revenue and expenditure data from the Monthly Statistics of Korea issued by the Bureau of 
Statistics Korea, which are identical to the fiscal statistics issued by the Bank of Korea. Although 
this dataset does not incorporate the revenues and expenditures of local governments8
The starting point of this analysis is the first quarter of 1970 because it is also the starting 
point of a consistent time series of GDP data. In the next section, I also use quarterly GDP data 
to derive dependent variables for this analysis. The quarterly GDP data has been seasonally 
adjusted by the Bank of Korea. Since we need data on potential GDP to calculate the GDP gap 
and Fiscal Impulse, I calculate the potential GDP using the Hodrick-Prescott filter, widely 
 and the 
social security system, it does include the central government’s general accounts, special 
accounts, public funds and others. The data was reported until the fourth quarter of 2000 and 
then was replaced by the consolidated budget data. Therefore, this dataset does not include the 
recent fiscal data, but it is sufficient for our analysis in this chapter that focuses on the effects of 
democratization on PBC in South Korea.  All fiscal data is seasonally adjusted with X-12 
ARIMA by author.  
                                                 
8 Strictly speaking, the consolidated budget system has not incorporated local government yet (Ministry of Planning 
and Budget, Korea 2002).  
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employed in macroeconomics especially in real business cycle study to isolate the cyclical 
component of a time series from raw data.  
 
 Political Data 
The main political variable in this chapter is the timing of elections. This chapter covers 7 
presidential elections, 9 legislative elections, and 3 nationwide local elections held between the 
years of 1970 and 2000 (Table 3-5).  The timing of elections in South Korea is fixed. The term 
for legislators in the National Assembly is four years. Presidential elections were held every four 
years from 1970 to 1972, six years from 1972 to 1979 while from 1980 to 1987 the election 
interval was seven years. Since 1987, presidential elections have been held every five years. 
Local elections were introduced in 1991. (National Election Commission, www.nec.go.kr )  
 
 
Table 3-5. Election Date in South Korea 
 
Type of Elections Date (Month, Year) 
Presidential 
Election 
April 1971, Dec. 1972, Dec. 1978, Dec. 1981, 
Dec. 1987, Dec. 1992, Dec. 1997 
Legislative 
Election 
May 1971, Feb. 1973, Dec. 1978, March 1981, 
Feb. 1985, April 1988, March 1992, May 1996, 
April 2000 
Local Election March 1991, June 1995, June 1998 
 
Source: National Election Commission ( www.nec.go.kr ) 
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2. Variables 
 
Dependent Variable 
The main dependent variable in this chapter is the incumbent’s fiscal position which is 
used to test Hypotheses 1 and 2. Simply put, a government’s fiscal policy can be characterized as 
“expansionary” or “contractionary.” To estimate the effects of the timing of elections on fiscal 
policy, I use quarterly fiscal impulse, calculated by separating the actual budget balance into two 
components—a cyclically neutral component and a fiscal stance component, as an indicator to 
measure the discretionary change in the budgetary position of the incumbents.    
Much of the literature on Political Budget Cycles has relied on total central government 
expenditures to measure an incumbent government’s efforts to use fiscal policy in order to 
manipulate the economic situation before elections. In fact, expansionary fiscal policies can be 
an effective means of influencing the government’s popularity among its citizens. However, 
expenditures reflect just one side of fiscal policy. In fact, the ruling government produces 
expansionary fiscal policies before an election in two ways: first by increasing the government 
expenditures and, second by decreasing taxes (Schunecht 1994). The government may use either 
one of these policy tools or both simultaneously (An 2002). Therefore, a government’s budget 
balance is a better indicator than its expenditures, when investigating its fiscal policies for 
possible manipulation.  
However, the actual fiscal balance may not be a good indicator to measure changes in 
fiscal policy. Economic growth rates are important determinants of fiscal position. In other 
words, the actual fiscal budget balance is shaped by certain cyclical factors in a market economy 
as well as by the government’s discretionary policies. We therefore need to separate the effects 
of the government’s discretionary policies from the effects of economic cycles. In this study, I 
am mainly interested in those changes in fiscal policy that result from intentional actions by the 
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incumbent party, as Alesina and Perotti (1995) suggest. In other words, I am less interested in 
those changes that come from the effect of the economic cycle on expenditure and tax revenues.   
The fiscal impulse can be a better indicator to isolate the effects of economic cycles and 
to determine whether a government’s fiscal policy is expansionary or contractionary. The fiscal 
impulse measure used in this study is similar to that used in the IMF’s World Economic Outlook 
(Heller et al. 1986). It is calculated by separating the actual budget balance into two 
components—a cyclically neutral component and a fiscal stance component. The cyclically 
neutral component is defined by assuming that nominal tax revenues are unit elastic with respect 
to actual nominal GDP and that government expenditures are unit elastic with respect to potential 
output valued at current prices.9
Despite the simplicity of the calculation, the fiscal impulse indicator has not been widely 
used in political budget cycle studies, especially in the time series analyses, with a few notable 
exceptions, including the works of Alesina and Perotti (1995), Von Hargen (2005), and Mink 
and Haan (2006). It is only in recent years that this indicator, which has commonly been used for 
 The fiscal stance component – the difference between the 
cyclically neutral and the actual budget balance – then captures the full effect of automatic 
stabilizers and discretionary changes in fiscal policy. The fiscal impulse is basically the annual 
change in the fiscal stance measure expressed as a share of GDP. Negative fiscal impulse 
indicates a more contractionary fiscal policy relative to that of the previous year, and positive 
fiscal impulse indicates a more expansionary demand impulse. Based on the previous discussion, 
I apply this method to calculate quarterly fiscal impulse. A more detailed description of the fiscal 
impulse calculation method is provided in Appendix 1 to Chapter 3. The result of these 
calculations is reported in Figure 4.1, along with the timing of elections in Korea.  
                                                 
9 As will be mentioned in Appendix 1, the unit elasticity has been criticized as an unrealistic assumption by many 
studies.  Simplicity of this measurement is its weakest and strongest point. Given that the other alternative requires 
complicated and sensitive measurement as well as sufficient data, the Fiscal Impulse used by the IMF can be a 
plausible alternative.  
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fiscal adjustment analysis such as those conducted by Alesina and Perotti (1995), is being 
employed in PBC studies.  
 
 Independent Variables 
The pre-election period dummy variable constitutes the main independent variable that 
allows me to test the hypotheses in this chapter. The Election variable takes the value of 1 in the 
period when expansionary policies are expected, 0 otherwise. I code N quarters prior to the 
election as the “pre-election periods” to denote the time lag between the policy implementation 
and the real electoral effects expected by incumbents. N = {1~4} quarters because it is not 
certain a priori how long these effects are likely to last. To compare the pattern of fiscal policy in 
pre- and post-election in the later part of the analysis, I also choose N = {-4~4} quarters.  
To test Hypothesis 2, I include a dichotomous democracy variable, coded 1 during 
periods where Korea was a democracy, and 0 otherwise. This indicator is extracted from the 
Polity IV Database developed by Marshall and Jaggers (2002) and Freedom House. The widely 
accepted turning point of democratization in Korea is the fourth quarter in 1987. This variable is 
used to estimate the interactive effect that the timing of elections and democracy have on fiscal 
policy.  
 
Control Variables 
I also control for some economic variables that affect the dependent variable. First, the 
GDP Gap (differenced) is used to control for a government’s response to a cyclical fluctuation in 
economy. If a country’s economy is moving toward a recession or is already experiencing it, the 
government of the country will typically adopt an expansionary fiscal stance. If the economy is 
booming, a contractionary policy will typically be employed to prevent the economy from 
overheating. If governments adopt a pro-cyclical fiscal stance, the coefficient of this variable 
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would be positive and if governments employ counter-cyclical policies, the coefficient will be 
negative.  
The other control variable is the change in the actual budget balance in the previous 
quarter. If the actual budget balance is negative, the fiscal stance of a government will tend to be 
contractionary to avoid deficit financing. 
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Figure 3-4. Fiscal Impulse and Election Timing 
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3. Methodology 
 
To assess the impact of election timing on fiscal policy and the effect of democratization 
on political budget cycles in Korea, I employ two main sets of statistical tests. The purpose of the 
first test is to see whether there are electoral effects on economic policy during all periods, 
regardless of the type of regime in power. The second test investigates if there is a significant 
difference in the degree of pre-election manipulation of economy before (1970-1987) and after 
(1988-2000) the democratization of South Korea. 
 
The basic time series regression model 
The basic model of the first test is: 
 
t  ,Y = Election+ k k t tZα β γ ε+ +  
 
where Yt denotes the fiscal impulse in time t, Election refers to dummy variables for the 
pre-(sometimes post-) election periods when expansionary (contractionary) fiscal policy is 
expected. Z is a vector of exogenous variables that affect the government’s fiscal stance: changes 
in the GDP gap and the actual budget deficit. tε is the disturbance term. If the expectations of 
PBC theory are correct, the coefficient of the Election variable should be positive.  
To take into account the problem of serial correlation of error terms, I employ the 
ARIMA (Auto-Regressive Integrated Moving Average) model (Box and Jenkins 1976, Hamilton 
1994, Gujarati 1995). The ARIMA procedure helps us identify time-trends in time-series and 
controls for the effect of time-trends on the regression model. It requires three steps: 
identification, estimation, and diagnosis. A detailed description of the ARIMA procedure 
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employed in this chapter is given in Appendix 2 to Chapter 3. Using this approach, I include 
ARMA (2, 1) terms for the dependent variable (Fiscal Impulse) in the ARIMA regression model.  
 
Time-Varying Effect of Democratization on F iscal Policy  
 
The second test examines whether there is a significant difference in the frequency and 
degree of pre-election manipulation of the economy between the non-democratic periods (1970-
1987) and the democratic periods (1988-2000) in Korea. In order to verify that what we are 
observing are time-varying effects, I divide the 124 observations into two sub-periods based on 
the prevailing regime type—72 quarters for the non- or pre-democratization period and 52 
quarters for post-democratization period. However, if we employ this method, we lose a large 
number of observations in each statistical test.  I therefore also use another approach, including 
a democracy dummy variable for all periods, and interacting it with the Election independent 
variable. If the theoretical argument of the “demise of developmental state” thesis is correct, the 
coefficient of the interaction variable should be positive. If my expectations are correct, the 
coefficient should not be statistically significant. Table 3-4 summarizes the expectations of my 
analyses and other approaches.  
I use the Chow test on the equation of the first test. The Chow test is simply “a test of 
whether the coefficients estimated over one group of the data are equal to the coefficients 
estimated over another” (Gould 2002: 1) using F-statistics. Since the ARIMA regression model 
in this chapter is a nonlinear econometric model and thus does not have F-statistics, I employ a 
Chow-type Wald test functionally equivalent to the Chow test. Finally, to examine the stability 
of the effect of elections on the fiscal stance of the government, I use a moving (rolling) 
regression analysis (Lin 1999). A sub-period for this moving regression consists of 40 
consecutive quarters. 
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4.  Estimation and Empir ical Results 
 
Test for Existence of PBC Hypothesis  
Table 3-6 displays the results of the time series ARIMA regressions for testing the 
hypothesis on the existence of PBCs in Korea. The main independent variable in this chapter is 
the Election dummy variable. The Election dummy variables are tested in three possible forms. 
The first specification is the most widely used in the opportunistic PBC literature (Alesina et 
al.1997, Kwon 2003).10
Another specification is to include all of the dummy variables in the estimated regression 
simultaneously (Gonzalez 2002, Faust and Irons 1999), as Column (5) shows. This approach 
helps us “identify effects that are specific single quarters in the political term. … The horizon has 
been chosen to be sufficiently long in order to capture the pattern in which economic policy is 
manipulated, and to avoid a possible discontinuity” (Gonzalez 2002). The other specification is a 
combined one. Based on the above two specifications, we can identify which dummy variable 
terms are statistically significant. In Table 3-6, two dummies – Q2 and Q3 – are statistically 
significant. Thus I include these two dummies in the estimated regression at the same time and 
exclude the other dummies as shown in Column (6).  
 In this specification, only one election dummy is included in the 
equation at a time, that is, n=1. As mentioned earlier, I test from N=1 to N=4 quarters prior to the 
election. Columns (1) to (4) in Table 3-6 show the above mentioned methods.  
Table 3-6 presents parameter estimates of the effects of election timing on fiscal impulse. 
As columns (3), (5), and (6) show, two pre-election period specifications - Q2 and Q3- display 
                                                 
10 This specification has been criticized since “it implicitly restricts the pre-election policy manipulation to be the 
same in every quarter…the dummy has a discontinuous nature, dropping from 1 to 0 around the pre-election 
horizon; … it might not be reasonable to expect such a discontinuity in policy, especially at the beginning of the pre-
election period.” (Gonzalez 2002) 
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evidence that supports electoral manipulation of economy, although we do not have any 
theoretical reasons to observe variation in the effect of different pre-election periods.  In other 
words, fiscal policy is more expansionary two or three quarters before the elections. The test 
provides empirical evidence that Korean fiscal policies are shaped to a significant extent by an 
incumbent party’s electoral concerns during the periods studied. This finding supports 
Hypothesis 1 regarding the existence of PBC in Korea.    
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Table 3-6. Timing of Election 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
DV: FI 
 
      
∆GDP Gap 0.128*** 0.134*** 0.126*** 0.131*** 0.128*** 0.127*** 
 (0.0175) (0.0196) (0.0164) (0.0175) (0.0161) (0.0160) 
∆Budget Deficit -0.990*** -0.982*** -0.987*** -0.991*** -0.988*** -0.988*** 
 (0.0166) (0.0143) (0.0176) (0.0160) (0.0174) (0.0171) 
Pre-Election 0.0117    0.0418  
(Q4) (0.0579)    (0.0453)  
Pre-Election  0.137   0.137* 0.127* 
(Q3)  (0.0803)   (0.0546) (0.0553) 
Pre-Election   0.163*  0.173** 0.167* 
(Q2)   (0.0770)  (0.0663) (0.0681) 
Pre-Election    0.0375 0.0720  
(Q1)    (0.0761) (0.0594)  
_cons -0.0869 -0.0705 -0.114 -0.0592 -0.153 -0.139 
 (0.189) (0.0370) (0.189) (0.0471) (0.186) (0.203) 
ARMA       
AR(1) 0.846* -0.762*** 0.775* 0.169 0.751** 0.763** 
 (0.402) (0.134) (0.341) (0.119) (0.282) (0.280) 
AR(2) 0.0611 0.119 0.131 0.182 0.154 0.150 
 (0.137) (0.145) (0.131) (0.108) (0.120) (0.117) 
MA(1) -0.718 1.000*** -0.680* 774.7 -0.649* -0.671** 
 (0.386) (0.001) (0.321) (.) (0.265) (0.260) 
sigma       
_cons 0.315*** 0.319*** 0.310*** -0.000413*** 0.305*** 0.307*** 
 (0.0411) (0.0343) (0.0425) (0.0000439) (0.0433) (0.0433) 
N 122 122 122 122 122 122 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Test for Democratization Effect on PBC Hypothesis  
As the developmental state underwent democratization, did manipulation of 
macroeconomic conditions by incumbents to help their reelection possibilities increase? To 
answer this question, the second test examines whether there was a significant change in the 
degree of economic manipulation before elections between the non-democratic period (1970-
1987) and the democratic periods (1988-2000). The effects of democratization on the PBC are 
tested in three possible forms as mentioned earlier. First, we separate the dataset into two periods 
and estimate each parameter as Columns (2) and (3) in Table 3-7 show. Second, I include a 
variable of democracy for all periods and interact it with the Election dummy term. If the 
expectation of “demise of developmental states” thesis is correct, the coefficient of the 
interaction variable should be positive, which means that PBC is a new phenomenon introduced 
after democratization. If on the other hand my hypothesis is correct, the coefficient of the 
interaction variable should not be statistically significant, indicating that the increased constraints 
(checks and balance) on the PBC offset the increased incentives (electoral competition) after 
democratization.  
Table 3-7 shows the test results for the democratization effect hypothesis. Column (2) 
and (3) present the result of first approach, splitting the data into two periods. During the pre-
democratization period, the two coefficients of the pre-election dummy terms are positive and 
they are significant at the 95 and 99 percent confidence level, respectively. Contrary to the 
expectations of the “demise of developmental states” thesis, the two coefficients of the pre-
election dummy terms are not significant during the post-democratization period although they 
both have positive signs. These findings indicate the existence of PBCs during the pre-
democratization period.  In other words, fiscal policy is more expansionary in the two to three 
quarters before elections during the pre-democratization period even though this period had a 
145 
 
low level of electoral competitiveness. This means that PBCs are not a new phenomenon after 
democratization.  
Column (4) in Table 3-7 illustrates the second approach. The main interest of this column 
is the interaction term between Election and Democracy. These coefficients are negative, but 
they do not achieve clear statistical significance. Only focusing on the sign of coefficients, we 
can observe that the degree of PBC decreased after democratization. Although we need to be 
cautious in interpreting the lack of statistical significance, it suggests a conclusion contradictory 
to the “demise of developmental states” thesis.  
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Table 3-7. Comparison of the Election Effects between Pre- and Post-Democratization Periods 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Pre- 
Democratization 
Period 
Post- 
Democratization 
Period 
 
DV: FI     
∆GDP Gap 0.127*** 0.121*** 0.143*** 0.129*** 
 (0.0160) (0.0242) (0.0315) (0.0156) 
∆Budget Deficit -0.988*** -1.006*** -0.969*** -0.987*** 
 (0.0171) (0.0316) (0.0139) (0.0170) 
Pre-Election(Q3) 0.127* 0.141 0.0851 0.133 
 (0.0553) (0.0722) (0.0560) (0.0823) 
Pre-Election(Q2) 0.167* 0.216** 0.0536 0.222** 
 (0.0681) (0.0795) (0.0966) (0.0856) 
Democracy    0.164 
    (0.148) 
Democracy*Q3    -0.0291 
    (0.104) 
Democracy*Q2    -0.121 
    (0.121) 
_cons -0.139 -0.221 -0.0193 -0.205 
 (0.203) (0.273) (0.0223) (0.208) 
ARMA     
AR(1) 0.763** 0.707** 0.870*** 0.739** 
 (0.280) (0.255) (0.218) (0.248) 
AR(2) 0.150 0.209 -0.0748 0.158 
 (0.117) (0.158) (0.160) (0.115) 
MA(1) -0.671** -0.620** -1.000*** -0.648** 
 (0.260) (0.229) (0.0001) (0.228) 
sigma     
_cons 0.307*** 0.350*** 0.195*** 0.305*** 
 (0.0433) (0.0603) (0.0205) (0.0438) 
N 122 69 52 122 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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To confirm the above test, I use two more supplementary tests. First, the Chow test is 
used to investigate whether the coefficients estimated over one period of the data are equal to the 
coefficients estimated over another.11
  
 Since the ARIMA regression model in this chapter is a 
nonlinear econometric model and thus does not have F-statistics, I employ a Chow-type Wald 
test. The Wald statistic is 1.87 for the Q2 Election dummy, and 1.38 for the Q3 Election dummy, 
which is much smaller than the 99 percent critical value of 5.99. The test for the degree of 
changes in the PBC cannot reject the null hypothesis of parameter constancy between two 
periods. In other words, there is no structural break between the pre- and post-democratization 
periods.  
                                                 
11 General form of the F test statistic is 
 
 
F *  =  ( RSS  -  RSS ) / q
 RSS / (T - k)
    F(q,  T - k)   if H  is trueR U
U
0~
 
“Now given that in this case, the restricted residual sum of squares (RSSR) is RSS0, the unrestricted residual sum of 
squares (RSSU) is RSS1 + RSS2, the number of restrictions under the null hypothesis (q) is k, and the degrees of 
freedom in the unrestricted model is T-2k (the full sample, less the two sets of k parameters being estimated), the F 
test statistic can be written as” (Perman: 17) 
CHOW(1) =  ( RSS  -  ( RSS  +  RSS  )) / k
 ( RSS  +  RSS  ) / (T - 2k)
    F(k,  T - 2k)   if H  is true0 1 2
1 2
0~
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Figure 3-5. Rolling Estimation Result 
 
 
My final test for the degree of change in PBC uses moving (rolling) estimates for 
investigating time-varying parameters. I estimate the coefficients for time period t by estimating 
the regression employing observations [t-w/2, …, t+w/2] with, so called, window width. When 
we set window [40], the number of observations for estimation is 40. The result of rolling 
estimation with 40 consecutive quarters in each sub-period is presented in Fig. 3-3. The 
parameter of Q3 seems more stable than that of Q2, but I cannot find any evidences of structural 
change of the coefficients Q2 and Q3 around 1987-1988. There seem to be structural breaks 
around 1980 for Q2, and around 1985 for Q3, but they do not appear to be related to 
democratization, the main focus of this chapter.  
To conclude, the above statistical analyses indicate that a PBC existed during the pre-
democratization period in Korea. The degree of PBCs in Korea did not significantly change after 
democratization.  
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Other findings 
I have tested the above two hypotheses with pre-election dummy terms. If fiscal policy 
tends to be expansionary before elections, we can expect that it will be contractionary after 
elections because an incumbent is expected to balance the budget deficit generated during the 
pre-election period, for the soundness of fiscal management. To test this proposition, I also 
include post-election dummy variables in the equation. If my theoretical expectations are correct, 
the coefficients of post-election dummies should be negative. The results of this test are shown 
Table 3-8. 
As Column (1) presents, all coefficients of pre-election dummies are positive and they 
turn to negative passing through election quarters. Q3 and Q2 in Column (1) for all periods, Q2 
in Column (2) for the pre-democratization period, and PQ2 and PQ4 in Column (3) for post-the 
democratization period have statistical significance respectively. The results support my claim 
that fiscal policy is expansionary before elections and becomes contractionary after elections.   
The other finding is related to the control variable, GDP Gap. All of the above tables 
show that the differenced GDP Gap variable has a positive coefficient that is highly statistically 
significant regardless of the time period. This means that fiscal policy becomes expansionary 
when the economy is booming and contractionary when the economy enters a recession. This 
finding suggests that fiscal policy in Korea is pro-cyclical rather than counter-cyclical. This 
contradicts the conventional wisdom (Haggard et al. 1994, Cooper 1994, Kim and Mo 1999, Koh 
2007). The most plausible explanation for the contrasting results would be the differences in the 
data the studies use. Cooper (1994) uses annual data and therefore if he is correct, the mid-term 
fiscal policy in Korea is counter-cyclical. This study, on the other hand, is based on quarterly 
data analysis. If this study is correct, the fiscal policy is pro-cynical in the short term. Another 
possible explanation for the different results is that Cooper’s study focuses on the Chun regime 
period (1980-1987), and this study incorporates periods before and after the democratization.. 
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Table 3-8. Differences between the Pre- and Post-Election Effect 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All Periods Pre- 
Democratization 
Period 
Post- 
Democratization 
Period 
DV: FI    
∆GDP Gap 0.130*** 0.138*** 0.129*** 
 (0.0195) (0.0267) (0.0167) 
∆Budget Deficit -0.988*** -1.004*** -0.971*** 
 (0.0156) (0.0258) (0.0117) 
Pre-Election(Q4) -0.0371 -0.0237 0.115 
 (0.0872) (0.0716) (0.0789) 
Pre-Election(Q3) 0.0735 0.145* 0.0466 
 (0.0768) (0.0715) (0.0521) 
Pre-Election(Q2) 0.0738 0.168 0.0340 
 (0.0870) (0.115) (0.0856) 
Pre-Election(Q1) 0.0462 0.0306 0.00698 
 (0.0899) (0.106) (0.0707) 
Election -0.168 -0.103 -0.124 
 (0.0891) (0.126) (0.0998) 
Post-Election(Q1) -0.0783 -0.192 -0.0487 
 (0.0754) (0.146) (0.0535) 
Post-Election(Q2) -0.112 0.149 -0.177* 
 (0.0713) (0.106) (0.0739) 
Post-Election(Q3) -0.00746 -0.123 -0.0860 
 (0.0832) (0.150) (0.0651) 
Post-Election(Q4) 0.0252 0.275 -0.151* 
 (0.104) (0.168) (0.0720) 
_cons -0.0258 -0.222 0.0585* 
 (0.0656) (0.299) (0.0271) 
ARMA    
AR(1) -0.768*** 0.670** 0.416 
 (0.148) (0.239) (0.243) 
AR(2) 0.0976 0.251 -0.264 
 (0.151) (0.159) (0.139) 
MA(1) 1.000*** -0.610*** -0.606*** 
 (0.0001) (0.179) (0.168) 
sigma    
_cons 0.308*** 0.328*** 0.166*** 
 (0.0325) (0.0446) (0.0147) 
N 122 69 52 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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V.  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
To summarize from the previous section, I have two main empirical findings regarding 
the effects of elections on fiscal policy. First, I find quite strong evidence of expansionary fiscal 
policy before elections and contractionary fiscal policy after elections. Second, democratization 
did not affect the degree of PBC in statistical terms. This suggests that there is no significant 
difference between the manipulation of economy before elections during the non-democratic 
periods (1970-1987) and the democratic periods (1988-2000). In addition, I find that fiscal policy 
in Korea was not counter-cyclical as conventional wisdom holds but quite pro-cyclical, at least, 
from the perspective of quarterly intervals.  
What are the implications of these findings? First, the findings challenge the conventional 
wisdom that PBC requires electoral competition. As discussed in the Testable Hypotheses 
section, this study suggests that PBC hinges not only on incentives (electoral competition) but 
also on constraints (checks and balances). Assuming that the magnitude of the difference 
between the incentives and the constraints determines the likelihood of PBC, we can postulate 
that the increased constraints on PBCs after democratization counterbalance the increased 
incentives in Third Wave Democracies. Combining the incentive and constraint structures for 
PBCs will help explain why studies of PBCs in developed democracies have generated mixed 
results while they have generated consistent results in developing or non-democratic countries. 
In other words, PBCs appear inconsistently in developed democracies because they are equipped 
with checks and balances preventing political manipulation of economy. In developing or non-
democratic countries, which typically do not have as many checks and balances, PBCs appear 
more consistently.  
152 
 
 Second, the findings of this study suggest that the degree of economic manipulation 
during the pre-democratization period might be as high as during the post-democratization 
period. Contrary to what the democratization literature suggests, macroeconomic policies under a 
democratizing government are not likely to be more inconsistent or inflationary than they were 
under authoritarian rule. This is because the increased incentives democratic governments have 
to manipulate the economy may be cancelled by the increased constraints. Third, the results of 
this analysis imply that electoral incentives for an incumbent to manipulate economy were 
present during the pre-democratization period in developmental states. Simply put, 
developmental states were more politicized than the bureaucracy dominance thesis holds. 
Although these findings may not directly disconfirm the developmental states thesis, this study 
provides a “revisionist” view of developmental state theory.  
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Chapter  4. The Effect of Democratization on Distr ibutive Politics: Dynamics 
of Targeted Spending 
 
 
This chapter examines how distributive policies changed in Korea due to 
democratization.  In Chapter 3, I demonstrated that politicization in macroeconomic policy did 
occur even during the pre-democratization period in South Korea, a developmental state. This 
chapter questions the conventional wisdom formulated by the bureaucracy dominance thesis that 
distributive policies in developmental states were not shaped by political considerations. In this 
chapter, I will delve into the question of whether political considerations shaped distributive 
policies during the pre-democratization period and whether democratization brought about any 
changes to these policies. 
This chapter is organized as follows. In the first section, I will provide a brief overview of 
theories of distributive politics focusing on “swing groups” vs. “support groups.” A review of the 
existing literature on distributive politics in Korea is also presented. In order to break the 
theoretical deadlock between the “swing voters” and “core supporters” hypotheses, I will 
describe Korean institutions, political cleavages, political goals, and political culture and how 
they have shaped distributive policies.  In Section 3, I will conduct a statistical analysis of the 
preliminary evidence for targeted spending before testing whether and how political 
consideration influences distributive policy. Section 4 elaborates my hypotheses regarding 
targeted spending, which I introduced in Chapter 2. Section 5 tests the hypotheses using panel 
data regression models. I conclude this chapter with a discussion of my empirical findings and 
their theoretical implications. 
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I. REVIEW OF DISTRIBUTIVE POLITICS AND THE DEMOCRATIZATION EFFECT 
 
1. Theoretical Explanation  
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, in most political systems incumbents will use political 
considerations in targeting scarce goods in order to maximize electoral goals. Distributing 
particular goods to specific groups is a more efficient tool for winning votes than distributing 
programmatic goals (Chang 2008, Lizzeri and Persico 2001, Persson and Tabellini 2003). 
However, the literature on distributive patterns in allocating resources has produced different 
theoretical propositions.  
Those who support the core voter theory claim that risk-averse political elites target core 
supporters because it is safer to buy their votes (Cox and McCubbins, 1986). That is, the 
likelihood of voting for an incumbent is highest when transfers are made to loyal voters. 
According to this model, an incumbent knows the core supporters’ preferences and desires quite 
well, while they do not know the swing voters’ and opposition backers’ preferences and desires 
(Schady 2000). Thus, they prefer the safer investment of keeping loyal voters happy over the 
riskier investment of trying to win support from swing voters or opposition backers. Instead of 
targeting voters with less affinity for the incumbent, office-seeking politicians always choose to 
strengthen the electoral base they have cultivated over time.  
On the other hand, those who support the swing voter theory claim that targeting swing 
voters is more efficient since such voters are ideologically indifferent to parties and more 
responsive to material incentives even though this strategy is somewhat risk-acceptant (Lindbeck 
and Weibull, 1987; Dixit and Londregan, 1996). The basic assumption of this model is that core 
supporters and opposition backers are less responsive to material benefits while swing voters are 
more responsive to them (Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987; Dixit and Londregan, 1996). According 
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to this model, an incumbent need not waste precious resources on rewarding core supporters who 
(it is assumed) have the same underlying ideological preferences as the incumbent and thus will 
vote for him or her anyway. Thus, the amount of transfers a region receives from the central 
government is expected to be positively correlated with a higher density of swing voters. 
Much effort has gone into testing the validity of these two competing models, but the 
empirical evidence has been somewhat contradictory. Without a theoretical breakthrough, it is 
hard to know why incumbents sometimes seem to focus on core supporters and sometimes focus 
on swing voters. In addition, it is hard to generalize about whether incumbents are, by nature, 
risk-averse or risk-acceptant and what strategies they would use to realize their preferences.   
In order to bridge the gap between the “core voters” and the “swing voters” models, I pay 
close attention to the institutional arrangements an incumbent faces and the political objectives 
s/he seeks to achieve. This dissertation examines an incumbent’s key political objectives and 
strategies, and the Korean political and institutional context in both the pre- and post-
democratization periods and uses these factors to analyze and compare the targeted spending 
pattern between authoritarian and democratic regimes in South Korea. It is crucial to understand 
what objectives authoritarian leaders had in holding elections (Joseph 1999, Bratton and Van de 
Walle 1997, Gandhi and Przeworski 2006, Magaloni 2006), because electoral institutions and 
targeted spending strategy were decided mainly based on these objectives. As seen in Chapter 2, 
the regime under President Park Chung Hee’s leadership in South Korea can be considered to be 
urban-biased because it worked to enhance its legitimacy by increasing its urban representation. 
Moreover, the N=2 Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) system adopted in order to achieve 
such political objective served as a significant institutional variable.  
When examining the elections held under democracy, this dissertation pays special 
attention to the five-year single-term presidency in Korea as a significant institutional variable, 
and strong regionalism and a history of political retaliation as important cultural factors. As 
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discussed in Chapter 2, the Korean presidency is often called an “imperial presidency.” At the 
same time, the Korean presidency is very fragile because of characteristic stemming from the 
institutional arrangement of the constitution such as single-term limits and complicated election 
timing. Thus, the five-year single term president’s incentives cannot perfectly match with that of 
ruling party and its next presidential candidate. As a result, since democratization the president in 
Korea has incentives to target both his/her core support group and opposition backers.  
The conventional “core supporters” and “swing voters” models do not capture the Korea-
specific pattern of distributive politics as discussed above. Thus, this dissertation specially 
focuses on how changing institutional arrangements and the incumbent’s political objectives 
shaped targeted spending.  
 
 
2. Empir ical Evidence in the Case of South Korea 
 
Following the above theoretical discussion, this section provides a survey of empirical 
studies on distributive politics in South Korea. As discussed in previous chapters, South Korea 
has been regarded as a hard case for detecting how elections shape distributive policies. The 
assumption has been that apolitical bureaucrats have made major decisions regarding distributive 
politics in adherence to long-term development objectives and that short-term political 
considerations did not interfere with these decisions. In other words, incumbents’ distributive 
policies have been more concerned with evening up development across regions than electoral 
politics (Kwon 2005). 
As a result, very few studies have spotlighted on distributive politics in South Korea 
(Kwon 2005, Horiuchi and Lee 2008). In a provincial-level analysis for the years from 1988 to 
1997, Kwon (2005) argues that the president distributed more national subsidies to swing 
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provinces. By contrast, Horiuchi and Lee (2008) argue that votes and expenditures have a U-
shaped relationship based on municipal-level data covering the 1993-2002 period. That is, an 
incumbent president distributes more benefits to both his turf and his rival’s turf, while 
distributing less to the regions where votes are more evenly divided. Differences between these 
two studies may arise from the use of 1) different units of observation (provinces or cities in 
Kwon’s study vs. municipalities in Horiuchi and Lee’s study); 2) different dependent variables 
(one type of transfers – national subsidies – in Kwon’s study vs. total transfers in Horiuchi and 
Lee’s study); and 3) different control variables (Horiuchi and Lee 2008).  
These two studies are deficient in several regards for answering the broader questions 
raised in this dissertation. The time-period Kwon’s and Horiuchi and Lee’s analyses investigate 
are 1988 to 1997 and 1993 to 2002 respectively, both of which fall within the post-
democratization period. As mentioned in Chapter 3, during this post-democratization period, 
electoral competition in Korean politics had been restored and bureaucrats were no longer free 
from electoral politics. Given that the restriction of electoral competition is regarded as a 
prerequisite of a successful economic growth in a developmental state, the key structural 
advantages of a developmental state may have been eroded by democratization. As Kwon 
admits, “the findings of this paper may not be conceived to disconfirm the literature on the 
developmental state, which is presumed to have been at its height during the pre-democratization 
period.” Thus, Kwon’s empirical analysis cannot provide a “revisionist” view on developmental 
states. If it were Kwon’s ambition to present a case that contradicts the demise of developmental 
state thesis, he should have concentrated on the developmental state during the pre-
democratization period.  
The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between political dynamics and 
resource allocation during the pre-democratization period and how democratization influenced 
this relationship. The time period of this study is from 1976 to 2008, which covers the pre-
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democratization as well as the post-democratization period. In this chapter, I compare the main 
characteristics of distributive politics between the two periods.  
 
 
II.  KOREAN CONTEXT AND TESTABLE HYPOTHESES  
 
In this section, I specify an incumbent’s targeted spending strategy by factoring in his or 
her key political goals, and the institutional and cultural characteristics of Korean politics. To 
derive my hypotheses, I examine how these factors have influenced budget-making during the 
pre-democratization and the post-democratization periods in Korea.  
 
1. Pre-Democratization Per iod 
The authoritarian regimes of Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan, which lasted for 
fifteen years before Korea’s democratization in 1987, could be labeled as a “golden period” for 
the development state from the perspective of economic development, but a “dark period” in the 
history of Korean politics. Presidential elections were held indirectly with almost pre-determined 
outcomes, and freedom of assembly was completely restricted. However, even during this 
period, electoral and party politics were not completely wiped out. A study by Domínguez 
(2011) compared South Korea under the Park Chung Hee regime to four different Latin 
American countries including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico from the perspective of 
dictatorship’s political effectiveness. According to this study, the Park regime before the 
imposition of the Yushin Constitution in 1972 received much higher scores for political 
effectiveness in the category of “use legislature and political parties” compared to the Latin 
American authoritarian regimes. The Park regime during the Yushin period fared worse than 
regimes in Mexico and Brazil in the use of legislature and political parties but better than those 
159 
 
in Argentina and Chile that had no legislature and election (Table 4-1). In this light, legislative 
elections during the authoritarian period in Korea embraced and effectively utilized the 
legislature and political parties, thereby reducing the cost of repression and achieving alimited 
degree of political effectiveness. 
  
Table 4-1. Comparative rank order for authoritarian political effectiveness: Choice of 
institutional means 
Rank Delegate to civilian 
elites 
Use legislature and 
political parties 
Co-opt > Repress 
labor unions 
1 Best S. Korea Yushin * S. Korea 1961-72 Mexico 
2 S. Korea 1961-72* Mexico Brazil 
3 Brazil * Brazil S. Korea 1961-72 
4 Argentina 1966 * S. Korea Yushin Argentina 1966 
5 Mexico Argentina 1966* Chile 
6 Argentina 1976 Argentina 1976* S. Korea Yushin 
7 Worst  Chile Chile * Argentina 1976 
*indicates ties 
Source: Dominguez 2011 
 
Political Background and Presidents’ Goal 
 
Park Chung Hee and the ruling Democratic Republican Party (DRP), which had 
relatively weak legitimacy due to their seizure of power through a coup d’état, declared martial 
law and imposed the Yushin Constitution in 1972 in order to secure a life-long hold on power for 
Park Chung Hee after it was predicted that a direct presidential election would not guarantee this 
objective. While President Park abolished direct presidential elections, he had to maintain the 
National Assembly elections due to public pressure at home and abroad. Under the political 
circumstances, the DRP’s legitimacy was undermined by its lack of support in urban areas, 
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which could be fatal to the party in the long term. First, there was an increase in electoral 
pressure due to rapid urbanization, given that the yeochon-yado phenomenon (support for the 
ruling party in rural areas and for the opposition in urban area) during this period was almost 
unbreakable. Even though the existing SMD system was designed to favor the ruling DRP, the 
DRP’s share of the vote and the district seating ratio continuously decreased under the SMD 
system due to rapid urbanization. Second, the authoritarian presidents Park Chung Hee and Chun 
Doo Hwan feared mass protests in the cities such as Seoul and Busan. Such mass movements in 
the urban areas became a huge concern for the authoritarian presidents. They thus wanted more 
support from the urban voters in coopting the opposition within the existing system. Third, the 
very fact that Park Chung Hee placed a great deal of emphasis on increasing urban representation 
is closely linked to his own political vision and the legitimacy of his regime. Urban areas in 
South Korea have traditionally been the very epitome of modernity and modern values (Choi 
1971), and therefore, leaders have always focused on urban areas in times of political turbulence. 
For Park Chung Hee who tried to secure his regime’s legitimacy through modernization and 
economic development, the significance of the urban areas, especially the city of Seoul, was 
absolute. Under such political circumstance, the most important political goal of presidents was 
to increase urban representation.  
 
N=2 SNTV and Target Identification   
As previous chapters discussed, Park Chung Hee abolished the SMD—which had been 
practiced as the election method for the National Assembly—and adopted the N=2 SNTV 
system. President Park’s intention behind adopting the SNTV was to increase the DRP’s urban 
representation in order to enhance the legitimacy of his regime (Choi 1973, Lee 1999, Mo and 
Brady 1999). It was Park’s objective to have a DRP candidate win the second seat under the N=2 
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SNTV system in urban areas where the likelihood of a DRP candidate being elected was very 
low under the previous SMD system. At the same time, however, under the N=2 SNTV system it 
became more likely for the opposition party to win the second seat in rural areas. In other words, 
under the N=2 SNTV system the ruling party and the opposition were likely to split the two seats 
in both urban and rural areas. Nevertheless, it was strategically advantageous for effective 
governing in the long-run for the DRP to give up some seats in rural areas to the opposition 
party, while increasing its own share of urban seats. Moreover, the fact that the Yujonghoe 
system allowed the president to assign one third of National Assemblymen, under the Yushin 
Constitution, made it less crucial for the DRP to secure the majority of votes in the National 
Assembly elections. 
The adoption of N=2 SNTV brought about significant and rapid changes in the 
competitiveness of regional elections and the identification of support groups. Competitiveness is 
usually measured through the difference in vote share between the first- and the second-place 
winners for SMD elections and the second- and the third-place winners for the N=2 SNTV 
system. Under SMD, voters in urban areas, including Seoul, backed the opposition and provided 
only low levels of support for the DRP. Under the N=2 SNTV system, however, these urban 
voters became a swing voter group that could determine the election outcome. During the 1971 
election under the SMD system, for example, the electoral margin (the difference in vote share 
between the winner and the runner-up) in Seoul was 22.8%. However, in the 1973 election, 
which used the N=2 SNTV system, the electoral margin (the difference in vote share between 
second- and third-place finishers) in Seoul was only 9.9%. The electoral competitiveness in rural 
areas also increased. During the 1971 election under the SMD system, the electoral margin (the 
difference in vote share between the winner and the runner-up) in Jeonbuk (one of the most 
representative of the rural areas) was 28.2%. However, in the 1973 election under the N=2 
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SNTV system, the electoral margin (the difference in vote share between second – and third-
place finishers) in Jeonbuk was only 7.0.  
Note that the candidates competing for the second seat diverged between the urban and 
rural areas under the N=2 SNTV. In the rural areas, a candidate of the Democratic Unification 
Party (DUP), the third-party, or an independent candidate competed against the largest 
opposition party, the New Democratic Party (NDP) to win the second seat, because a DRP 
candidate almost always won 1st place in the rural areas. For example, during the 1973 election, 
the DPR candidates won 1st place in 46 rural districts among 57 districts. This pattern was 
reversed in the urban areas with DRP candidates, third party candidates, and independent 
candidates competing for the second seat since the largest opposition party candidate usually 
won the first seat. During the 1971 election under the SMD, the DRP won only 1 seat among 19 
seats in Seoul whereas during the 1973 election under the N=2 SNTV, it won one 1st and six 2nd 
seats among the 16 seats distributed to 8 districts in Seoul.  
In sum, the introduction of the N=2 SNTV increased competitiveness in both urban and 
rural areas. Moreover, the elimination of the ban on independent candidacy encouraged third 
party and independent candidates (Mo and Brady 1999). This elimination was a part of the 
“divide and rule” strategy the Park regime hoped to achieve with the introduction of the N=2 
SNTV and the Yushin Constitution. To increase its urban representation by introducing the N=2 
SNTV system the DRP had to give up some of its electoral advantages in the rural areas. The 
total number of the rural districts during the 1971 election under the SMD system was 117 while 
the number decreased to 55 (with 110 seats) during the 1973 election held under the N=2 SNTV 
system. The DRP won 79 seats among 117 total seats during the 1971 election. However, during 
the 1973 election, the total number of seats it could win was 55. The DRP strategically 
nominated only one candidate in the district across the country including the rural districts. The 
DRP with strong party discipline did not face coordination problem during the candidate 
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nomination process. This was not the case for the opposition NDP. Sometimes two candidates 
were nominated for the same district while the NDP affiliated politicians who were not 
nominated frequently left the party and entered the election as independent candidates. This 
resulted in the fragmentation of the opposition party, which in turn helped the ruling DRP in 
securing a smooth legislative process. The DRP had to give up some of its electoral advantages 
in rural areas under the N=2 SNTV, but it managed to increase its urban representation and 
successfully caused divisions in the opposition party.  
To recapitulate, Park Chung Hee and the DRP attempted to increase their urban 
representation by adopting the N=2 SNTV system thereby increasing the chance that a DRP 
candidate would finish second in the urban areas where its support had traditionally been weak. 
As planned by Park Chung Hee, voters in urban areas who had previously belonged to the 
political opposition backer group under the SMD system, became a swing voters group that 
could determine the election outcome under the N=2 SNT system. From the implementation of a 
new electoral system, we can deduce that Park Chung Hee and the DRP had specifically targeted 
spending to the urban areas in order to achieve their political objectives, which was to increase 
their urban representation. The regime calculated that even if its core support in rural areas might 
be weakened due to the greater expenditures allocated to urban areas, the N=2 SNTV system 
would buffer the negative short-term electoral effects.  
 
2.  Post-Democratization Per iod    
 
Political Background and Presidents’ Goal 
 
After democratization, elections became “the only game in town” (Przeworski 1991) in 
South Korea. Since the democratic transition, which began in 1987 after two and half decade 
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under military rule, South Korea has held free and competitive elections on a regular basis to 
choose its presidents and lawmakers to the National Assembly. Korea also passed the so-called 
“two turnover test” (Huntington 1993), a major milestone for democracy. Five presidential 
elections that were conducted through direct popular vote after the democratic transition in 1987 
were extremely competitive in that most of the winners did not win a majority vote, and divided 
government has become the norm rather than an exception.  
Unbridled presidential power, which is often witnessed in a fledgling democracies 
(O’Donnell 1994, 1998), has created the so-called “imperial presidency” in Korea. The power of 
the “imperial presidency” is derived from the very fact that the president presides over a highly 
disciplined, efficient ruling party and a strong regional voting base. Using non-statutory political 
power and partisan support, a president can extend his/her influence over the legislature. Because 
of these characteristics, Korean presidents have wielded unrivalled influence over distributive 
policy, especially the allocation of the budget.  
At the same time, Korean presidency is very fragile because it is shaped by constitutional 
and institutional arrangements such as the single term limit and the complicated timing of 
elections. The five-year, single-term limit made presidents vulnerable to the lame-duck 
phenomenon, thus diminishing their authority faster than expected (Kihl 2013). When a president 
is past the half-way point in his/her tenure, bureaucrats and politicians in the ruling party no 
longer feel obligated to show loyalty to the president while opposition parties no longer fear the 
president’s power. The ‘last step’ in the early lame-duck process is the president’s withdrawal 
from his/her party, under pressure from the media, the opposition party, and even the ruling 
party. Moreover, most former presidents of Korea have suffered political retribution after leaving 
office, which has led presidents to become concerned about obtaining a graceful retirement. As a 
result, since democratization presidents in Korea have had three main goals: 1) Retaining 
influence throughout his/her term in order to preempt early lame-duck status ; 2) Obtaining a 
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graceful retirement that prevents political retaliation after s/he leaves office; and 3) Ensuring the 
smooth operation of government by obtaining cooperation from rivals during his/her term.  
 
F ive-Year Single Term Presidency and Target Identification  
 
These political goals shaped the president’s preference in designing a strategy for 
targeted spending. The president’s first target for spending are his/her core supporters who are 
crucial to ensuring that the president continues to have influence throughout his term and who 
can defend him from any potential political problems after retirement. The presidential candidate 
of the ruling party also focuses on core supporters, and his/her short-term goal is to unify the 
core supporters in order to win the next election. The simple majority rule of presidential 
elections in Korea motivated the ruling party and its presidential candidate to focus on unifying 
their core support group. While the ruling’s party wide electoral margin in its stronghold areas 
did not increase its seats under the N=2 SNTV, it did help ensure its victory in the simple 
majority presidential elections. As the election results indicate, since democratization, it has been 
nearly impossible for the presidential candidate to win without concentrated support from the 
core group. In addition, Korean presidents often adopted a campaign strategy that used regional 
rivalries to unify the core supporters group and gain electoral advantages. Regarding core 
support group, the incumbent president, and the ruling party’s candidate in the next political 
elections share the same political goal.  
The president’s and the ruling party’s attitude toward swing voters diverge. For the ruling 
party’s presidential candidate, the logical, short-term decision would be to support swing voters 
in order to win the next election. It is highly likely that swing voters would be more responsive 
to the material benefits than opposition backers who are much less likely to support the ruling 
party. Moreover, politicians in the ruling party seeking office or reelection may adopt the risk-
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acceptant “swing voters” strategy because the incumbent president’s lame duck status influences 
negatively their objective of winning re/election. Swing voters should be the target of politicians 
of the ruling party seeking office or reelection, but they are not the target of the five-year single 
term president. This is because a president under a single-term system or one who is serving 
his/her second term in a system with a two term limit is less likely to be concerned with the 
short-term electoral implications of his policies. From the perspective of incumbent president, 
there is no reason for swing voters to protect a weakening president who will step down after 
five years.   
As a result, the president’s second most important target is opposition backers rather than 
swing voters. The five-year single term president has ample reason to diversify the political risk 
s/he faces rather than to accept the political risk in the Korean context. A president whose 
political priority is to secure a graceful retirement and to prevent early lame-duck status may 
choose instead to invest in the opposition. The president does this to forestall potential political 
retaliation from the opposition party once he or she steps down. He or she is also motivated to 
reduce the level of resistance from the opposition that may hinder the smooth operation of the 
government during his/her presidency. Moreover, if a president uses strong regionalism and 
rivalry as an election strategy in order to increase the ruling party’s vote in its strongholds, he or 
she may motivate opposition backers to unify and hinder government activities. The president 
will therefore target opposition supporters as an insurance measure against his/her lame-duck 
status, which is inevitable due to the institutional arrangements. The pressure to withdraw from 
his/her party and the fear of an ungraceful retirement and political retribution may also lead the 
president to make the decision to target supporters of the opposition.  
We can expect that a five-year single term president of Korea would therefore have 
incentives to target both his/her core support group for risk-aversion as well as opposition 
backers for risk-diversification.  
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3. Testable Hypotheses 
 
Based on the above discussion, I propose the major hypotheses of this chapter here. 
Following Cox and McCubbins (1986) and Horiuchi and Lee (2008), this study assumes that 
there are three regions based on the density of support for the incumbent: high (H), medium (M), 
and low (L). Region H is the incumbent’s stronghold, and Region L has the least support for the 
incumbent. Voter support for an incumbent is relatively evenly divided in Region M. As scholars 
have noted, a smaller margin of victory indicates a more competitive election and a greater 
presence of swing votes (Dahlberg and Johansson 2002, Diaz-Cayeros, Estevez, and Magaloni 
2008, Albertus 2012). Given that a swing voter usually casts the vote that determines the 
outcome of an election in a competitive election, the term “swing voter” and “pivotal voter” are 
sometimes used interchangeably. The swing voter group, “often equated with the closeness or 
margin of the victory,” (Diaz-Cayeros, Estevez, and Magaloni 2008: 3) under the SMD system 
conventionally coincides with the medium support group (Region M) with a narrower electoral 
margin (Cox and MCubbins 1986, Diaz-Cayeros, Estevez, and Magaloni 2008, Diaz-Cayeros 
2008).  
As discussed earlier, the political goal of presidents under authoritarian rule was to 
increase urban representation due to electoral pressures stemming from increasing urbanization, 
escalating mass protests in urban areas, and the authoritarian leaders’ obsession with modernity. 
Urban areas under SMD before the adoption of N=2 SNTV were low support areas (Region L), 
for the ruling DRP, with a wide electoral margin between the 1st place winner (opposition) and 
the 2nd place finisher (DRP).  DRP candidates had a very low possibility of being elected under 
SMD. To win more seats in urban areas, Park Chung Hee adopted the N=2 SNTV electoral 
168 
 
system. Under this system, the DRP had a very strong likelihood of winning the 2nd seat in each 
district.  
The new system (N=2 SNTV) transformed the rival’s turf (Region L, urban areas) into a 
swing voters region with narrow electoral margins. There was often only a small vote margin 
between the ruling party and independent candidates in the competition for the seat awarded to 
the second place finisher. Under the N=2 SNTV, rural areas remained strongholds (Region H) of 
the ruling party which typically carried them by wide electoral margins. This wide electoral 
margin meant that the ruling party would gain little from concentrating resources in rural areas 
since they were likely to finish in first place regardless. As a result, I argue that both the electoral 
margin and political support for the ruling party should be negatively correlated with total 
transfers under N=2 SNTV system during pre democratization period in Korea.    
 
Hypothesis 3. The swing voters group in urban areas with low incumbent party support 
and narrow electoral margin under the N=2SNTV received more benefits during the pre-
democratization period. As a result, the relationship between government transfers and 
electoral margin/ incumbent party support has an inversely proportional relationship  
 
 
The institutional environment surrounding the target spending after the democratization 
underwent significant changes. Direct popular election of the president, which was abolished 
during the authoritarian rule, has been reinstated, and as a result, presidential elections have a far 
greater impact on targeted spending. Because presidents in South Korea are limited to a single 
five-year term, the president has three main goals: 1) Retaining influence throughout his/her term 
in order to preempt early lame-duck status; 2) Obtaining a graceful retirement that prevents 
political retaliation after s/he leaves office; and 3) Ensuring the smooth operation of government 
by obtaining cooperation from rivals during his/her term.  
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The president’s first target for spending are his/her core supporters who are crucial to 
ensuring that the president continues to have influence throughout his term and who can defend 
him from any potential political problems after retirement. The president’s second most 
important target is opposition backers rather than swing voters. The president targets them in 
order to try to get them to cooperate during his/her term and to persuade them not to try to seek 
political retribution after his/her retirement. This strategy, however, is not a rational choice in the 
short-term from the perspective of the ruling party or the ruling party’s candidate in the next 
elections because those allocations of resources rarely transform into political support in the next 
election. As a result, this strategy sometimes causes a conflict between the president and the 
candidate. Yet, the president in Korea has always had control of budget allocation and thus 
his/her preferences have prevailed. 
In sum, five-year single term presidents in Korea since democratization have had 
incentives to target both their core support groups (for risk-avoidance) and opposition backers 
(for risk-diversification). As a result, I argue that since democratization the relationship between 
the political support of ruling party and total transfers has been a U-shaped curve, meaning that 
swing voters get less resources than core voters and opposition backers. In addition, I expect core 
voters as the most important target would get more resources rather than opposition backers as 
the second most important target.  
 
Hypothesis 4. Both the incumbent’s own turf and the rival’s turf have received a larger 
benefit package under SMD during the post-democratization period. As a result, the 
relationship between government transfers and incumbent party support has resembled a U-
shaped curve. 
 
Below, I will test the above hypotheses by examining whether there was any political 
manipulation of distributive policies during the pre-democratization period and possible changes 
that were brought by the democratization as summarized in Table 4-2.  
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Table 4-2. Theoretical Expectations 
 
Target Regions Expected  
Effect 
Hypothesis 
Region H 
 
Region M 
 
Region L 
 
 
Region H & L 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
 
+ 
 
Core support groups (Cox-McCubbins) 
 
Swing voters (Lindbeck-Weibull, Dixit-Londregan) 
 
Swing voters during pre-democratization 
period(Bae) 
 
Revised Core support groups during post-
democratization period (Horiuchi-Lee, Bae) 
 
 
 
III. PRELIMINARY EVIDENCE OF TARGET SPENDING 
 
As illustrated in Section 2, both Park Chung Hee’s and Chun Doo Hwan’s 
administrations had incentives to use the N=2 SNTV to increase representation in the urban 
areas. They also sought to provide more material benefits to Seoul during the pre-
democratization period. By contrast, the administrations that came into power after 
democratization had incentives to focus on both their own support groups as well as those of 
their rival parties. During the 10 years (1988-1997) Presidents Roh Tae Woo and Kim Young 
Sam were in office, the core-support groups for each president were concentrated in North 
Gyeongsang/Gyeongbuk and South Gyeongsang/Gyeongnam in the Yongnam region while the 
rival parties’ support groups were concentrated in North Jeolla/Jeonbuk and South 
Jeolla/Jeonnam in Honam region.   
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As previously discussed with the PBC case studies, testing the determinants of 
distributive policy requires rigorous statistical methods. The unit of analysis used in this section 
is the individual province and the dependent variable is total expenditure per capita. The units of 
analysis used to test the determinants of distributive policy later in this chapter are the individual 
province for the pre-democratization period and the individual municipality for the post-
democratization period.  
Table 4-3 below indicates the total expenditure per capita in major provinces compared to 
the national average from 1970 to 2008 divided into 5-year periods. The total expenditure per 
capita in Seoul in 1970 was 8,588 won, equivalent to 143% of the national average, which was 
5,989 won. The ratios for North Jeolla/Jeonbuk, South Jeolla/Jeonnam, and North 
Gyeongsang/Geongbuk and South Gyongsang/Gyeongnam combined were 40%, 86%, 97% 
respectively. The total expenditure per capita in Seoul, which was identified as a swing voter 
area under the N=2 SNTV system during the pre-democratization period, surpassed the national 
average. The total expenditure in the provinces, classified as support base for the authoritarian 
regimes during the period, was below the national average.  
 
Table 4-3. Expenditure per capita in Local Government
 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2008
5,989         20,135       79,710       173,575    550,703    1,195,548 1,651,739 2,640,011 3,457,423 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
8,588         27,687       84,819       185,314    513,220    933,220    1,261,861 1,946,313 2,499,833 
143% 138% 106% 107% 93% 78% 76% 74% 72%
2,376         15,513       66,044       146,933    561,581    1,580,733 2,085,611 3,849,698 5,364,253 
40% 77% 83% 85% 102% 132% 126% 146% 155%
5,134         18,083       74,398       201,963    606,156    1,594,339 2,823,402 5,060,895 7,075,572 
86% 90% 93% 116% 110% 133% 171% 192% 205%
5,679         19,953       93,245       153,808    564,820    1,331,824 2,056,083 3,676,947 5,109,213 
95% 99% 117% 89% 103% 111% 124% 139% 148%
5,813         16,385       83,735       210,036    865,142    1,701,621 2,067,950 3,579,189 4,566,040 
97% 81% 105% 121% 157% 142% 125% 136% 132%
Average
Seoul
Jeonbuk
Jeonnam
Gyeongbuk
Gyeongnam
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As demonstrated by the Figure 4-1 below, this trend was reversed in the 1980s and the 
early 1990s. Seoul, classified as a swing voter group, enjoyed privileges that greatly surpassed 
the national average under the authoritarian regimes. However, the total expenditure began a 
continuous downturn in the 1990s. In 2008, the ratio between Seoul and the national average was 
72%. Conversely, the total expenditure per capita of North Cholla/Jeonbuk, South 
Cholla/Jeonnam, North Kyongsang/Gyeongbuk and Kyongsang/Gyeongnam provinces, which 
fell much below the national average under authoritarian rule, reached above the national 
average in the mid-1980s. In 2008, the total expenditure per capita for South Cholla/Jeonnam 
was 7,075,572 Won, which was more than twice the national average of 3,457,423 Won.  
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Figure 4-1. Expenditure per capita in Local Governments 
 
 
 
In sum, distributive spending before and after democratization shows clear regional 
differences. Under the Park and Chun regimes, regions that were underdeveloped due to the 
government’s unbalanced development strategy enjoyed fewer benefits than did Seoul and other 
highly developed urban areas. This trend was reversed after democratization as indicated by the 
fact that Seoul’s total expenditure per capita fell below the national average. Through this 
preliminary analysis, we can speculate that, under authoritarian rule, swing voters in urban areas 
including Seoul, received many more benefits compared to core supporters in rural areas. In 
addition, we also find that, under democracy, core supporters and opposition supporters in 
Gyeongsang and Cholla region received more benefit than did swing voters in urban areas.   
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IV. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS  
1.  Data  
The datasets used in this chapter come from various sources. Fiscal data from Jibang 
Jaejeong Yeongam (Local Finance Yearbook) and Jaejeonggo, published annually by the 
Ministry of Public Administration and Security, cover the period from 1973 to 1988 for the pre-
democratization period, and from 1989 to 2008 for the post-democratization period. Election 
data are based on the four National Assembly elections during the pre-democratization period 
(1973, 1978, 1981, 1985) and the five presidential elections during the post-democratization 
period (1987, 1992, 1997, 2002, and 2007). When matching election data with fiscal data, a one-
year lag is used. Population data is gathered primarily from the Census.  
The units of analysis are individual provinces for the pre-democratization period and 
individual municipalities for the post-democratization period. The units of analysis for the post-
democratization period include si (city), gun (county) for the rural areas and gu (district) for the 
urban areas. For the pre-democratization period, however, data on the total transfers from the 
central government to the municipality, the dependent variable for this analysis, are available 
from 1976 for si (city) and gun (county) in the rural areas. The total transfer data from gu 
(district), a municipality in the urban areas, was not available until 1988. Given the limitations of 
data availability, I used provinces as the unit of analysis for the pre-democratization period. 
The number of provinces increased from ten to twelve during the period of pre-
democratization under scrutiny here because Incheon and Deague, which had been under the 
administrative control of the Kyunggi province and the North Gyeongsang province respectively, 
were separated and established as cities under central government control. The number of 
municipalities according to the 2008 data is 228. In the dataset, some municipalities do not 
appear over the full period due to mergers and/or eliminations, while others were newly created. 
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As a result, the dataset has an unbalanced panel structure in which some cross-sectional units are 
observed only for a limited period of time.  
 
2. Variables 
Previous works on distributive politics in South Korea have relied on two different types 
of dependent variables: the per capita level of total transfers (Horiuchi and Lee 2008) and 
national subsidies (Kwon 2005). This study follows Horiuchi and Lee’s method. It is very 
difficult to properly estimate the comprehensive political effects on targeted spending with 
program-specific or type-specific subsidies, given the fact that a particular project is often 
financed from various sources (Ansolabehere et al. 2002, Horiuchi and Saito 2003).  The total 
transfers are defined as the sum of bojogeum (subsidy), jibang gyobuse (local allocation tax), and 
jibang yangyeogeum (local transfer tax).  
The key political independent variable is the vote share in National Assembly elections 
during the pre-democratization period, and the president's vote share during the post-
democratization period. These variables are perceived as indicators of how loyal a province or a 
municipality is to an incumbent. Therefore, a positive sign of the vote share coefficient implies 
that a president delivers more transfers to his or her core supporters whereas a negative sign 
implies that a president delivers more transfers to the opposition.  
To capture the influence of the swing voters group, I also use the variable Electoral 
Margin. As discussed earlier section, the swing voter group under the SMD system normally 
coincides with the medium support group (Region M) with a narrower electoral margin (Cox and 
MCubbins 1986, Diaz-Cayeros, Estevez, and Magaloni 2008, Diaz-Cayeros 2008). Thus, as 
demonstrated by Figure 4-2 (2), the relationship between political support for a ruling party and 
electoral margin forms a U-shaped curve.  
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However, Region M is not always aligned with the swing voter group. According to 
previous studies that uses margin of victory, Region L transform into a swing voter group under 
the N=2 SNTV system. The introduction of the N=2 SNTV decreased the electoral margin 
between the 2nd and 3rd places both in rural and urban areas. Yet, from the ruling DRP’s 
perspective, its competitiveness in the rural areas did not increase since under the SMD, the rural 
areas were the party’s stronghold. This meant that it was relatively easier for a ruling party 
candidate to win the 1st or 2nd place under the N=2 SNTV. The DRP managed to have 46 
candidates wining 1st place during the 1973 election in the 57 rural districts. Under the N=2 
SNTV system, the margin of victory between the 2nd and the 3rd place finishers held no 
significance to the DRP in designing targeted spending since its candidate normally won 1st 
place. Rather, a meaningful electoral margin from the perspective of ruling DRP in allocating 
resources was the difference of vote share between the 1st place winner and the 3rd place 
finisher. In the case of the pre-democratization period under the N=2 SNTV system, Region L 
where the overall support rate was low but the electoral margin dropped, was a swing voter 
group because the possibility of victory increased. As demonstrated in Figure 4-2 (1), the 
relationship between political support for the ruling party and electoral margin under the N=2 
SNTV looks almost proportional rather than a U-shaped curve.   
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Figure.4-2. Political Support and Electoral Margin 
(1) Pre-democratization period 
 
 
 
(2) Post-democratization period 
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 As discussed earlier, the electoral margin under N=2 SNTV was measured as the 
difference in vote share between the 1st and 3rd place finishers, in the case the ruling party 
candidate won the 1st place, and between the 2nd and 3rd, in the case the ruling party candidate 
won the 2nd place. After democratization, the electoral margin was measured as the difference in 
vote share between the 1st and 2nd if the ruling party candidate won 1st or 2nd place. If the DRP 
candidate won 3rd place, the electoral margin was measured as the absolute value of the vote 
shares of the 1st and 3rd place finishers. A negative sign on the electoral margin coefficient 
implies that a president delivers more transfers to the regions where swing voters are 
concentrated. However, the positive sign itself cannot clarify whether more benefits are delivered 
to core supporters or opposition backers.       
Control variables include the fiscal independence index and the logged dependency ratio 
(the percentage of youth and elderly in the population). The Fiscal Independence Index (FII), 
which measures the share of local tax resources in the total budget, is used to decide the portion 
of transfers governed by a formula. The more financially independent a municipality, the smaller 
the amount of transfers delivered.  Data for socio-political variables are gathered from the 
National Statistical Office (NSO) website (http://www.kosis.kr/) and Main Indicators of 
Municipality (Si, Kun, Ku Juyo Jipyo) published by the NSO. Tables 4-4 and 4-5 provide the 
summary statistics for variables during the pre- and post-democratization periods, respectively. 
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Table 4-4. Summary of Variables during Pre-Democratization Period 
Variable Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
No. 
Obs 
Per capita total transfers 
(logged) 
9.0979 1.0284 7.0011 11.3108 176 
Ruling party’s vote share (%) 35.6109 5.640 23.4373 56.7255 176 
Electoral Margin (absolute 
value) 
19.3929 6.9842 3.9947 45.0949 176 
Fiscal Independence Index (%) 72.2523 17.1257 42.1355 98.9044 176 
Population density rate (%) 6.4770 1.6326 4.5849 9.7268 176 
 
 
Table 4-5. Summary of Variables during Post-Democratization Period 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max No. Obs 
Per capita total transfers 
(logged) 
6.1261 1.3008 1.0759 9.7723 4380 
President’s vote share (%) 43.4520 24.8408 1.9591 97.4872 4084 
Electoral margin (absolute 
value) 
7.9338 44.2088 0.3231 95.8724 4092 
Legislator’s co-partisan 
status with president 
0.5399 0.4980 0 1 3955 
Fiscal Independence Index 
(%) 
40.2867 17.9777 3.4611 98.9466 4380 
Youth & elderly population 
ratio (logged) 
0.3173 0.0466 0.2016 0.4669 4380 
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3. Methodology 
 
For empirical estimation, I employ the following basic model for the pre-democratization 
period: 
 
ln Yit = β0 + β1Xit + β2Zit + εit  - (Eq.1) 
 
Yit is total transfers from the central government to local provinces i in a given fiscal 
year t. Xit is the vote share of a ruling party candidate in municipality i in the previous National 
Assembly election for the pre-democratization period as of year t. To capture the impact of the 
swing voters group on spending, I also use the electoral margin as an independent variable. The 
electoral margin under the N=2 SNTV system is measured as the difference in vote share 
between the first- and the third-place winners if the ruling party candidate wins first place in a 
district. If the ruling party candidate wins second place, it is measured in terms of the difference 
in vote share between the second- and the third-place finishers. As shown in Figure 4-1 (1), the 
relationship between the vote share of the ruling party candidate and electoral margin is very 
proportional. The coefficient of correlation between these two variables is almost 0.8. In order to 
avoid the multi-collinearity problem, I test the variables separately. Zit and εit are a set of control 
variables and a disturbance term, respectively.  
The hypothesis in the previous section expects that there would be an inversely 
proportional relationship between support for the incumbent (measured by the vote share in the 
previous election) and total transfers. We would also expect an inversely proportional 
relationship between electoral margin and total transfers. Thus we can expect that the coefficient 
of both incumbent vote share and the electoral margin would have negative signs (β1 < 0).    
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For the empirical estimation of the post-democratization period, I propose the following 
equation. 
 
ln Yit = β0 + β1Xit + β2X2it + β3Zit + εit  - (Eq.2) 
 
Equation 2 is almost the same as Equation 1, except it adds the squared term of Xit. The 
hypothesis suggests that the relationship between political support for an incumbent (measured 
by the vote share of ruling party in the previous election), and the total transfers would result in a 
U-shaped curve. If “the revised core support groups” hypothesis—in which both the high support 
regions and the low support regions receive larger benefits than do the medium regions—is 
correct, then the curve would also form a U-shape as shown below in Figure 4-3 (2). In this case, 
the coefficient of the squared term of the ruling party’s vote share should be positive (β2 > 0). If 
“the conventional swing voter” hypothesis, which holds that the medium regions receive larger 
benefits than do the high support and the low support regions, is correct, then the curve would be 
an inverted U-shaped form as shown below in Figure 4-3 (1). In this quadratic equation, the sign 
of effect of the vote share (β1) indicates the relative size of the transfers that the high support 
region and the low support region receive. If the coefficient is negative (β1 < 0), the high support 
region (Region H) receives more transfers than do the low support region (Region L). If the 
coefficient is positive (β1 > 0), the Region L receives more transfers than do the Region H. [See 
Figure 4-3 (3) and (4) below].    
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Figure 4-3. Intuitive Explanation about the Quadratic Relationship 
 
 
 
 
To estimate Equation (1) and (2), the model includes the lagged dependent variable, 
Transfer it-1, as a regressor because past transfers would impact the current level of transfers but 
also to deal with the problem of autocorrelation. Since the lagged dependent variable is 
correlated with the error term, traditional static panel data model estimators such as fixed effects 
and random effects estimators are likely to be inconsistent, due to presence of endogenous 
regressors. One solution to solve this problem is to use instrumental variables (IV) estimation, 
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proposed by Anderson and Hsaio (1981), by taking the first difference of the regression equation 
to remove permanent unobserved heterogeneity. However, in dynamic panel data models where 
“the series are highly autoregressive and the number of time series observations is moderately 
small” (Blundell, Bond and Windmeijer 2000), the standard GMM estimator has been found to 
have large finite sample bias and poor precision.  
To respond to this issue, unbiased dynamic panel data estimators were introduced based 
on Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) (Arellano and Bond 1991, Blundell and Bond 
1999). The estimators assume that “lagged levels (Difference GMM) and additionally lagged 
differences (System GMM) are valid instruments for the lagged endogenous variable” (Mehrhoff 
2009: Non-technical summary. They are uncorrelated with the transformed error term. For this 
procedure, I employ the System GMM estimator in this analysis.12 over-identifying 
restrictions
 For testing 
 in a statistical model, I used the Sargan test in each analysis.  
 
4. Estimation and Empir ical Results 
Table 4-6 presents the parameter estimates of the effects of the political and economic 
variables on the amount of total transfers distributed to each province during the pre-
democratization period (1976 to 1988). In Model 1, the incumbent’s vote share has a negative 
effect on the total transfers which is indicated by the coefficient. The coefficient is statistically 
significant at 5%, 1%, and 0.1% levels. The sign of the coefficient is consistent with my 
expectation and results in an inverse proportional relationship. This verifies the hypothesis that 
urban areas, where the vote share of the DRP was low but the likelihood of a DRP candidate 
winning the 2nd place increased with the introduction of the N=2 SNTV, received more benefits 
during the pre-democratization period. This also supports my expectation that an incumbent’s 
                                                 
12 I also estimated Equation (1) and (2) using the two-stage least square (2SLS) estimator and the Difference GMM, 
which did not produce qualitative different results.   
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main goal was to gain second place seats in opposition bastions rather than first place in the rural 
areas where the ruling party could have an easy victory with its candidates winning the 1st place 
with a high vote share.  
Model 2 shows the results of the electoral margin effect on the total transfers. The 
negative sign of the coefficient is consistent with my theoretical expectations and is statistically 
significant at 5% level. Clearly, total transfers tend to be distributed to the swing provinces--that 
is, provinces with higher levels of electoral competition. The results also indicate that provinces 
that are less supportive of the incumbent are likely to receive more transfers than more 
supportive provinces.  
The results of my analysis of the pre-democratization period contradict Cox-McCubbins’ 
core supporters group hypothesis. The relationship between the political support for incumbents 
and the benefits distributed/received is inversely proportional. Region L with the least support 
received more benefits from the central government. My analysis suggests that in Region L, vote 
share did not influence targeted spending. Rather, my analysis suggests that the reduced electoral 
margin between the 2nd and the 3rd place finishers with the possibility of a ruling party 
candidate winning 2nd place influenced the targeted spending. In this vein, the Lindbeck-
Weibull and Dixit-Londregan prediction is more consistent with the empirical pattern that we see 
in Korea in that the total transfers tended to be delivered to swing provinces.  
The effects of the socioeconomic variables are mixed. As I expected, the coefficients of 
the fiscal independence index are negative and statistically significant at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% 
levels in both models. This indicates that the distribution of total transfers has an inverse 
relationship with provincial revenues. Another socioeconomic factor - population density – has a 
positive effect on the distribution of the total transfers. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that 
the government during the pre-democratization period in Korea fostered even socioeconomic 
development across the regions, my analysis shows that the central government delivered more 
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transfers to relatively more developed provinces with a higher population density, particularly to 
the urban areas such as Seoul and Busan. The coefficient of population density is statistically 
significant at the 5% level in Model 1, but did not reach statistical significance in Model 2.   
 
Table 4-7 presents the results of my analysis on the data from the post-democratization 
period (1988 to 2008). In Model 1, an incumbent’s vote share has a negative effect on the total 
transfers while the squared incumbent’s vote share has a positive effect. The coefficients’ 
magnitudes are relatively stable and are statistically significant at the 0.1% level. The signs of 
these coefficients are consistent with my expectation: a U-shaped curve. The results of this 
analysis verify the hypothesis that both the incumbent's own turf and rival regions received more 
benefits than did swing voter regions. The electoral margin effect also supports my hypothesis as 
indicated in Model 2. As expected, the coefficient of the electoral margin has a positive effect on 
the distribution of total transfers, meaning that municipalities that had a larger vote margin (i.e,, 
ruling party and opposition bastions) tended to receive more transfers, other things being equal. 
When I put the above three variable together as in Model 3, they yield the same results. All the 
coefficients are statistically significant at the 0.1% level. In Model 4, I added another variable— 
ruling party legislator—to test the impact of having a National Assembly member from the 
ruling party on the distribution of transfers. The sign of the coefficient is negative but it is not 
statistically significant. Moreover, the coefficient’ magnitude is very small ( -0.00146). In other 
words, the impact of a ruling party legislator is difficult to observe.     
The effects of the socioeconomic variables are also mixed. The result shows that the 
distribution of the total transfers has an inverse relationship with municipal revenue as I 
expected. However, the coefficients of the population dependency ratio have negative signs in all 
models, which contradicts the expectation that a higher percentage of youth and elderly people in 
a municipality relative to the working age population would reflect higher welfare needs in a 
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given municipality and would lead the central government to boost its allocation of total 
transfers. Thus, we can speculate that, in Korea, the total transfers from the central government 
to a municipality do not reflect the municipality’s welfare needs even during the post-
democratization period. 
The above results for the post-democratization period support my expectation that the 
main target for an incumbent is his/her own turf and rival regions. This is partly due to the 
incumbent’s objectives—to secure a graceful retirement and avoid accusations of “unfairness” 
regarding to the distributions of transfers. The results stand in contrast to the swing voter 
hypothesis (Lindbeck-Weibull 1987, Dixit and Londregan 1996) which suggests the electoral 
margin has a negative effect on the distribution of transfers. My analysis is partially consistent 
with Cox and McCubbins’ argument in that a risk-averse incumbent has the tendency to deliver 
larger benefits to his/her core supporters group. However, my analysis also indicates that a 
president has incentives to allocate more distributive benefits to his/her rival’s stronghold as an 
insurance measure against an early lame-duck status and political retaliation after retirement. 
Moreover, Cox and McCubbins’ model is insufficient to capture the dynamics of targeted 
spending in Korea where presidents serving a single five-year term have to channel resources 
both to their core supporters for risk-aversion and their political rival’s supporters for risk-
diversification. Instead, these results are more consistent with the previous study of Horiuchi and 
Lee (2008). 
 
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
I have two key empirical findings regarding the effects of elections on distributive 
policies. First, I have found an inverse proportional relationship between the incumbent party’s 
electoral support (and electoral margin) and transfers from the central government to provinces 
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during the pre-democratization period (1976 to 1988). This supports my argument that the main 
target for an incumbent during the pre-democratization era were urban areas and the objective 
was to win second place in opposition strongholds rather than first place in areas where the 
ruling party had high support. Second, I also have discovered a U-shaped curve that supports my 
argument that spending was focused on both the incumbent's own turf and rival areas in the 
democratic period (1988 to 2008).  
What are the implications of the above findings? First, the finding about the effects of 
elections on distributive policies in the pre-democratization period supports the theoretical 
challenges to the bureaucracy dominance thesis. According to the developmentalist thesis, an 
incumbent’s welfare should be “significantly derived from fulfilling his/her concern about 
evening up development across the regions” (Kwon 2005) without any political considerations. 
Yet, the results demonstrate that politicized spending existed in developmental states. 
Second, we have observed that resource allocations focused on urban areas facilitated a 
“crisis of success” in developmental states. The credit for rapid economic growth rested with 
developmental states, but city dwellers, the main beneficiaries of the rapid economic growth, 
became more critical of authoritarian rule and started to side with opposition parties (Kim 2000). 
The developmental state, ironically, lost electoral support from urban areas in spite of 
disproportionate and active material support allocated to these areas by the government.  
Third, the analysis helps us reconcile competing arguments about whether incumbents 
cater to “core voters” or “swing voters” by identifying the various political conditions that 
determine their strategies in the Korean context. My proposal to focus on an incumbent’s 
political goals and how they are shaped the institutional configurations will likely help bridge the 
gap between these two competing arguments. 
Another point that should be noted is that political institutions, such as the SNTV system, 
should not be considered as non-democratic. Although the SNTV system was employed by 
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authoritarian regimes in Korea during the pre-democratization period as a way of securing their 
political power, we cannot say that the SMD system was generally superior to the SNTV system. 
SNTV combined with political culture and the specific political goals of the incumbent in Korea 
to produce the reversed U-shaped curve with regard to the electoral effect on distributive 
patterns. Thus, caution is needed before making hasty generalizations.          
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Table 4-6. Political Allocation during Pre-Democratization Period 
 
DV: Per Capita Total 
Transfers 
(1) (2) 
Total Transfers(t-1) 0.759*** 0.764*** 
 (0.035) (0.035) 
   
Ruling party candidates’ 
vote share 
-0.0211**  
 (0.007)  
 
Electoral margin 
 
 
  
-0.0163* 
(0.008) 
Fiscal Independence Index -0.0172*** -0.0170*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
   
Population Density  0.119* 0.106 
 (0.057) (0.060) 
   
_cons 3.605*** 3.190*** 
 (0.620) (0.617) 
N 164 164 
 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 4-7. Political Allocation during Post-Democratization Period 
 
DV: Per Capita Total 
Transfers 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Total Transfers(t-1) 0.820*** 0.822*** 0.801*** 0.799*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
     
President’s vote share -2.651***  -2.096*** -2.294*** 
 (0.147)  (0.153) (0.157) 
     
President’s vote share(sq.) 2.791***  2.124*** 2.329*** 
 (0.156)  (0.173) (0.167) 
     
Electoral margin  
 
 
Fiscal independence index 
 
 
 
-0.0154*** 
0.473*** 
(0.030) 
 
-0.0144*** 
0.357*** 
(0.032) 
 
-0.0159*** 
0.332*** 
(0.032) 
 
-0.0160*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
     
Youth and elderly ratio -1.126*** -0.810*** -0.906*** -0.700*** 
 (0.170) (0.173) (0.179) (0.192) 
     
Ruling party’s legislator    -0.00146 
    (0.013) 
     
_cons 2.679*** 1.914*** 2.549*** 2.531*** 
 (0.086) (0.074) (0.086) (0.091) 
N 4007 4012 4007 3605 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Chapter  5. Conclusion 
 
This study has explored the effect of democratization on election-oriented economic 
policy in East Asian developmental states in order to better understand when incumbents use 
state resources for electoral gain and whom they target with such resources. Contrary to the 
bureaucracy dominance thesis in developmental state theory, I argued that developmental states 
did politicize macroeconomic and distributive policy. Based on existing studies, I identified two 
sets of research questions. First, I asked a set of questions regarding political budget cycles: 1) 
Can PBCs occur without electoral competition, or with a low level of electoral competition? 2) 
Were the bureaucrats in pre-democratic developmental states autonomous and apolitical as the 
bureaucracy dominance thesis argues? 3) Are PBCs in these countries a new phenomenon that 
came into being only after democratization? The second set of research questions dealt with 
distributive politics: 1) What are the main political goals and strategies of the incumbent in each 
period? 2) To achieve these goals, which group was the more effective target for transferring 
economic resources? 3) Do opposition backers, a group that has rarely been examined in studies 
of distributive politics, play any role in regards to targeted spending?  
I have chosen South Korea for an in-depth case study for several reasons. First, South 
Korea can provide a useful environment for analyzing the effects of democratization on PBCs. 
Korea presents a hard case for detecting political manipulation of the macro-economy. It also 
possesses the necessary conditions for PBCs, which include presidential systems and fixed 
timing for elections. South Korea’s democratic opening in 1987 and its subsequent consolidation 
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have produced new incentive and constraint structures for PBCs. The second reason I used South 
Korea as my case study is that it represents an interesting case to study targeted spending, given 
its regional patterns of voting and the variation it has experienced in terms of electoral rules. 
South Korea’s pattern of bloc voting based on strong regionalism makes it easier to identify 
which group should be targeted from the perspective of incumbents. In addition, The N=2 Single 
Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) system introduced during the pre-democratization period and the 
Single Member District (SMD) system adopted during the post-democratization period in Korea 
enable me to study the effect of institutional changes on targeted spending.  
 
I. SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS 
 
Chapter 2 provided historical background on PBCs and target spending in South Korea, 
focusing on the incentive and constraint structures facing election-oriented macroeconomic 
policy. It showed that authoritarian leaders in Korea had incentives to manipulate macro-
economic conditions before elections to increase the ruling party’s urban representation. Park 
Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan attempted to target spending to urban areas under the N=2 
SNTV system during National Assembly elections in order to get more seats in urban areas. 
Given their predominant position in the legislative-executive relations, Park and Chun faced 
almost no constraints in attempting to manipulate macroeconomic conditions for political gain. 
After democratization, the incentive structure for PBCs and targeted spending became more 
favorable due to the extremely competitive elections and frequent presence of divided 
government. The chapter also shows that a five-year single term president of Korea would have 
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incentives to target both his/her core support groups for risk-avoidance and backers of his/her 
opposition for risk-diversification. At the same time, however, the structural constraints on the 
president’s ability to manipulate macroeconomic conditions for political objectives increased. 
The relatively stronger organizational capacity gained by the National Assembly to conduct 
budget reviews significantly reduced the degree and scale of the president’s discretion.  
Thus, Chapter 2 concluded that the incentive for PBCs and targeted spending under 
authoritarian rule in Korea were smaller than that under democracy, but that the constraints on 
PBC and targeted spending were also smaller under authoritarian rule than under democracy. I 
expect that the increased constraints (checks and balances) offset the increased incentive 
(electoral competition) after democratization.  
Chapter 3 presented empirical analyses of the degree of politicization of macroeconomic 
policy in authoritarian South Korea and the effects of democratization on PBCs in this country. 
This chapter provided two key empirical findings regarding the effects of elections on fiscal 
policy. First, I found quite strong evidence of expansionary fiscal policy before elections and 
contractionary fiscal policy after elections even under authoritarian rule. Second, South Korea’s 
democratization did not affect the degree of PBCs in statistical terms. This suggests that there is 
no significant difference between the manipulation of economy before elections during the non-
democratic periods (1970-1987) and during the democratic periods (1988-2000). These empirical 
findings support the expectation outlined in Chapter 2 that the increased constraints offset the 
increased incentive after democratization.  
Chapter 4 explored how distributive policies changed in Korea due to democratization. In 
this chapter I presented two key empirical findings. First, the chapter found an inverse 
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proportional relationship between an incumbent party’s electoral support (and electoral margin) 
and transfers made from the central government to provinces during the pre-democratization 
period (1976 to 1988). This finding supports the argument that the main target for an incumbent 
during the pre-democratization era were urban areas and the objective was to win second place 
under the N=2 SNTV in opposition strongholds (urban areas) rather than first place in areas 
where the ruling party had high support. The finding also supports my claim that the political 
goal of presidents during this period was to increase urban representation in response to electoral 
pressures stemming from increasing urbanization, escalating mass protests in urban areas, and 
the authoritarian leaders’ obsession with modernity. 
Second, Chapter 4 also discovered a U-shaped relationship between an incumbent party’s 
electoral support and transfers made from the central government to municipalities during the 
post-democratization period (1988 to 2009). This finding supports my claim that both the 
incumbent’s own turf and rival regions received more benefits than did swing voter regions. The 
logic behind the argument is as follows. Because the president in South Korea is limited to a 
single five-year term, a Korean president has three main goals: 1) retaining influence throughout 
his/her term in order to preempt early lame-duck status; 2) obtaining a graceful retirement that 
prevents political retaliation after s/he leaves office; and 3) ensuring the smooth operation of 
government by obtaining cooperation from rivals during his/her term. To achieve these goals, the 
president’s first target for spending are his/her core supporters who are crucial to ensuring that 
the president continues to have influence throughout his/her term and who can defend him/her 
from any potential political problems after retirement. The president, at the same time, should 
take care of opposition backers. The president targets them in order to try to get them to 
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cooperate during his/her term and to persuade them not to try to seek political retribution after 
his/her retirement. Table 5-1 summarizes the key findings of this study.  
 
Table 5-1. Summary of the Key Findings 
 
(1) PBCs 
 
Hypothesis Variable Estimation Explanation 
Existence of PBC Election Timing  (+) PBC occurred. 
 
Democratization 
Effect on PBC  
 
 
Election Timing  
* 
Democratization  
(+)  (+) 
 
Increased constraints offset 
increased incentives. 
Methodology Time Series Regression (ARIMA) 
 
(2) Targeted Spending 
  
Period Hypothesis Variable Estimation Explanation 
Non-
democracy 
Swing 
Voters 
Electoral Margin (-) Swing voters 
with low support 
> Core 
supporters 
Support for Ruling 
Party 
(-) 
Democracy 
Core & 
Opposition 
Backers 
Support for Ruling 
Party (squared term) 
(+) Core supporters 
& opposition 
backers > swing 
voters 
Electoral Margin (-) 
Methodology Dynamic Panel Data Analysis (System GMM) 
 
 
II. IMPLICATIONS  
 
This study proposes alternative approaches to PBCs and distributive politics, focusing on 
the effect of democratization and its subsequent institutional changes on election-oriented 
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economic policy. First, I found quite strong evidence of PBCs even under authoritarian rule in an 
East Asian developmental state that has been regarded as a hard case for detecting the effect of 
electoral politics on economic policy. The study also found that the degree of economic 
manipulation during the pre-democratization period may be as high as during the post-
democratization period. The findings challenge the conventional wisdom that PBCs require 
significant electoral competition, which came into being only after democratization. This study 
instead suggests that PBCs hinge not only on incentives (electoral competition) but also on 
constraints (checks and balances). Assuming that the magnitude of the difference between the 
incentives and the constraints determines the likelihood of PBC regardless of the nature of 
regime, we can postulate that the increased constraints on PBCs after democratization 
counterbalance the increased incentives for PBCs in new democracies. The failure to take into 
account the different incentive and constraint structures for PBCs helps to explain why studies of 
PBCs in developed democracies have generated mixed results while they have generated 
consistent results in developing or non-democratic countries. In other words, PBCs appear 
inconsistently in developed democracies because they are equipped with checks and balances 
preventing political manipulation of economy. In developing or non-democratic countries, which 
typically do not have as many checks and balances, PBCs appear more consistently.  
Second, this study emphasized the importance of institutional arrangements that shape an 
incumbent’s political preferences in calculating the tactical allocation of resources. Although the 
existing “core support” and “swing voter” models are solidly grounded, the competing two 
models do not fully illuminate the strategic dilemma incumbent parties face. When the parties try 
to expand their electoral base by attempting to win the support of groups outside the core, they 
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face the risk of losing their core supporters’ loyalty in the long term. If they focus on attending to 
the core supporters, the parties may risk losing elections in the short term. To solve this strategic 
dilemma, this study explored the institutional influences on incumbent’s targeted spending 
decisions. Contrary to the assumption of the earlier studies on targeted spending, partisan loyalty 
is not totally exogenous. This means that the degree and elasticity of core supporters’ loyalty 
may vary depending on the level of electoral volatility or competitiveness under different 
electoral institutions. Since there has been little effort to investigate how these two competing 
theories may be conditional on different institutional arrangements and political objectives of the 
incumbents under the institution, this institutionalist approach may help break the deadlock 
between “core supporter” and “swing voter” models.  
Therefore, in identifying the groups that incumbents target to maximize strategic 
effectiveness, this dissertation paid special attention to the N=2 SNTV system that South Korea 
used under authoritarian rule and the five-year single term presidency that it used under 
democracy. Under authoritarian rule in Korea, the N=2 SNTV transformed the rival’s turf 
(Region L, urban area) into a swing voter region with narrow electoral margins. There was often 
only a small vote margin between the ruling party and the independent (or the third party) 
candidate in the competition for the seat awarded to the second place finisher. Under the N=2 
SNTV, rural areas remained strongholds of the ruling party which typically carried them by wide 
electoral margins. This wide electoral margin meant that the ruling party would gain little from 
concentrating resources in rural areas since they were likely to finish in first place regardless. 
The regime calculated that even if the core support from rural areas might be weakened due to 
the greater economic support allocated to urban areas, the wider electoral margin under the N=2 
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SNTV system would buffer the negative short-term electoral effects, that is, risk of losing seats 
due to supporter groups’ potential defect.  
The five-year single term presidency under democracy also plays a critical role for an 
incumbent president in identifying target groups. The incumbent president and the ruling party’s 
candidate in the next presidential elections both want to channel resources to core supporters but 
for different reasons. The incumbent president adopts a risk-averse “core supporters” strategy to 
protect himself/herself during the latter part of his/her term and after retirement. The presidential 
candidate of the ruling party also focuses on core supporters, but his/her short-term goal is to 
unify the core supporters in order to win the next election. The simple majority rule of 
presidential elections in Korea motivated the ruling party and its presidential candidate to focus 
on unifying their core support group. While the ruling party’s wide electoral margin in its 
stronghold areas did not increase its seats under the N=2 SNTV, the wide electoral margin the 
ruling party racked up in these areas helped ensure its victory in the simple majority presidential 
elections. As the election results indicate, since democratization, it has been nearly impossible 
for the presidential candidate to win without concentrated support from the core group. In 
addition, Korean presidents often adopted a campaign strategy that used regional rivalries to 
unify the core supporters group and gain electoral advantages. 
The president’s and the ruling party’s attitude toward swing voters diverge. For the ruling 
party’s presidential candidate, the logical, short-term decision would be to support swing voters 
in order to win the next election. It is highly likely that swing voters would be more responsive 
to the material benefits than opposition backers who are much less likely to support the ruling 
party.  
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A president under a single-term system or one who is serving his/her second term in a 
system with a two term limit is less likely to be concerned with the short-term electoral 
implications of his policies. A president whose political priority is to secure a graceful retirement 
and to prevent early lame-duck status may choose instead to invest in the opposition. The 
president does this to forestall potential political retaliation from the opposition party once he or 
she steps down. He or she is also motivated to reduce the level of resistance from the opposition 
that may hinder the smooth operation of his/her government during presidency. Moreover, if a 
president uses strong regionalism and rivalry as an election strategy in order to increase the 
ruling party’s vote in its strongholds, s/he may motivate opposition backers to unify and hinder 
government activities.  
We can thus speculate that South Korean presidents targeted opposition backers for 
spending in order to ensure a smooth presidency and/or a graceful retirement. This strategy may 
not be optimal in the short-term from the perspective of the ruling party or the ruling party’s 
candidate since it rarely transforms into political support in the next election. As a result, this 
strategy sometimes causes a conflict between the president and the candidate. Yet, the president 
in Korea has always had control of budget allocation and thus his/her preferences have prevailed. 
Thus, which groups are targeted for election-oriented spending may be conditional upon the 
different institutional arrangements and political objectives of the incumbents. Therefore, the 
approach employed here, which emphasizes institutional analysis, may be helpful in resolving 
this theoretical deadlock between the core and swing voter theories.  
This study also found that the electoral incentives for an incumbent to manipulate the 
economy were present during the pre-democratization period in developmental states. PBCs and 
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targeted spending occurred in Korea before and after democratization, and democratization did 
not affect the degree of PBCs in statistical terms. According to the developmentalist thesis, an 
incumbent’s welfare should be “significantly derived from fulfilling his/her concern about 
evening up development across the regions” (Kwon 2005) without any political considerations. 
On the contrary, the results demonstrate that politicized spending existed in developmental 
states. Simply put, developmental states were more politicized than what the bureaucracy 
dominance thesis suggests. Among the two approaches that criticized bureaucracy dominance 
thesis in developmental state, this study supports the approach that denies the existence of 
bureaucracy dominance itself (Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993). Contrary to mainstream 
developmental state theory (Johnson 1982; 1987, Evans 1989, Wade 1989), this study shows that 
bureaucrats in developmental state were politicized in terms of macroeconomic and distributive 
policy even before democratization and globalization. It was not simply the case that 
democratization and globalization reduced the degree of bureaucratic dominance. In this respect, 
these findings run directly counter to the developmental states thesis, at least, in the realm of 
fiscal and distributive politics. As Kang argues by citing numerous corruption cases in Korea, 
politics propel incumbent’s policy choice even at the height of Park Chung Hee’s rule and 
bureaucrats were not independent of political interference in setting economic and distributive 
policies. This study supports the argument that the politicization of bureaucrats was concealed or 
was dismissed out of hand because economic growth was so spectacular (Kang 2002). However, 
Kang also argues that democracy increased the impact of money politics after 1987. In other 
words, the already-politicized bureaucracy was aggravated due to democratization. This 
argument is partly comparable to the “decline of developmental states” thesis that suggests that 
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the bureaucracy was neutral and depoliticized during the pre-democratization period but 
politicized after democratization. However, my empirical analysis showed that democratization 
did not affect the degree of PBCs in statistical terms and I argued that the increased constraints 
(checks and balances) offset the increased incentives (electoral competition) after 
democratization. This study thus provides backing for Ramseyer and Rosenbluth (1993) and 
McCubbins and Noble (1995) who criticize Johnson’s bureaucracy dominance thesis regardless 
of the time period of analysis. 
There remain some theoretical issues to be clarified in the study. How can we apply the 
findings of this study to other cases? For example, it should be noted that political institutions, 
such as the SNTV system, should not be considered as non-democratic. Although the SNTV 
system was employed by authoritarian regimes in Korea during the pre-democratization period 
as a way of securing their political power, we cannot say that the SMD system was generally 
superior to the SNTV system. SNTV combined with the political culture of Korea and the 
specific political goals of the incumbent to produce the reversed U-shaped curve with regard to 
distributive patterns. Thus, caution is needed before making hasty generalizations. 
Other limitations of my study include that I did not develop a hypothesis about the effects 
of legislative elections on distributive politics. Since previous research as well as my study here 
reports that the impact of legislative elections on targeted spending is marginal compared with 
that of presidential elections in Korea, this study focused on presidential elections after 
democratization. Nevertheless, given the increasing role of the National Assembly regarding 
budget review and fiscal control, further studies are needed on this topic.     
202 
 
Appendix  
I. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2 
1. Ranking of Indices for Legislative Budget Institutions 
Kim Wehner Kim Wehner Kim Wehner Kim Wehner Kim Wehner Kim Wehner Kim Wehner
United States 10.0 15.5 10.0 8.2 7.7 7.9 8.0 3.0 10.0 10.3 10.0 12.0 92.8 (1) 94.8 (1)
Sweden 10.0 15.5 10.0 8.2 6.7 6.8 4.0 1.5 10.0 10.3 1.3 1.6 70.1 (2) 73.2 (2)
Denmark 10.0 15.5 5.0 4.1 10.0 10.2 4.0 1.5 5.0 5.2 3.8 4.6 63.0 (3) 68.4 (3)
Norway 10.0 15.5 10.0 8.2 3.3 3.4 4.0 1.5 10.0 10.3 0.0 0.0 62.2 (4) 64.8 (4)
Belgium 10.0 15.5 5.0 4.1 3.3 3.4 2.0 0.8 10.0 10.3 2.5 3.0 54.7 (7) 61.7 (5)
Mexico 2.5 3.9 10.0 8.2 3.3 3.4 4.0 1.5 10.0 10.3 7.5 9.0 62.2 (4) 60.5 (6)
Netherlands 10.0 15.5 7.5 6.2 3.3 3.4 4.0 1.5 2.5 2.6 5.0 6.0 53.8 (8) 58.5 (7)
Bulgaria 10.0 15.5 5.0 4.1 3.3 3.4 2.0 0.8 10.0 10.3 0.0 0.0 50.5 (14) 56.7 (8)
Switzerland 10.0 15.5 10.0 8.2 3.3 3.4 4.0 1.5 5.0 5.2 0.0 0.0 53.8 (8) 56.2 (9)
Brazil 7.5 11.6 10.0 8.2 3.3 3.4 6.0 2.3 7.5 7.7 0.0 0.0 57.2 (6) 55.3 (10)
Iceland 10.0 15.5 5.0 4.1 6.7 6.8 4.0 1.5 5.0 5.2 0.0 0.0 51.2 (12) 55.2 (11)
Indonesia 10.0 15.5 5.0 4.1 6.7 6.8 4.0 1.5 5.0 5.2 0.0 0.0 51.2 (12) 55.2 (12)
Luxembourg 10.0 15.5 10.0 8.2 2.2 2.2 4.0 1.5 5.0 5.2 0.0 0.0 52.0 (11) 54.4 (13)
Korea 2.5 3.9 5.0 4.1 0.0 0.0 4.0 1.5 10.0 10.3 10.0 12.0 52.5 (10) 53.0 (14)
Austria 10.0 15.5 5.0 4.1 2.2 2.2 2.0 0.8 7.5 7.7 0.0 0.0 44.5 (19) 50.6 (15)
Venezuela 7.5 11.6 5.0 4.1 6.7 6.8 6.0 2.3 5.0 5.2 0.0 0.0 50.3 (15) 50.0 (16)
Germany 10.0 15.5 5.0 4.1 3.3 3.4 4.0 1.5 5.0 5.2 0.0 0.0 45.5 (17) 49.4 (17)
Finland 10.0 15.5 2.5 2.1 4.4 4.5 4.0 1.5 5.0 5.2 0.0 0.0 43.2 (24) 47.8 (18)
Uganda 2.5 3.9 2.5 2.1 5.5 5.6 2.0 0.8 10.0 10.3 5.0 6.0 45.8 (16) 47.7 (19)
Cambodia 7.5 11.6 5.0 4.1 6.7 6.8 2.0 0.8 5.0 5.2 0.0 0.0 43.7 (22) 47.5 (20)
Italy 10.0 15.5 5.0 4.1 2.2 2.2 4.0 1.5 5.0 5.2 0.0 0.0 43.7 (23) 47.5 (20)
Czech Rep. 7.5 11.6 5.0 4.1 0.0 0.0 4.0 1.5 10.0 10.3 0.0 0.0 44.2 (20) 45.9 (22)
Latv ia 5.0 7.7 5.0 4.1 3.3 3.4 4.0 1.5 10.0 10.3 0.0 0.0 45.5 (17) 45.1 (23)
Turkey 7.5 11.6 7.5 6.2 0.0 0.0 4.0 1.5 7.5 7.7 0.0 0.0 44.2 (20) 45.0 (24)
Hungary 7.5 11.6 2.5 2.1 1.1 1.1 4.0 1.5 10.0 10.3 0.0 0.0 41.8 (25) 44.4 (25)
Portugal 10.0 15.5 5.0 4.1 0.0 0.0 4.0 1.5 5.0 5.2 0.0 0.0 40.0 (28) 43.8 (26)
Romania 7.5 11.6 5.0 4.1 3.3 3.4 4.0 1.5 5.0 5.2 0.0 0.0 41.3 (26) 42.9 (27)
Phillippines 7.5 11.6 5.0 4.1 4.4 4.5 0.0 0.0 5.0 5.2 0.0 0.0 36.5 (38) 42.3 (28)
Greeece 7.5 11.6 5.0 4.1 3.3 3.4 2.0 0.8 5.0 5.2 0.0 0.0 38.0 (30) 41.7 (29)
Serv ia 7.5 11.6 5.0 4.1 3.3 3.4 2.0 0.8 5.0 5.2 0.0 0.0 38.0 (31) 41.7 (29)
Budget Institution Index
(Rank)Country
Financial Authority Organizational capacity
Amendment Reversion Flex ibility Time Committee Research
 
(continued on the next page) 
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1. Ranking of Indices for Legislative Budget Institutions (cont.) 
Poland 7.5 11.6 0.0 0.0 1.1 1.1 4.0 1.5 10.0 10.3 0.0 0.0 37.7 (34) 40.9 (31)
Slovenia 7.5 11.6 5.0 4.1 0.0 0.0 4.0 1.5 5.0 5.2 1.3 1.6 38.0 (30) 39.9 (32)
Canada 2.5 3.9 2.5 2.1 3.3 3.4 2.0 0.8 10.0 10.3 2.5 3.0 38.0 (31) 38.9 (33)
Spain 7.5 11.6 5.0 4.1 3.3 3.4 4.0 1.5 2.5 2.6 0.0 0.0 37.2 (36) 38.6 (34)
Urguay 2.5 3.9 5.0 4.1 3.3 3.4 4.0 1.5 10.0 10.3 0.0 0.0 41.3 (26) 38.6 (34)
Fiji 10.0 15.5 5.0 4.1 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.8 2.5 2.6 0.0 0.0 32.5 (45) 38.2 (36)
Slovakia 10.0 15.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 1.5 5.0 5.2 0.0 0.0 31.7 (47) 36.9 (37)
Argentine 2.5 3.9 5.0 4.1 6.7 6.8 4.0 1.5 5.0 5.2 0.0 0.0 38.7 (29) 35.8 (38)
Kenya 2.5 3.9 7.5 6.2 2.2 2.2 2.0 0.8 5.0 5.2 2.5 3.0 36.2 (39) 35.3 (39)
Hong Kong 5.0 7.7 7.5 6.2 1.1 1.1 2.0 0.8 5.0 5.2 0.0 0.0 34.3 (42) 34.9 (40)
Israel 0.0 0.0 5.0 4.1 5.5 5.6 2.0 0.8 10.0 10.3 0.0 0.0 37.5 (35) 34.7 (41)
Albania 2.5 3.9 5.0 4.1 6.7 6.8 2.0 0.8 5.0 5.2 0.0 0.0 35.3 (40) 34.6 (42)
Swaziland 2.5 3.9 5.0 4.1 6.7 6.8 2.0 0.8 5.0 5.2 0.0 0.0 35.3 (41) 34.6 (42)
Morocco 2.5 3.9 0.0 0.0 2.2 2.2 2.0 0.8 10.0 10.3 2.5 3.0 32.0 (46) 33.7 (44)
Russia 5.0 7.7 5.0 4.1 1.1 1.1 4.0 1.5 5.0 5.2 0.0 0.0 33.5 (43) 32.7 (45)
Peru 7.5 11.6 0.0 0.0 1.1 1.1 4.0 1.5 5.0 5.2 0.0 0.0 29.3 (49) 32.3 (46)
Tadzhikstan 0.0 0.0 5.0 4.1 3.3 3.4 4.0 1.5 10.0 10.3 0.0 0.0 37.2 (36) 32.2 (47)
Panama 2.5 3.9 5.0 4.1 3.3 3.4 4.0 1.5 5.0 5.2 0.0 0.0 33.0 (44) 30.0 (48)
Japan 2.5 3.9 2.5 2.1 5.5 5.6 2.0 0.8 5.0 5.2 0.0 0.0 29.2 (50) 29.1 (49)
South Africa 0.0 0.0 5.0 4.1 6.7 6.8 2.0 0.8 5.0 5.2 0.0 0.0 31.2 (48) 28.1 (50)
Taiwan 2.5 3.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 1.5 10.0 10.3 0.0 0.0 27.5 (51) 26.2 (51)
United Kingdom 2.5 3.9 5.0 4.1 1.1 1.1 0.0 0.0 2.5 2.6 2.5 3.0 22.7 (57) 24.5 (52)
Ghana 2.5 3.9 7.5 6.2 1.1 1.1 2.0 0.8 2.5 2.6 0.0 0.0 26.0 (53) 24.2 (53)
Ireland 0.0 0.0 5.0 4.1 6.7 6.8 2.0 0.8 2.5 2.6 0.0 0.0 27.0 (52) 23.8 (54)
Malawi 0.0 0.0 5.0 4.1 3.3 3.4 2.0 0.8 5.0 5.2 0.0 0.0 25.5 (54) 22.3 (55)
New Zealand 2.5 3.9 3.3 2.7 3.3 3.4 2.0 0.8 2.5 2.6 0.0 0.0 22.7 (57) 22.1 (56)
France 2.5 3.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 1.5 7.5 7.7 0.0 0.0 23.3 (56) 21.9 (57)
Australia 2.5 3.9 2.5 2.1 3.3 3.4 2.0 0.8 2.5 2.6 0.0 0.0 21.3 (59) 21.0 (58)
Thailand 0.0 0.0 5.0 4.1 1.1 1.1 4.0 1.5 5.0 5.2 0.0 0.0 25.2 (55) 19.8 (59)
Chile 2.5 3.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 1.5 5.0 5.2 0.0 0.0 19.2 (60) 17.6 (60)
Source: Wehner 2006, Chunsoon Kim 2015 
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2. Revenue and Expenditure changes in elections held dur ing economic recession 
per iod 
Pre-democratization period 
 
 
As shown in the above figure, there is no clear change indicating PBC. There is no fluctuation in 
both revenue and expenditure before and after the election. .  
 
 
The rate of increase in the revenue, which reached up to 31.1% during the Election Q-2, 
decreased to the mid-20% during the Election Q-1 and Election Q. Except for that, there is no 
noticeable cycle observed. There is no significant change in the expenditure before and after the 
election.  
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There is a change in the revenue that may indicate a sign of PBC. The rate of increase in the 
revenue, which reached around 20% during the Election Q-3, decreased dramatically to 6.6% 
during the Election Q-2 and 1.7% during the Q-1. During the Election Q+2, the rate of increase 
in the revenue more than doubled, exceeding a little over 15%. There is also a hint of change in 
the expenditure that points toward PBC. The rate of increase in the expenditure, which was only 
5.1% in the Election Q-2, almost tripled in the Election Q-1, reaching up to 15%. Right after the 
election, the rate of increase in the expenditure dropped to 5% and remained in that range.  
 
 
 
Post-democratization period 
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The rate of increase in the revenue was dramatically increased in the Election Q, but that trend 
was immediately stabilized. Therefore, this trend does not seem to signify a change due to PBC. 
The rate of increase in the expenditure continued to decrease up until the Election Q and bounced 
back up to 40% in the Election Q; however, the rate fell to around 10% after the election. This 
may indicate a weak sign of PBC.  
 
 
 
The rate of increase in the revenue continued to decrease from 34.6% during the Election Q-3 
to10% during the Election Q. However, the rate of increase in the revenue after the election did 
not increase. In the case of expenditure, the rate of increase took an opposite turn from the 
conventional PBC. The expenditure decreased before the election, but was on an upward trend 
after the election.  
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The rate of increase in the revenue decreased from 32.8% in the Election Q-3 and 58.1% in the 
Election Q-2 to 13.2% in the Election Q-1, and then further down to 8.7% during the Election Q. 
This rate increased to around 20% after the election, however. This may indicate a weak sign of 
PBC. In the case of the rate of increase in the expenditure, it decreased during the pre-election 
period, thereby taking an opposite turn from the conventional PBC. It continued to display a 
similar pattern of behavior even after the election.  
 
 
There is no significant change that indicates PBC. The rate of increase in the expenditure takes 
an opposite turn from the conventional PBC.  
 
 
 
 
The rate of increase in the revenue takes a turn that is aligned with the conventional PBC, while 
that in the expenditure takes an opposite turn. Before the election, the rate of increase in the 
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revenue increased and then decreased after the election. However, the rate of increase in the 
expenditure, which was relatively low before the election, was increased after the election.  
 
 
 
There is no particular sign of PBC in the revenue. The rate of increase in the expenditure, 
however, increased more than tenfold from 3.4% during the Election Q-2 to 44.2% in the 
Election Q-1. As the election quarters passed by, the rate of increase in the expenditure was on a 
downward trend, dropping below 10%, even as low as -10%. This indicates a strong sign of 
conventional PBC in the expenditure.  
 
 
 
 
There is no sign of PBC observed in both revenue and expenditure.  
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II. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3 
 
1. Calculation of Fiscal Impulse 
 
Estimation of Potential GDP 
The first step to calculate Fiscal Impulse is to estimate Potential GDP. Among various 
methods to estimate potential GDP, I adopt the Hodrick-Prescott filter widely used in 
macroeconomics due to its simplicity especially in a real business cycle theory to separate the 
cyclical component of a time series from raw data. The well-known criticism to the HP filter is 
that it tends to lead spurious results due to the ad-hoc character of the filter. It should be noted 
that the HP filter is considered to be more appropriate for the estimation of past cycles rather 
than prediction of business cycles in future. This is because I employ the HP filter for estimation 
of potential GDP in the past. The GDP gap derived from potential GDP is presented with the 
recession periods of Business Cycles, published by the Bureau of Statistics Korea in Figure 4.4. 
It seems that the GDP gap value and the recession period cord relatively well together.  
 
Calculation of F iscal Impulse 
The measurement starts by establishing a base period in which actual and potential GDP 
are judged to be the same. Following Heller et al.(1986), I selected a base period where potential 
output was close to the actual output. In this calculation, the base period is the second quarter of 
1992. Government expenditure is termed cyclically neutral if it increases proportionately with 
increases in nominal potential output.  
 
Equation (1) shows the decomposition of the actual budget balance B=(T-G): 
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B = (t0Yp – g0Yp) – [t0 (Yp –Y)]  – FIS      (1) 
 
Where 
 
t0 = To/Yo, the revenue ratio in the base period 
g0 = G0/Y0, a base-period expenditure ratio 
Y = actual output in nominal prices 
Yp = potential output in nominal prices 
T = government revenues 
G = government expenditures 
 
and FIS is a measure of the fiscal stance.  
 
Equation (1) can be rewritten as 
B = (t0Y – g0 Yp) – FIS = Bn – FIS 
 
Taking the first difference of the fiscal stance measure, one obtains an absolute measure 
of the fiscal impulse, FI 
 
FI =   ∆FIS  =  (∆G – g0∆ Yp) – (∆T – t0∆Y) 
  =  -∆B – g0∆ Yp +  t0∆Y 
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Figure 4.7 GDP Gap and Business Cycles 
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2.ARIMA Procedure (Box-Jenkins Approach) 
In general, the Box-Jenkins approach is most widely used in selecting an 
appropriate ARIMA model for the purpose of estimating and forecasting a univariate 
time series. This approach is comprised of three stages: (a) identification, (b) estimation, 
and (c) diagnostic checking. Based on this procedure, I illustrate the procedure with the 
Fiscal Impulse used as dependent variable in this chapter.  
 
Identification 
An investigation of graph and a comparison of the sample ACF and PACF to 
those of various theoretical ARIMA process may suggest several plausible model.  
 
(1) Graph 
The below line graph seems to be stationary as showing no significant patterns in 
the graph: white noise.  
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0
5
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(2) Unit Root Test  
To confirm the estimation from the above, I will test the time series data for 
stationary (unit root problem) using Augmented Dickey-Fuller test. Our null hypothesis 
(H0) in the test is that the time series data has a unit root (non-stationary) while 
alternative hypothesis (Ha) that the series is stationary. The ADF statistics is -18.53 
which is much smaller than critical values (-3.503, -2.889, and -2.579 at each 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level respectively) in case the number of observation is 122. (See below Table) 
Thus we can reject the null hypothesis and hence can conclude that the alternative 
hypothesis is true, i.e. the time series has no unit root (stationary).      
 
Table. Dickey-Fuller Test for Unit Root  
 
ADF 
statistics 
1% Critical 
value 
5% Critical 
value 
10% Critical 
value 
No. of 
observation 
-18.533 -3.503 -2.889 -2.579 122 
 
(3) Correlogram  
To seek suitable values of p in AR and q in MA in our model, we need to examine 
the correlogram and partial correlogram of the time series. As shown the below figure, 
there are one and two (or three spikes) in ACF and PACF (The lag 3 of PCAF is located 
around the significant limit). Since the ACF is tailing off to zero from lag 2 and the 
PCAF is tailing off to zero from lags 3 or 4, we can infer that the best candidate ARMA 
models for the time series are ARMA(2, 1) or (3,1). However, the ARMA lags cannot be 
selected solely by looking at the ACF and PACF. In the next step, we will decide which 
would be more suitable for the time series, using BIC values. 
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Estimation  
To identify the best lags, we need to fit several models with different lag choices. 
To select the best suitable model for the series, we will choose the one with the lowest 
BIC (Baysian Information Crieterion) values among the below nine models. In the below 
output BIC matrix, the rows correspond to the AR degree (p) and the columns correspond 
to the MA degree (q).  
 
 MA (q) 
AR (p) 
514.4458 514.3529 527.1042 
514.2113 555.9783 558.9801 
514.3784 558.9979 557.9268 
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 The smallest BIC value among the above modes is 514.2113 in the (2, 1) position. 
I confirm that it corresponds to an ARMA (2, 1) model.  
 
Diagnostic Checking 
Q- statistics and correlogram show that there is no significant pattern left in the 
ACFs and PACFs of the residuals, it means the residuals of the selected model are white 
noise.  
 
 
With the above three steps, I selected ARMA(2,1) model for Fiscal Impulse. I 
used Stata 12 and Eviews 6 for the above procedure.  
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